

By Mr. PERKINS: Petition of many citizens of New York State against atrocities of the Russian Government toward its own people—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RHINOCK: Petition of W. J. Arnold and other citizens of Kentucky, for a national highways commission and Federal aid in construction of highways (H. R. 15837)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, of Cincinnati, Ohio, against prohibition legislation for the District of Columbia—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. RYAN: Petitions of Polish Roman Catholic Union of America; Polish Union of America; Polish Patriotic Ladies' Society Manda, 1,150 members; Polish Falcon, No. 6; Central Association of Woodmen of the World, 8 lodges, 1,400 members; Polish Organizations of Black Rock; St. Barbaras Parish, of West Seneca, N. Y.; the Poles of Buffalo in mass meeting assembled, and Kosciuszko Camp, No. 92, Woodmen of the World, against the Polish expropriation act of the Prussian Diet—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SABATH: Petition of Lake Seaman's Union, against H. R. 225, amending section 4463 of Revised Statutes—to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Also, petition of the Association for Protection of the Adirondacks, favoring H. R. 10457 (for forest reservations in White Mountains and Southern Appalachian Mountains)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. TIRRELL: Petition of A. A. Johnson, praying for the creation of a national highways commission (H. R. 15837)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania: Petitions of R. H. Jutt and 21 others, residents of Potter County; H. O. Rice and 16 others, residents of Tioga County; H. S. Burt and 32 others, residents of Potter County; Albert Dunning and 24 others, residents of Tioga County, and A. B. Wheeler and 14 others, residents of Tioga County, all in the State of Pennsylvania, for S. 3152, for additional protection to dairy interests—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of David Wurster and 18 others, residents of Lycoming County, Pa., for a national highways commission and for Federal aid in road construction (H. R. 15837)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. YOUNG: Petition of sundry citizens of Michigan, for amendment of the Sherman antitrust laws—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SATURDAY, April 11, 1908.

[Continuation of the legislative day of Monday, April 6, 1908.]

The recess having expired, the committee, at 11 o'clock and 30 minutes a. m., was called to order by the Chairman, Mr. MANN.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask the condition of the time of both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois has consumed two hours and fifty-four minutes and the gentleman from Tennessee two hours and ten minutes.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, then I ask the gentleman from Tennessee to go ahead.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I now yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GREGG].

Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chairman, the upbuilding of our Navy, like providing all means of national defense, should be, and I believe is, absolutely nonpartisan. There are men on that side of the House and there are men on this side of the House, level-headed, well-balanced men, who do not oppose a navy, but who believe that the naval appropriations should be kept within reasonable limits. [Applause.] They believe that the naval appropriations should not bear any unfair or unjust proportion to the sums of money needed and appropriated to the other branches of the Government. On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, there are gentlemen upon that side and there are gentlemen upon this side who seem to be navy mad. Their thought by day is of much navy, and their dream by night is of more navy. They seem to have no care for the efficient administration of any other branch of the public service. If permitted to have their way, they would cripple the other needs of the Government in order to expend on the Navy more than its just proportion of the nation's revenue.

They would cut short the improvement of our waterways and of our harbors. We are to have no river and harbor bill this

year because we have not sufficient funds, but I hear no suggestion from the Navy enthusiasts to in any way economize on the Navy. On the contrary, they are making an effort to increase the appropriation beyond what the Committee on Naval Affairs after careful consideration has determined upon.

They would postpone the completion of our coast defenses.

The War Department this year recommended \$38,000,000 for the erection of needed fortifications. The Committee on Appropriations, because of the condition of our finances, appropriated only about \$8,000,000. Yet there are men on this floor who want to use twenty millions of that necessary saving in the building of two battle ships more than the number recommended by the Committee on Naval Affairs. They would postpone the erection of public buildings needed by the Government for the proper conduct of its business, and would deny to the underpaid Government employee an increase in salary in order that they may the more rapidly expand the naval establishment. Those of you who have in your districts rivers and harbors which are left unimproved, and who need public buildings which will not be provided for, will be in a pitiable condition before your constituents if you vote all the money to carry out an extravagant naval programme. What will the American people say of the Congress if after raising our own salaries we refuse to raise the salaries of equally as just employees of the Government, where the necessity is just as great, on the ground that we have not the money, when they learn that we waste money on an extravagant naval programme? Those who favor this programme either do not realize that there is a limit to the nation's revenues or they are absolutely indifferent as to other needs of the Government. To such a programme or policy I am unalterably opposed, and would oppose it just as vigorously if recommended by a Democratic Administration as I do when recommended by a Republican Administration. With me it is a question of rational, proper, public policy; it is not a question of partisan politics. [Applause.]

I believe first in providing such coast and harbor defense as will absolutely insure that no hostile force will ever put foot on our shores. With this provided there will, in time of war, be no demand for the Navy to furnish coast protection. Our ships can go out to sea to meet the enemy, and needing none for coast defenses and being able to send our entire fleet where the emergencies demand it, we can do with fewer ships. I believe also in maintaining an army sufficient as a nucleus, and a large, well-trained, equipped, and efficient militia, which in time of trouble can come to the relief of our standing Army while we are mobilizing the volunteers who have always been and who always will be the bulwark of our defense. These are matters of defense, and I believe in providing them before we provide means of aggression and offense. I believe in a reasonable navy, such a navy as will protect us against dangers reasonably to be expected, while we go ahead attending to our own business, doing justice to and expecting nothing but justice of all other nations on the earth. But I do not believe in building a navy for the purpose of encouraging and engendering a jingo and bullying spirit. [Applause.] I believe that a nation, like a man, will sometimes get into trouble while trying to avoid it. I am firmly convinced that a nation, like a man, when seeking trouble will be sure always to find it. [Applause.]

Every State in this Union has a law prohibiting the carrying of arms. This is based on the theory that men who go unarmed will avoid trouble which they might not seek to avoid if they go armed. [Applause.] Now, is it not a little strange that as to individuals we enact laws upon the theory that a man when unarmed will avoid trouble, but contend that the way for a nation to avoid trouble is to go with the biggest armament in the world? [Applause.] Scorning the idea of building a navy for purposes of offense and regarding it only as a means of defense, I believe that our present Navy is in units sufficient, and that we need only to maintain the present number of units. Now, I have some pretty good authority on that proposition. In his message to the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress the President said:

It does not seem to me necessary, however, that the Navy should be, at least in the immediate future, increased beyond the present number of units. What is now clearly necessary is to substitute efficient for inefficient units as the latter become worn out, or as it becomes apparent that they are useless.

Probably the result would be obtained by adding a single battle ship each year.

Again, in his message to the second session of the Fifty-ninth Congress, on December 3, 1906, he said:

I do not ask that we continue to increase our Navy. I ask merely that it be maintained at its present strength, and this can be done if we replace the obsolete and outworn ships by new and good ones, the equal of any afloat in any navy.

He then proceeds to mention some ships in our Navy which he considers obsolete and outworn, and then he adds:

All these ships should be replaced by others, and this can be done by a well-settled programme of providing for the building each year of at least one first-class battle ship, equal in size and speed to any that any nation is at the same time building.

We took his advice and adopted a well-settled programme of providing for the building each year of a first-class battle ship, equal in size and speed to any which any nation was at the same time building, and I believe in that. Whenever we build a battle ship, build it the equal of anything that any other nation is even contemplating putting upon the waters. [Applause.] But, lo, presto change! We had hardly got settled to this well-settled programme until he unsettles himself and seeks to unsettle us and to unsettle our well-settled programme. This year, without any apparent reason for his change of mind, he recommends the building of four battle ships, and if the same ratio of increase continues next year, we will have to be building sixteen, and if reports are true, he is using the power of his Administration to force upon us this new unsettled programme. I say there is no apparent reason for this change of mind or change of policy. If attempted to be justified on the ground that there is danger of conflict with Japan, I answer that the relations between the United States and Japan were much more acute and much more strained on December 3, 1906, when he said that one battle ship was enough, than they were in December, 1907, when he asked for four. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

If attempted to be justified on the ground that the fleet has been sent to the Pacific and there is no fleet upon the Atlantic, I answer that if we have trouble with Japan it will be upon the Pacific and not upon the Atlantic, and we will need our fleet there and will not need it in the East. But it has been recently determined that the fleet shall be returned to the Atlantic. This, to my mind, is proof conclusive that the Administration does not now, if it ever did, anticipate any trouble with Japan.

I went on the Committee on Naval Affairs in the Fifty-ninth Congress. During that Congress naval officers came before us, and, with closed doors and transoms down for fear a passer-by might overhear, we were told of the danger of war with Germany. This year they come to us and they whisper to us that they were mistaken about Germany, but it is Japan sure this time, and I fear that when this error is dispelled by time, like the error about Germany was, there will be some other nation ready to jump on us. I for one am becoming tired of such tactics. They are an insult to the intelligence of the committee. They are a fraud upon Congress and a fraud upon the American people. [Applause on the Democratic side.] All suggestions of danger of war with Japan beget in me an absolute pity for the suggester. I read recently a certain article written from Tokyo on February 20, 1908, by a correspondent of a number of American newspapers, and it states the position so well that I will simply read an extract from the article.

This was written on February 20, 1908, from Japan:

A critical examination of Japan's national resources and present financial status reveals such a sorry condition of affairs that even the suggestion of war with a power like the United States seems to be the height of absurdity. No matter how well Japan may be prepared for war in a military way, in other respects it is not at all prepared. Modern war means spending money, and in order to spend money one must have resources. Japan is poverty stricken and almost bankrupt. Its total wealth is but one-twentieth of that of the United States, although its population is more than half as great.

If every vestige of wealth in Japan could be turned into cash, the whole amount would not be enough to buy the clothing and furniture used by the people of the United States. The entire income of the Japanese Government is not as great as that of the United States Steel Corporation.

Now, those men who advocate the building of more battle ships than the two recommended by the committee forget that there is a limit to the resources even of this rich nation, and they also seem to forget the many other needs of the Navy, not to mention the needs of other Departments of the Government, and the large amounts of money necessary to supply those needs. I will mention a few of these needs of the Navy. We have not the facilities for docking the large vessels of the *Delaware* class that we are now building. This will require many millions of dollars. We need navy-yards and naval stations on the Pacific, in Hawaii, and in our insular possessions. These will require many more millions of dollars.

The conduct of our navy-yards has been upon the most unbusinesslike basis. Each bureau of the Navy has had its own separate power plant, its own separate machine shop, and its own separate establishment of every kind. This has entailed unnecessary expense. The present Assistant Secretary of the Navy, encouraged by bills introduced in Congress and by suggestions from the Committee on Naval Affairs, has undertaken a system of consolidation by which we will consolidate all the

power plants into one, all the different machine shops into one, and all the duplicated establishments into one establishment. This will require many more millions of dollars. But its expenditure will be wise, because the net saving to the Government will justify it. Then, the Gun Factory at Washington needs millions of dollars to so equip it that we can make there the guns and other armament needed for our ships at reasonable cost and within reasonable time. The present annual fixed expenses of the Navy for salaries of officers and of enlisted men and for general administration is \$100,000,000. This is exclusive of any increase. Each battle ship adds increases to this fixed annual expense of about \$1,000,000.

Now, there is another thing I want to call attention to. The Secretary of the Navy told us in his hearings this year that to equip and properly officer the ships that we now have and that we are now building we are 1,846 officers short. We are graduating annually at Annapolis from 180 to 200. Putting it at 200, making no allowances for death or retirement amongst our present officers, it will require nine years to graduate the officers necessary for the ships we now have. What excuse is there or what use is there in building more ships and putting them in reserve without officers, when by the time we have the officers ready for them they will become obsolete and of no practical use to the Government? [Applause.]

Mr. SCOTT. Will the gentleman permit a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREGG. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. In view of the shortage to which the gentleman has called attention, I would like to inquire what is being done now? Are ships tied up at the wharves because they can not be officered?

Mr. GREGG. Yes, sir; they put them in reserve, as they call it. Just lay them up.

Mr. SCOTT. Can the gentleman tell us how many and what ships are in reserve?

Mr. GREGG. I do not know the exact number, but those that they can not officer are placed in reserve, and the programme of these naval enthusiasts is to build more and put them in reserve and let them become obsolete before we have officers to put on them. And that is not all. We have not the men for them. We are short of men for crews and before we can find the men to equip these new ships that they are clamoring for they will have become obsolete.

Our Navy is now, in size, the second in the world—second only to that of England. I believe in maintaining this position, which can be done by a sane, conservative development each year, without any wild risks.

Ours is not only larger than any other navy except England's, but ship for ship and man for man our Navy is superior to that of any other on earth. This superiority added to our superior size gives us an ample margin of superiority. If we are not to be satisfied with maintaining our position of second, then there is only one other thing to do, and that is to enter into a wild scramble to surpass England.

Any other course is useless and extravagant. We are already superior to any nation but England. Now, then, every ship that we add to our Navy in the meantime which does not make us superior to England is useless as far as the other nations are concerned, and of no avail as far as England is concerned. So we are left the alternative of being satisfied to hold our present position, or enter into a wild scramble for superiority with England, and we know that before she will submit to that she will exhaust every resource within her power. We will enter into a wild scramble that will bankrupt both nations, and I trust that the American people, with nothing but pride to base it upon, will never enter upon such a mad, foolish scramble as that. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I reserve what time I have left.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has two minutes remaining.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I now yield one hour to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson], a member of the committee.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, after the eloquent and illuminating speech of the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, there is hardly need for making further reference to the body of the naval appropriation bill. I beg to call attention, however, to the fact that the large amount of money carried by that bill is due chiefly to the cost of administration and maintenance, and that the attack on the line of expenditure is chiefly directed to new construction. I here make the suggestion that those gentlemen who wish to attack that bill on the basis of the large amount of money should make their attack on the first part of the bill. Proportionately, the amount carried for new construction is very small. I realize that with

the high standard in our Navy the cost of maintenance must always be greater than the relative cost abroad. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be possible to make substantial economies in the cost of administration and maintenance, and I hope to have some part, if possible, in making such economies. There is a movement on the part of the Navy Department that gives promise of substantial returns in economy of administration.

But I beg to earnestly call attention to the fact that the new construction is the most vital part of the bill, and of the new construction the battle ships are the most vital items, not only because these realize the greatest economy in construction, in getting full return for every dollar expended, but also because the battle ship is the unit that determines and secures the purpose for which the Navy exists. In spite of superficial statements to the contrary, it is a fact based on human nature that to be prepared to resist attack tends to ward off attack. The American Navy is not only intended, as are all the other navies, to win the victory when war must come, but it is also intended to enable this nation to live in peace and tranquillity, without molestation from the military and aggressive nations of the world. [Applause.] And when any aggressive nation, with its chief of staff, investigates the question whether a war is to be undertaken or not, that nation does not ask about administration; it does not ask about maintenance; it does not ask about auxiliaries; it asks, How many battle ships has the other nation? [Applause.]

It is scarcely necessary to refer seriously to the remarks of gentlemen as to the effect of shortage in personnel upon the advisability of building more ships, after the chairman of the committee has distinctly pointed out that the present bill will carry 6,000 additional men, enough not only to man the four battle ships that are building, but enough to man the remaining four battle ships, if such are provided in this bill. To take the broad statement of the Secretary of the Navy as to the total number of officers and men required to man every ship in the Navy down to the last monitor, gunboat, yacht, and tug, and say because there are not enough that we ought to stop building battle ships is simply ridiculous.

Mr. FOSS. May I interrupt the gentleman a moment? The gentleman does not mean to state that I said that we provide in this bill for enough men to man the four battle ships for which I understand the gentleman proposes to make a motion in the House?

Mr. HOBSON. Not at all. I have said it is enough, with 800 men per ship, to man the four battle ships and practically four more, if we decide to have them built.

Mr. FOSS. I made the statement that we provide 6,000 men to man the ships already authorized; but it does not provide for ships that will be authorized by this bill.

Mr. HOBSON. I understand that perfectly.

Mr. FOSS. I want to make that clear.

Mr. HOBSON. A shortage of personnel does exist in the Navy, and it is due to the fact that we are not scientific in treating the question. Abroad, whenever a battle ship is authorized, the law carries automatically enough men to man the ship. We have neglected to do this in the past.

Mr. GREGG. Will the gentleman permit me to interrupt him?

Mr. HOBSON. I have a two-hours speech and only one hour of time, but am glad to yield, though yesterday my requests for interruption were all refused.

Mr. GREGG. Does the gentleman know that we have not been able to supply the men required even for the number authorized?

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman does not know anything of the kind. [Applause.] Recruiting has never been better in time of peace.

Mr. GREGG. Then the gentleman does not know the facts.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I hope to see this question of personnel treated in a scientific way in the future. Instead of advancing one delinquency, a shortage in men, as a reason for committing another delinquency in a shortage of ships, I hope to see ample provision made for both. At present officers are being added fast enough. The trouble lies in the congestion at the top and the bottom. Reorganization has not kept pace with expansion, and to-day our rear-admirals average less than two years in their grade before retirement, while in foreign services the average is from eight to eleven years. The need for reorganization has become imperative, and I hope to see the necessary legislation, if not at this session, then at the next session. As to the men, if we add 6,000 additional men a year, we shall have as many men as we need before any ship authorized in this bill is in commission.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] does not wish that his very accurate statement, that the Naval Committee has given earnest consideration to the matters involved in this bill, should mislead the Congress. I therefore believe it is incumbent upon me to state that at least two-thirds of the Naval Committee, including the chairman, believe that we ought to authorize four battle ships this year instead of two. They voted to authorize only two simply because they thought we could not get more than two, and feared that recommending more would lessen the chances of getting the two. Their convictions are for four. The recommendation of two was a matter of policy and expediency.

Mr. Chairman, self-preservation is the first law of nature, whether it applies to a plant, to an animal, to a man, or a nation. Provision may be individual or collective. Men in organized communities have provided collectively for self-defense. Collective provision is infinitely preferable to the individual provision, not only because it is far more effective, but also because it relieves individuals from the more or less injurious task of going armed. Arbitration is infinitely preferable to armaments. But, Mr. Chairman, there must always be adequate provision for self-defense of one kind or the other. No form of life on this earth is left to the benevolence of other life for its preservation. It is wrong; it is flying in the face of the Almighty who created us to ask it to be otherwise. Therefore it simply remains, in providing for national defense, to determine whether adequate collective provision is attainable or whether, as a nation, we must depend upon our own national provision.

I submit that it is the fundamental duty of every man who loves his country, and every man who loves his kind, to use every effort in his power to further the cause of providing a system of collective preservation, of creating among the nations an organization analogous to that provided in civilized communities by which differences are settled by law based upon justice. I believe that we have begun a new era, as the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLOMEW] yesterday pointed out. I believe we are already upon the path which is going to end in an international organization, where there will be adequate provision for securing the defense of individual nations, thus permitting individual nations to give up their individual armaments. I am glad to bear testimony to the fact that America has taken the leading part in the work as far as it has gone, and that the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BARTHOLOMEW], though too modest yesterday to mention the fact, himself penned the resolution of St. Louis, and it was the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON] who introduced it, the resolution that brought forth the Second Hague Conference, the purpose of which was primarily to provide for periodical conferences at The Hague, to evolve ultimately into an international congress that would make laws for civilized nations to live under.

I am glad to bear testimony to the fact that it was likewise the American delegation and the gentleman from Missouri who had the chief part in the Inter-Parliamentary Union in laying the plank of the platform before the First Hague Conference that resulted in the establishment of the permanent tribunal of The Hague. I am glad to say that America is in the forefront of the peace movements of the world. But no one can deny the fact, which was stated yesterday by the gentleman from Missouri, that up to this point the provision has not been adequate. There is no police provided for out among the nations to protect us or any other nation. There is no adequate tribunal. The permanent tribunal of The Hague is a diplomatic rather than a judicial tribunal. It has no jurisdiction essentially its own, and even if it had, there is no power to bring offending nations to the bar. In fact, there is no international law which can be properly called law. It has not the force of the common law of England.

There is nothing behind it. Each nation interprets it to suit itself. There is no authorized body to-day to make laws for the world. The furthest progress that has thus far been made is to negotiate arbitration treaties between nations by pairs. The proposition of the American delegates at the last Hague conference to have a general mondial arbitration treaty, elastic and automatic, was rejected by the conference, and to-day the arbitration treaties that have just been negotiated between our country and other countries simply provide for what may be called minor questions. Every treaty now in existence between the great powers of the world specifically reserves and eliminates questions of independence, questions of honor, questions of vital interest, from the provision for arbitration. I ask what provision is going to be made for guaranteeing the honor, independence, and vital interests of our nation? They are eliminated from courts of arbitration. What other provi-

sion will you make for them? If provision is important for minor questions, it must be more important for vital questions. Vital questions being excluded from arbitration can have no other recourse but provision through armaments.

Let us do all we can to expand the area of arbitration. I hope this Congress will vitalize its group of the interparliamentary union by giving it official recognition and by providing funds for its use. I hope there will be provision for permanent representation at The Hague conferences and the Pan-American conferences. But after we have done our utmost let us not expect a century plant to bloom in a day, even in small communities. Trial by battle was in vogue for five hundred years after trial by jury was begun. Bear in mind that even to-day among the other great nations of the world honor is still settled by trial by duel. Bear in mind that even here, in the nation where organization for peace is developed to the highest degree yet attained within this generation, there took place between kindred States the greatest war the world ever witnessed.

My countrymen, do not let us be deceived. The question of self-preservation is too vital to be trifled with. Until long years after an international organization is created we must still rely upon ourselves. Until arbitration has been extended to all questions and has proven itself effective we must look to ourselves for national self-preservation. Upon what instrumentalities must we depend? Either armies or navies. Armies involve men in vast numbers, taking them from their work. Navies involve ships, leaving the men at work. Armies are in the midst of the people; navies are far away on the sea. Armies may tend to undermine the institutions of a country. No navy has ever usurped civil power or overturned a government since the world began. On the contrary, navies have been the cradle of liberty, protecting the citizens of a country in their peaceful pursuits and relieving them from the pursuit of arms.

For these reasons all nations of the earth have chosen naval power as far as conditions permitted. Here in America the conditions for naval power are ideal. By controlling the waters that lead to our shores our nation could realize a perfect security and our citizens could continue in tranquillity to work out their glorious destiny.

In provision for a navy, I submit that there should not only be adequate power to win the war, if it must come, but adequate power to prevent the war, if possible, and this means, my countrymen, that in the waters in question there should be a substantial margin of superiority. When navies seem to be about equal, the aggressive power believes in its own and it will take occasion to put it to a test.

I will give you an illustration. In the time of the war with Spain the two navies were estimated as just about equal. Each thought its navy was superior. War came. I do not hesitate to say that if we had had three or four more battle ships the margin of superiority would have enabled the troubles in the West Indies to be settled by diplomacy. Mark you, when you are determining between two battle ships and four, you are trifling with that small vital margin upon which peace and war will hinge, upon which the value of your whole Navy is at stake. Twenty millions of dollars put into battle ships a few years prior to 1898 and there would have been no war. When the war came our coast-line people were thrown into panic, and we spent \$50,000,000, threw it away upon mosquito fleets of no use. The Spanish war has cost us in one way, directly and indirectly, about \$1,400,000,000. Twenty-five million dollars put into battle ships in advance would have spared it all; and yet the total cost, including pensions, is counted up to the Navy and Army.

Now, let us examine in detail this question and, in a business-like way, establish a scientific basis and reach conclusions that are not matters of opinion, but conclusions that are as unchangeable as the laws of mathematics and the laws of nature.

Take the Atlantic Ocean. Around it are assembled the great maritime powers. Take the powers of Europe. Measuring along the indentations, Great Britain has 2,200 miles of coast line, France has 1,700 miles, Germany has 800 miles, making altogether about 4,700 miles for the three great maritime nations of Europe. Across the ocean America has in the Atlantic Ocean proper 5,400 miles of coast and in the Gulf 4,300 miles. Upon examination you will find that our country is accessible from the water through its entire area east of the Rocky Mountains. Through the St. Lawrence River and Canadian canals over 300 British vessels could pass to the Great Lakes, about which there are 4,700 more miles of coast line.

Up the Mississippi River and its tributaries and the other rivers leading up from the Atlantic there are over 15,000 miles of waterways. Do not scoff at the navigation of even inland rivers in time of war, if the enemy has control of the sea

and has armies. The civil war will answer any such tendency to scoff. Adding Cuba, 7,000 miles of coast line, and Porto Rico, 500, we have over 35,000 miles of American coast line, compared with 4,700 miles for the three great maritime nations of Europe. But that does not end America's responsibility. We have assumed the Monroe doctrine; we propose to maintain it. Along the eastern coast of Mexico there are 1,700 miles and for Central America 1,500 miles, and on the east coast of South America 12,500 miles, making nearly 16,000 miles added by the Monroe doctrine, and making a total of nearly 50,000 miles for this nation to protect, as against 4,700 for the three principal maritime nations of Europe.

The great European centers have been built inland. America's great centers have been built on her waterways. On her Atlantic coast line alone there are 15,800,000 of American citizens living within gunshot of the water, with seventeen billions six hundred millions of property. On the Gulf there are 1,900,000 people and eight hundred millions of property. On the Great Lakes there are 7,000,000 of people and seven billions two hundred millions of property. On the Mississippi River and its navigable tributaries there are eleven and a half millions of people and eight billions six hundred millions of property. We are the most exposed nation on earth—36,000,000 of our people and thirty-seven billions of our property now lying within gunshot of the water, more citizens exposed than there are citizens exposed in all Europe combined, more property exposed than there is property in all the rest of the world combined.

If you have a trust company or valuables, do you not put a guard over them even in the most civilized community, with the best regulated police force? Would you, then, propose to leave all the vast national interests unguarded out in the world where there is no police, no law, no courts? Let us examine further. Coast fortifications are valuable, but they have never prevented a determined commander from running by. We ought to have coast defenses, but even on the plan laid out by the Board of National Defense, where we have expended eighty-four millions, there remains seventy millions yet to be expended—nearly half is unprovided for, and for the half already built we lack by more than 4,000 men enough to man the guns with half crews.

Of the twenty-seven fortified harbors only five have complete provision for fire control and only one-third have complete searchlight provision. We furthermore lack a mobile land force to protect the rear. No fort that ever existed could withstand an attack from the rear with mobile troops. We have no army that could be mobilized to prevent the seizure of these forts from the rear. We have altogether only 19,000 of Regulars; there are only 9,000 in the United States—less than the police of New York City—and they are scattered far and wide. We have 50,000 trained militia. The largest organization we have is the regiment. We have neither brigade nor division organization.

An expedition can leave Europe from any one of the great maritime powers with less than a hundred and fifty thousand men, and in three weeks that expedition can capture Washington City, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York without any possibility of substantial resistance. Furthermore, before we could assemble an army capable of expelling them from one city they could have done what they pleased with all that property and embark practically without loss. The expedition would destroy our shipyards, our navy-yards and arsenals and leave us impotent. We would have to start all over and build a new navy. How long would it take us? Perhaps ten years.

And at how much cost? Untold billions—then we would have to create a stupendous transport service and a great army, turning our citizens from their peaceful pursuits to the profession of arms. Then we would have to go across the ocean, where no base could be found and where a great army would resist any attempt to land. Without a ready army, without bases in Europe, without a merchant marine the United States could be raided without a chance for retaliation. We would win in the end, but at what a cost!

My countrymen, this should not be permitted to continue. As a simple matter of insurance, as a police proposition, America must have a navy capable of controlling the ocean in the Atlantic against any nation of Europe. [Applause.]

Mr. RAINEY. Will the gentleman permit a question? How many battle ships does the gentleman think we ought to have to defend our enormous coast lines?

Mr. HOBSON. I will state that. At the present juncture the British have forty-five battle ships and thirty-three armored cruisers available in the waters of the Atlantic, making seventy-eight. Germany has twenty-one battle ships and six armored cruisers, making twenty-seven in all. France has sixteen battle ships and fifteen armored cruisers, making thirty-one. America has three battle ships and two armored cruisers, making five.

As to the necessity of the future, the British have ten *Dreadnought* ships with their keels laid. She is laying down two more, and there are three Brazilian *Dreadnoughts* in England; the last two South American battle ships which were built were taken over by England—the *Swiftsure* and *Hotspur*. Adding those three Brazilian battle ships with the two she is laying down, she will have five available in addition to the ten now coming on fast. France has six laid down and six more projected, making twelve. Germany has five laid down and has authorized four for this year and four for next year and four for the following year, and so on to about 1917. If we would simply hold our present relative position, we will have to authorize six great battle ships this year and four more each subsequent year until further development.

Mr. RAINEY. How long would it take at this rate before developments occurred that would stop the building of four a year?

Mr. HOBSON. No one can foresee.

Mr. RAINEY. It might go to 200 or 300 battle ships according to the gentleman's position.

Mr. HOBSON. If the other nations built 200 each then we ought to build about 300. Now, please do not interrupt me in order to ask ridiculous questions. I do not yield, Mr. Chairman, for such questions.

Mr. RAINEY. How much will it cost to maintain these battle ships?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama declines to yield.

Mr. RAINEY. I thought he declined to yield to a ridiculous question and I am not asking ridiculous questions. [Applause.]

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, it is puerile for us to assume that we are not in any danger.

Mr. RANDELL of Texas. How long, according to that programme, would it take to bankrupt the world?

Mr. HOBSON. Well, America controls seventeen billions of the world's banking capital, and the rest of the world controls seventeen billions. The other nations have large armies—we have not. It will bankrupt the rest of the world about 2,000 years before it would bankrupt America. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, we have, as I say, laid down the Monroe doctrine. The Monroe doctrine lies 5,000 miles from our shores. Any man in earnest about the doctrine must realize that, to make it safe and secure against aggressions from Europe, we must be able to send a fleet there as large as any European power could send.

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. I am sorry I must decline to yield further.

Mr. Chairman, our form of government is peculiar. Within our borders the citizens of foreign nations have to be subjected to the same treatment as American citizens, and therefore are amenable in police cases to local State authority. No nation of the world has consented to that proposition. It has been challenged many times in the Atlantic, and last year it was challenged in the Pacific, and our Government could not guarantee to California security in exercising its constitutional rights. Now, with the fleet in the Pacific it can not guarantee the States of the Atlantic seaboard. In addition, we are the only nation in the world that stands for the equal rights of men. The great governing classes of other nations base their claims upon heredity. We can not assume for a moment that here, with the oceans now bridged with an infinite number of bridges leading from the armies of the monarchies of Europe, we can live in security unless we can control those bridges. The only rational basis for an enduring peace is for America to have control of the sea in the Atlantic. Four battle ships this year would not be sufficient for this.

They would not even maintain our present position relatively to Germany and France. Unless we quicken our pace we shall fall to fourth place.

But another ocean has come upon us. It is unseemly for preachers to send a memorial here to this Congress quoting the President two years ago and failing to quote him to-day, for them to assume that there are no more naval responsibilities to-day than there were two years ago. The fact that the President recommended only one ship two years ago shows that he is anxious to recommend the minimum. This year he has recommended four. Why? Another ocean has been added since two years ago. The Aleutian Islands and Alaska put 5,100 miles of coast line upon us, the Pacific coast 3,100 miles, the Hawaiian Islands 780, Samoa 85, Guam 80, the Philippine Islands 13,600, making 27,000 and odd miles. South America adds nearly 17,000 more, making in all nearly 40,000 miles for America. Japan has 13,000 miles. Japan's coast line is cen-

tered all there at home. Ours is scattered over the whole face of the ocean. If our fortifications are imperfect in the Atlantic, they are far more imperfect in the Pacific.

If the nations of Europe have armies that have bridged that ocean and are ready to come upon us when the time arrives, the nations of Asia have done likewise. Japan has 420,000 men under arms. There is not a hostile army within 500 miles. No nation ever carried that many men under arms long. Japan has a million tons of merchant marine. She can put between 150,000 and 200,000 men aboard ship in three days. She has 110,000 citizens in the Hawaiian Islands; America, 7,000. Japan has 100,000 Japanese in continental America, counting 80,000 trained soldiers. Ten thousand soldiers on the Pacific slope are organized into compact clubs. Within a section of only four squares in Oakland Japanese clubs have six shooting galleries. Nine companies of Japanese have been organized in Vancouver. Japan has established a great naval base at Kelung, in Formosa, and one at the Pescadores. She has organized a Filipino-Japanese party in the Philippine Islands. Japan has built up her navy in like proportion. She has now practically ready two *Dreadnoughts*, and laid down two more. This year she is to lay down seven more, making eleven great ships. Some have imagined that the great Japanese preparations were intended for China. They do not need all those *Dreadnoughts* for Chinese gunboats.

There is not an armored ship of any European nation in the Pacific Ocean. I am not talking about war. It is the other side that puts war talk into my mouth. I am giving facts that, as patriots, we have no right to neglect.

We sent sixteen battle ships to the Pacific Ocean. Two more have joined, making eighteen, together with eight armored cruisers, making altogether twenty-six. Japan has eleven armored cruisers and eleven battle ships, making twenty-two. She is adding the *Ibuki* and *Kuroma*, making twenty-four; she has added the *Sitsuma* and the *Aki*, two *Dreadnoughts*. The comparison of the gentleman from Tennessee yesterday of a great ship against four small ones is simply astonishing, as though a great ship with three more knots' speed would let four small vessels assemble around her and, while they concentrate their fire upon her, she would carefully distribute her fire equally among them. The firing of the modern battle ship has been revolutionized.

You can keep your gun on the target all the time and stand off 6,000, 7,000, and 8,000 yards and hit with a majority of the shots. These great ships of Japan that carry sixteen great guns, having three knots an hour more speed, can choose their distance and concentrate all their fire on a single vessel. There are experts who will tell you that the gun fire of one of these ships can destroy any existing fleet that might approach. By a conservative estimate one of these is equivalent to four smaller vessels, and the two would be equivalent to eight, making the total Japanese fleet equivalent to thirty-two. Thus if we should send every ship of the Navy to the Pacific, and absolutely strip the whole Atlantic Ocean, we could not keep pace with Japan in the next five years.

I have pointed out that the minimum basis of our duty in the Pacific and our duty to the Atlantic is six ships for each ocean. Even admitting that a single fleet could serve in both oceans, which it could not do, on account of the vast distance between the oceans, we should have to provide six ships as the minimum this year. A programme of only four is thus down to bed rock and touches the danger point. It is natural that Japan should desire to control in the East. Just emerging from mediævalism, it is natural that she should wish to extend her dominions and to take our possessions. It is natural that she should marshal her own power and the power of China and the power of India—the power of the yellow man—to gain supremacy of the world.

The moment the American fleet leaves the Pacific Ocean they could take our possessions without any resistance. We have no transports to carry our Army to retake them, and we have no army ready. Our fleet could not take them, and the attempt to get them back again would be more futile than it would be to get even with any nation of Europe.

It is not necessary to point out the grave danger that lurks in a race problem between the yellow and white races. Territorial and commercial considerations show the danger of conflict, notably the question of the open-door policy in China. America must be prepared to take care of her own interests.

And if she will take care of her own interests, she will do a great duty to the world. If we had had \$50,000,000 worth more of battle ships in 1898 when we called upon Russia to evacuate Manchuria she would have evacuated, and that would have spared the world that war. Every movement of Japan and the European powers tends toward the division of China.

When the partition of China begins this world will be set on fire, and out of that fire the great nations of Europe will discover that the yellow man does not love one white man more than another. While Germany would probably be the next to be thrown out of Asia, and France would follow, and the British last.

The papers Japan is controlling throughout China are teaching the Chinese to hate all foreigners. The dismemberment of China would thus precipitate a great race war. Our investigation thus far has been for the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean separately. It is necessary to consider them together.

The nations of the white race have hated one another so long that they ask nothing better than to play off another race against them. A nation of Asia, preparing for war with America, would proceed to get an alliance with a nation of Europe.

There is existing to-day a hard and fast, offensive and defensive alliance between Great Britain and Japan. There has been one official interpretation of that alliance. This was by the premier of the Dominion of Canada on February 28. In defending the leaving of the question of immigration of Japanese into Canada to the Japanese Government, he stated that Canada should do that because they would expect the Japanese to come to Vancouver in time of war, and they ought to let them come in time of peace; that he could see how, for defense of common interests in the northern Pacific, the Japanese and British ships would be together, and would weigh anchor from Vancouver. It is true that the public, published part of that Anglo-Japanese treaty specifies the regions of India and of eastern Asia; but no Japanese fleet would come over to Vancouver to start toward India. The British Government has yet to disclaim the interpretation of that treaty by the premier of Canada.

Let me repeat that I am not talking war; I am talking facts. We have 90,000,000 of people. I will take second place to no man in appreciating their strength and their willingness, if necessary, to fight for liberty and for home and country, but the yellow man can fire as straight as the white man. The yellow man can live on one-tenth of what the white man can. We have felt free from danger from invasion from Europe, although we are not free from raids. We may be free from invasion from Europe, but, my countrymen, we are not free from invasion from Asia. The location of our Pacific coast places it, with the open ocean toward Asia, in a dangerous condition, with Japan in alliance with a great maritime power of Europe that would keep the ocean open. The unlimited myriads of Asia could descend upon our shores. We are within reasonable distance of the point where this nation may have to fight for its very existence.

I here proclaim you may refuse to recognize the inevitable facts if you wish, but the time is coming when this nation, not only to do its duty in the world, but to preserve its very existence, will either have to turn the country into a mighty army or it will have to control the sea in the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, both at the same time. Which should be the choice—to turn our citizens into soldiers or a small part of our wealth into ships?

I realize full well that objections exist. I know the question of expense is thrown up at us. The war between Russia and Japan cost the South over \$500,000,000 in the slump of cotton. Last year we lost \$24,000,000 in the markets for cotton goods alone. I pointed out the cost of the Spanish war.

In 1812 we had a disastrous war. If we had had a substantial navy, the British would never have persisted in violating our rights in the Atlantic Ocean, we would have had no war. Washington City would not have been burned. Before that we paid two and a half million dollars to the Barbary pirates as tribute and ransom. One-half of that would have given us a fleet that would have prevented war and would have insured the security of our commerce. In 1800 France would not even respect our rights as neutrals, and we had a war with France. If we had had a navy there would have been no war. When you come to discuss the question of expense you are dealing with a disease. War is a disease. America's Navy is a preventive, and every dollar in ships will save us hundreds of thousands of dollars that would otherwise be lost in war.

I know there are some who distrust their country. They are afraid if we have a great navy we will abuse the power. I think a man descends pretty low when he chooses to think a mean thing about his own country when there is no occasion for it. I ask any gentleman here, Would your constituents have this nation play the part of a bully, simply because we had a big navy? Of course not. Neither would mine. It is not so abroad. Abroad a czar, an emperor, a monarch, or an ambi-

tious dynasty can have a nation's power turned to conquest and oppression. In America it would have to be the people, and they would not do it. In analyzing the power that there is in 90,000,000 of people you know we have found out that they are the safest guardians of liberty. Do you not realize that those 90,000,000 of people, men who do not hate any other people in the world engaged in peaceful pursuits, are the one repository in this world with which you can trust great power?

Do you trust the British with a navy three times as big as ours, more readily than you would trust America? Great Britain and the other nations have enemies—have had enemies down the ages. Their navies are specifically for war. America has no enemy. Her navy is for peace. Somebody has to have the biggest. Which ought it to be? Mark you, and believe me, my countrymen, I am not advocating permanent navies. I am pointing out the path which in the shortest time, with America keeping the peace of the world, her interests justifying her intervention and giving a chance to create an international organization that will be adequate for peace, and thus lead to the point where America and all other nations can give up their navies. But you know, as practical men, that we have not yet reached that point. Nations still have to have navies.

I submit it to you, as long as they have to have navies, then America, the peace nation, ought to have the biggest navy. You can not escape this conclusion. But some say that this is the advocacy of force. It is nothing of the kind. I have lived in Europe, I have lived in Asia, I have seen enough of the reign of might and brute force around the world. The reign of might and brute force is the trouble with the suffering world. It is time some nation of peace and beneficence could have some influence in the great councils of the nations. This is the way in which in the shortest time to put an end to the reign of force in the world. Some say, "Oh, he is a young man who wants war; he has had a taste of war." Mr. Chairman, it cured me, that taste did. I see men before me who in the great war would get up before breakfast and do more fighting than was done in the Spanish war altogether. You ask them if they do not believe me.

I do not care how hot-blooded a man may be before he goes in. Let him go in and get a taste of war, and that will make of him a disciple of peace for the rest of his days. There has never been a greater slander on any men than to say that men of war want war.

I climbed aboard the *Teresa* three days after the battle of Santiago. As I came over the gangway I saw a gun's crew dead, every man at his post. An 8-inch shell had penetrated the armor and exploded and killed them all. Being a naval constructor, I jumped down on the protective deck to examine to see if the structure had been blown up between the upper coal bunkers. It was gloomy. I saw a man in a corner. I wondered what he was doing there. I found that the main steam pipe ran from the boilers forward to the engine room aft underneath the deck, and they had put in a special stop valve and brought a spindle up through the deck, so that if the pipe was cut and it proved impossible to reach the regular stop valve in the engine room, then a man located above the deck in battle using a double ratchet wrench could shut it off from above.

Fire had swept over the ship, and that man had been burned up. Have you ever seen those figures at Pompeii, figures of men and animals, that had been asphyxiated? They were nothing like that man. When he found he was getting weaker, he got down on his knees and he put his chin down on his chest. There he was, burned to a crisp, but the charred bones of his fingers were still grasping his wrench. [Applause.]

When I think of the Spanish war my heart cries out, "How long, how long must noble men continue to slay each other in this way?" When the smoke raised from the battlefields of Manchuria and the martial spirit of the world was aroused, I could see men dead and dying, 500,000 of them. I knew that America, had she done her duty to the world, could have spared the world that war.

I have been out in Japan and in those countries. I have seen the huts and the homes of the peasants. Life is hard at its best. I knew that the women and children there were weeping and wailing for dear ones that never could return. I know that widows and orphans are going through the hard world today without the protection of father, husband, son, or brother. And I know our country could have spared it all. Some one says he talks navy and war because that is his profession. You might as well tell a doctor that he talks surgery because that is his profession. I have gone into these things, my country-

men. The war clouds are gathering. I have gone about America and I have made over 1,700 speeches in the cities pleading for peace.

Four hundred and forty-one audiences, aggregating over 400,000 persons, assembled at representative American cities, situated in forty-two States of the Union have adopted the following resolution practically unanimously:

In the interest of peace and justice: Be it

Resolved by this gathering of representative citizens, That general treaties of arbitration should be negotiated by the United States with all nations, granting jurisdiction to the international court at The Hague over as many classes of controversies as the other contracting power in each case can be induced to transfer from the field of battle to the precincts of courts of justice.

2. That the United States should declare in favor of a permanent international congress, containing representatives from every nation, to assemble periodically and automatically for the purpose of suggesting such changes in the law of nations and in the method of its administration as the current of events may make desirable and practicable.

3. That present conditions call for the immediate adoption of a progressive naval programme that will give the United States a Navy capable of performing its duty, i. e., of protecting our vast seacoast, our great and ever-increasing volume of ocean-going commerce, our growing interests in foreign markets, our distant possessions, and of executing effectively all the just foreign policies of the nation.

4. That the chairman appoint a committee of three to call upon the mayor, who is hereby requested to join with said committee in communicating this resolution to the Representative in Congress of this district, the two Senators from this State, and the President of the United States.

This resolution has likewise been unanimously adopted by the legislature of Georgia and the legislature of New York.

PARTIAL LIST OF CITIES IN WHICH RESOLUTION HAS BEEN ADOPTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1905.

Meyersdale, Pa.
Coldwater, Mich.
New Hope, Pa.
Gallipolis, Ohio.
New Brighton, Pa.
Anderson, Ind.
Hiram, Ohio.
Washington Court House, Ohio.
Wolcott, N. Y.
Plymouth, N. H.
Hartford, Conn.
Afton, N. Y.
Canajoharie, N. Y.
Hlon, N. Y.
Wakefield, Mass.
Amesbury, Mass.
Alexandria, Pa.
Berwick, Pa.
Connellsville, Pa.
Barron, Wis.
Eau Claire, Wis.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Marshalltown, Iowa.
Primghar, Iowa.
Hampton, Iowa.
Excelsior Springs, Mo.
Fulton, Mo.
Alva, Okla.
Newton, Kans.
San Angelo, Tex.
Tyler, Tex.
Georgetown, Tex.
Southwestern University, Texas.
Gonzales, Tex.
San Marcos, Tex.
Bryan, Tex.
Houston, Tex.
Beaumont, Tex.
Meridian, Miss.
Memphis, Tenn.
Davidson College, North Carolina.
Greensboro, N. C.
Greenville, S. C.
Logansport, Ind.
Camp Point, Ill.
King City, Iowa.
Centerville, Iowa.
Plattsburg, Mo.
York, Nebr.
Lincoln, Ill.
Rochester, Ind.
McConnellsville, Ohio.
Malta, Ohio.
Vinton, Iowa.
Feebles, Ohio.
Freeport, Ohio.
Cadiz, Ohio.
Bloomington, Ill.
Kahoka, Mo.
Paris, Ill.
Defiance, Ohio.
Clarksburg, W. Va.
Cumberland, Md.
Broken Bow, Nebr.
Owensboro, Ky.
Iowa City, Iowa.
Pana, Ill.
Chillicothe, Mo.
Hastings, Nebr.
Charleston, Ill.
Hamilton, Mo.
Hutchinson, Kans.
Peabody, Kans.
Manhattan, Kans.

Salina, Kans.
Topeka, Kans.
Kansas City, Mo.
Paola, Kans.
Council Grove, Kans.
Chanute, Kans.
Henderson, Ky.
Attica, Ind.
Ballinger, Tex.
San Angelo, Tex.
Marshall, Tex.
Nacogdoches, Tex.
Lake Charles, La.
Corsicana, Tex.
Groesbeck, Tex.
Waco, Tex.
Cleburne, Tex.
Oklahoma, Okla.
Sulphur, Ind. T.
Ardmore, Ind. T.
Mineral Wells, Tex.
Denton, Tex.
Greenville, Tex.
Fort Worth, Tex.
Fort Smith, Ark.
Durant, Okla.
Bartlesville, Okla.
Chickasha, Okla.
Hobart, Okla.
Atoka, Okla.
Commerce, Tex.
Temple, Tex.
Tishomingo, Okla.
Ashland, Ohio.
Grove City, Pa.
Gulfport, Miss.
Laurel, Miss.
Yazoo City, Miss.
Water Valley, Ohio.
Hartselle, Ala.
Coatesville, Pa.
Front Royal, Va.
Gainesville, Fla.
St. Petersburg, Fla.
Lancaster, N. H.
Milford, Mass.
Canandaigua, N. Y.
Wooster, Ohio.
Binghamton, N. Y.
St. Peter, Minn.
Stillwater, Minn.
Oshkosh, Wis.
Waukegan, Ill.
Little Rock, Ark.
Itasca, Tex.
Hillsboro, Tex.
Galveston, Tex.
San Antonio, Tex.
Donnellson, Iowa.
Eldon, Mo.
Redfield, S. Dak.
Huron, S. Dak.
Newton, Iowa.
Sedalia, Mo.
Fort Collins, Colo.
Rockford, Ind.
Sioux Falls, S. Dak.
Norfolk, Va.
Richmond, Va.
Harrisburg, Va.
Lexington, Va.
Durham, N. C.
Emporia, Va.
Danville, Va.
Columbia, S. C.

Amery, Miss.
Tupelo, Miss.
Richmond, Ind.
Winfield, Iowa.
Bristol, Va.
Fullerton, Nebr.
Danville, Ill.
Clinton, Iowa.
Mexico, Mo.
Hannibal, Mo.
Bethany, Mo.
Auburn, Nebr.
Fairbury, Nebr.
Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Harlan, Iowa.
Fort Madison, Iowa.
Clinton, Mo.
Dallas, Tex.
New Philadelphia, Ohio.
Perry, Iowa.
Elgin, Ill.
Lexington, Nebr.
Delavan, Wis.
Vincennes, Ind.
Greenfield, Ohio.
Terre Haute, Ind.
Quincy, Ill.
Waxahachie, Tex.
Nevada, Mo.
McAlester, Okla.
Russellville, Ark.
Fayetteville, Ark.
Clinton, Mo.
Fort Scott, Kans.
Iola, Kans.
Independence, Kans.
Springfield, Mo.
Monett, Mo.
Bentonville, Ark.
Pittsburg, Kans.
Neosho, Mo.
Waterloo, Iowa.
Red Oak, Iowa.
McComb, Ill.
Lebanon, Ky.
Beatrice, Mo.
Lead, S. Dak.
Des Moines, Iowa.
Dublin, Ga.
Paducah, Ky.
Elba, Ala.
Atlanta, Ga.
Edgefield, S. C.
St. George, S. C.
Jacksonville, Ala.
New Market, Ala.
Newton, Ala.
Fort Deposit, Ala.
Mount Sterling, Ky.
Martins Ferry, Ohio.
Sharon, Pa.
Bloomfield, W. Va.
Glen Ridge, W. Va.
Petersburg, Va.
Lynn, Mass.
North Adams, Mass.
Stevens Point, Wis.
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Frankfort, Ohio.
Laporte City, Iowa.
Independence, Iowa.
Audubon, Iowa.
Monson, Iowa.
Stanberry, Mo.
McPherson, Kans.
Lincoln Center, Kans.
Sherman, Tex.
Danville, Ky.
West Point, Miss.
De Land, Fla.
Orlando, Fla.
Union, S. C.
Washington, Ga.
Monroe, La.
Americus, Ga.
Dadeville, Ala.
Evergreen, Ala.
Uniontown, Pa.
Warren, Pa.
Erie, Pa.
Peru, Ind.
Newark, Ohio.
Athens, Ohio.
Buckhannon, W. Va.
Cameron, Mo.
Flint, Mich.
Minot, N. Dak.
Carrington, N. Dak.
Coopertown, N. Dak.
Menomone, Wis.
Watertown, Wis.
Milwaukee, Wis.
Arkansas City, Kans.
Marion, Kans.
Muskogee, Okla.
Cherryvale, Kans.
Baldwin, Kans.
Waverly, N. Y.
Torrington, Conn.
Bangor, Me.
Skowhegan, Me.
Waterville, Me.
Houlton, Me.

Brooklyn, N. Y.
Olean, N. Y.
Springville, N. Y.
New Bedford, Pa.
New Castle, Pa.
Saltsburg, Pa.
Bowling Green, Ky.
Roanoke, Va.
Bristol, Tenn.
Godfrey, Okla.
Winfield, Iowa.
Meadville, Mo.
Maryville, Mo.
Ottawa, Ill.
Sigourney, Iowa.
Fairfield, Iowa.
Goldfield, Iowa.
Clay Center, Kans.
Coshocton, Ohio.
Harrisonburg, Va.
Percell, Va.
Charles City, Iowa.
Hamilton, Ill.
Nora Springs, Iowa.
Spencer, Iowa.
Glenwood, Iowa.
Farrington, Iowa.
Bedford, Iowa.
Storm Lake, Iowa.
Albert Lea, Minn.
Bloomfield, Iowa.
Oskaloosa, Iowa.
Siloam Springs, Ark.
Muskogee, Okla.
Vinita, Okla.
Tulsa, Okla.
Pittsburg, Kans.
Beatrice, Nebr.
Sac, Iowa.
Jefferson, Iowa.
Missouri Valley, Iowa.
Athens, Ohio.
Creston, Iowa.
Albia, Iowa.
Ottumwa, Iowa.
Tipton, Iowa.
Knoxville, Tenn.
Birmingham, Ala.
Brundidge, Ala.
Hartford, Ala.
Ozark, Ala.
Abbeville, Ala.
Montgomery, Ala.
Enfauila, Ala.
Columbia, Ala.
Andalusia, Ala.
Geneva, Ala.
Camden, Ala.
Linden, Ala.
Selma, Ala.
Centerville, Ala.
Sylacauga, Ala.
Albertville, Ala.
Huntsville, Ala.
Starkville, Miss.
Oxford, Miss.
Florence, Ala.
Patton, Ala.
Auburn, Ala.
Wetumpka, Ala.
Brewton, Ala.
Troy, Ala.
Atmore, Ala.
Stillwater, Okla.
Enid, Okla.
Blackwell, Okla.
Wichita, Kans.
Iola, Kans.
Garnett, Kans.
Parsons, Kans.
Sabetha, Kans.
Kirksville, Mo.
Centralia, Ill.
St. Louis, Mo.
Marion, Ill.
Olney, Ill.
Elkhart, Ind.
Abington, Ill.
Ames, Iowa.
Chicago, Ill.
Louisville, Ky.
Union City, Ind.
Laporte, Ind.
Kewanee, Ill.
Chariton, Iowa.
West Union, Iowa.
Boone, Iowa.
Conrad, Iowa.
Osage, Iowa.
Mankato, Minn.
La Crosse, Wis.
Baraboo, Wis.
Aurora, Ill.
Elkader, Iowa.
Waverly, Iowa.
Muscatine, Iowa.
Sparta, Ill.
Kansas, Ill.
Appleton, Wis.
Fond du Lac, Wis.
Marietta, Ohio.
Ironton, Ohio.

Hillsboro, Ohio.
 Rochester, N. Y.
 Derby, Conn.
 Boston, Mass.
 Bellefonte, Pa.
 Syracuse, N. Y.
 Burlington, N. J.
 Citronelle, Ala.
 Gainesville, Ga.
 Cartersville, Ga.
 Cordele, Ga.
 Dawson, Ga.
 Farris Springs, Fla.
 Quitman, Ga.
 Thomasville, Ga.
 Fort Gaines, Ga.
 Lumpkin, Ga.
 Blakely, Ga.
 Richland, Ga.
 Monroeville, Ala.
 Alexander City, Ala.
 Montevallo, Ala.

Wetumpka, Ala.
 Corinth, Miss.
 Jackson, Tenn.
 Blue Mountain, Miss.
 Decatur, Ala.
 Canton, Ohio.
 Portland, Ind.
 Summit, N. J.
 Rockville Center, Long Island.
 Atlantic City, N. J.
 Albany, Ga.
 Marion, Ala.
 Talladega, Ala.
 Gadsden, Ala.
 Athens, Ala.
 Spartanburg, S. C.
 Florence, Ala.
 Wilmington, Del.
 Lexington, Va.
 New Concord, Ohio.
 Chattanooga, Tenn.
 Webster City, Iowa.

I have gone tirelessly about the land night and day, just pleading for peace because I see the war clouds are gathering—clouds that would bring not only war between nations of the white race, but a great war between the races of the world, and I see America upon the apex in mid-ocean, the friend of all nations, kin to the other nations, the one great nation without territorial ambitions, standing for the rights of men and for those just policies between nations that make peace, enduring peace, possible. I see America placed here to send the black clouds of war back below the horizon. It is not a dream, not a vision. You and I can do it. Let us begin now by authorizing four battle ships in this appropriation bill.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield twenty minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, notwithstanding the dire forecasts to which we have listened that the world will soon be afire and that the war clouds are gathering, I am gratified to notice that equanimity and contentment still prevail in this Chamber. We are not afraid that the disaster will come upon us, at least until after we conclude the consideration of this bill. But I can not listen to such an address as that which has just been made in the House without words of emphatic dissent, I might even say of rebuke.

The United States is not a country which, like a quarrelsome belligerent, stands with a mailed fist raised aloft, ready to strike the first offender, nor is it a country which will maintain the specious pretense that upon it rests the responsibility of maintaining by force the peace of the world. [Applause.] Our chiefest distinctions are that we are in the forefront of modern civilization; that ours are the triumphs of commerce, of industry, and of science; that here, more than anywhere else on the globe, we have maintained the importance of each individual; and that we give respect and reverence to the teachings of Christianity. We have made peace between nations; and the crowning glory of Theodore Roosevelt's career, when the whole history is written, will be that he brought the warring nations of Japan and Russia together. [Applause.] You would have to search with a microscope to find that one battle ship or twenty battle ships had anything to do with that magnificent achievement in the cause of the world's peace. It was accomplished rather by a reliance upon his fairness, upon the justice and disinterestedness of the American people, factors which would have been swept away if we had those ambitions which belong to a country having a great navy and seeking to dominate the nations of the earth. [Applause.]

The fundamental fallacy in all these arguments is that in this day neither an individual nor a nation is safe unless he goes armed. Just exactly the contrary is true. [Applause.]

Why is life worth living now? Why, it is because a spirit of humanity has so come to possess the people that the weak are protected alike with the strong. [Applause.] The cause of him who is wronged is the strongest cause that can exist under heaven. When sympathy is aroused it is a factor more potent than armies. This is certainly true of the individual. Why is it that chivalry gives such respect to the tenderer sex? Because she is weaker, because she is entitled to the protection of the stronger. Our sheltering, our protecting hand does not go out to the Amazon; she does not need our protection, because she is strong enough already. [Laughter.] So it is with nations. No nation can afford to impose on a weak people. The public opinion of the civilized world is stronger than the armies and navies of the proudest empire. [Applause.]

Suppose some nation of Europe should go to South America and seek to subject a weak people there. In this day those nations to the south have such a degree of civilization that the excuse could not be made that is made in the case of barbarous tribes. Why, the whole civilized world would rise up and le-

gions would crowd to the bar of nations, crying "Hands off! hands off!" [Applause.] Let the strong keep away from the weak. And yet we are not weak. I listened here once to the singing of patriotic songs at a close of a Congress, and in face of the vigor, patriotism, and high aspirations displayed, with the gift of song that was shown in this Chamber, along with a certain glamor and enthusiasm of the occasion, there was one thought that came to me more than any other, and that was, What nation anywhere could stand up against this free America in case of a conflict? War is not a matter alone of armies, but of resources and endurance, and in that particular we stand far ahead of any other nation on the globe. Certain ones say to us—some of those who are most earnest in their advocacy of the battle ship—there will be war with Germany, or war with England, perhaps, or war with France. But those nations can not thrive without the supplies obtained from this country. Why, if you shut off England from obtaining food from this country in six months there would be starvation. Talk about sending battle ships up the difficult channel of the St. Lawrence! There would be no boundary line between the United States and Canada by the time the battle ships got across the Atlantic. [Laughter and applause.]

Some persons talk about war between Japan and China. They talked about war between France and Germany over the Morocco incident. There was a very strong occasion for war between England and Russia over the incident off the Dogger Bank, but the good sense of the nations prevailed over the hysteria of those who were shouting for a war and war did not materialize. There is now a solidarity of interest—

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Ohio. If time permits at the close of my remarks I will try to answer the question; my time is very short. There is a solidarity of interest among the nations of the earth—such that war will not be tolerated. It is practically impossible between civilized nations unless some irresistible ground for conflict exists, as did exist in the case of Japan and Russia. I must say as regards Japan that no nation which has made leaps and bounds into the family of civilized nations has behaved with more moderation than the Japanese. [Applause.] Along with their remarkable military triumph there has been a magnificent growth in civilization and in those features which bring them into line with modern life; but if there were to be a contest between this country and Japan, what would it be? It would be a contest between races, and I am not willing to give up the idea that the Caucasian race will be dominant in the world's affairs for all time. [Applause.] There has been a good deal of talk about how Japan was going after the Philippines. A great relief has been given to that alarm within a few days by the talk of designs which Japan has upon Australia. [Laughter and applause.] Why, that is rational; if Japan has designs, it is against the civilization of the western world, so that it is out of the question that there should be any contest in which we would be alone. We have no entangling alliances. I rejoice in the thought that, although if we should be involved in a struggle no marching armies from other nations would keep step for our support, nevertheless in any quarrel of ours with any people of Asia it is not our cause, it is the cause of them all; and you can lay that down as a feature of this situation which will make for our defense and for the protection of the world's peace as well.

I have listened oftentimes to the talk of our becoming peacemakers by building a navy. How absurd that is! Great Britain starts in as a peacemaker and has a navy sufficient to quell disorder anywhere in the world, to make disorderly peoples behave themselves. But Germany thinks that it is not enough; she must also be a peacemaker more than Great Britain. France comes into the list, and she must be a peacemaker; and this competition in peacemaking is a spectacle in the eyes of the world. [Applause.] But these armed peacemakers will not command confidence. The increase of navies is to increase the might and the prestige of the countries which build them, and for each enlargement in our naval programme the whole world will look with an added degree of suspicion upon us, thinking that our designs are not for peace, but for empire and for the enlargement of our dominion.

I have stood here often, and I stand here now, for the principle that this country should take the lead in the paths which lead to peace; that we should take advantage of our magnificent isolation, of the confidence that other nations place in us. Thus we will have the confidence of the world and be able to make peace in proportion as our policy looks to peace.

Several years ago in my wanderings I visited the beautiful town of Samara, in far-off Russia, where the plains bear away toward Asia, where Slav and Tartar combine in making the

population. I was in a garden which looked much like those in western Europe, and there was a band that was playing for the people. They were playing the Marseillaise. It was suggested to the Russian officer that we who were Americans would like to have the band play some American air, the Star Spangled Banner, perhaps. The officer went to the bandstand, put his hand on the shoulder of the leader, and immediately the band stopped their tune and began to play Hail Columbia, Happy Land. [Applause.] There was a scene which would warm any American heart. The swains who were strolling around in the grove drew together and listened with an intense degree of eagerness, demanding a repetition, not once or twice, but thrice. There was an outburst of enthusiasm that made the wanderers feel as if they were at home. [Applause.] It was not the music of Hail Columbia—for that was inferior to some of the other tunes—but the throng recognized that those sweet strains told of a land beyond the mountains and the plains, across the wide ocean, where the watchwords are progress, liberty, truth, and equal opportunity; a land to which the poor and the struggling may look up with hope in the belief that some day, as a beacon light, its beneficence will extend to the darkest portion of the earth. [Great applause.]

So I say it is by seeking peace that we shall maintain our glory, our influence, our prestige among the nations. I would not say that we should abandon our naval strength. Personally I believe in one battle ship and one battle ship only, according to the enunciated programme of several years ago. [Applause.] But I now register my protest, and I hope I shall have opportunity again to register it, against this ambitious programme. What a man earnestly desires in his youth, that sometimes he may have in its fullness in his old age. I have respect for the idealists who look forward to the future. I am willing to be counted as one of them in my advocacy of what I believe to be the truth, in the firm conviction that, not to-day, perhaps, but in the near future, we shall join with other nations by peaceful methods, by arbitration, and by manifestations of reason and good will, as the leaders in a lasting peace which shall diffuse its influence all over the globe. [Loud applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. LILLEY].

Mr. LILLEY. Mr. Chairman, I propose to introduce a joint resolution which, if adopted, will save the cost of these two odd battle ships every year. It reads as follows:

Joint resolution.

Whereas there has been gross extravagance and lamentable misappropriation of public funds, to the extent of more than \$100,000,000, in expenditures on or in navy-yards and naval stations in excess of what business men would have expended to produce the same results; and

Whereas great economies may be effected by the Federal Government by the abandonment and sale of certain navy-yards and naval stations and the reorganization of the others: Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That the President shall appoint, immediately after the passage of this act, a commission consisting of three members, two of whom shall be men of reputed ability in the management of large industrial affairs, and a retired naval officer who has served as chief of bureau, whose duty it shall be to report to the President and Congress upon the advisability of the abandonment and sale of navy-yards and naval stations at Kittery, Me.; Port Royal and Charleston, S. C.; Key West, Fla.; New Orleans, La.; and Mare Island, Cal., and to make such recommendations as they see fit for improving the organization and efficiency of navy-yards and naval stations and eliminating the waste of public moneys in the maintenance of same.

SEC. 2. That the commission shall appoint a secretary, to perform such duties as the commission may designate, and it shall be the duty of the commission to file its final report on or before the 1st day of January, 1909.

SEC. 3. That the commission shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, and call for papers and accounts.

SEC. 4. That each member of the commission shall receive during the term of service the sum of \$3,000, and the secretary the sum of \$1,500. The traveling expenses of all members of the commission, including secretary, also all other necessary expenses, shall be paid by the Treasurer upon warrant of the chairman of the commission, and for this purpose is hereby appropriated the sum of \$15,000, or such part thereof as may be required, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act.

In view of the fact that Admiral Goodrich has been appointed to visit all the yards on the Atlantic coast to make an inspection, it may be of interest to hear what he says in the New York Tribune of April 4:

Rear-Admiral Goodrich takes occasion to express himself concerning the existence of certain navy-yards; he has communicated to the Washington authorities the belief that there are too many navy-yards; that only a few are really necessary on each coast and that the others should not only be closed up, but the ground upon which they stand sold or otherwise ceded, so that on no pretext can they ever be opened again.

Mr. Chairman, I desire also to quote a few words from Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce, whom naval officers unanimously concede to be one of the ablest business officers, of whom we have very few in the United States Navy:

About twenty years ago the Secretary of the Navy, not satisfied with the business methods of our navy-yards, propounded the following

query: Whether a given navy-yard is fully equipped with the necessary appliances for the prompt and economical execution of such work as may be required to place it in proper condition for the probable demands of war?

A portion of the answer of the board of officers to whom the question was addressed is given herewith at length, as it goes to the very root of the matter and shows clearly that the unbusinesslike methods which obtain in our navy-yards have their origin in the defects inherent in the Navy Department. The logical conclusion—the conclusion from which one can not escape—is, as there stated, that reforms in our navy-yard methods must begin in the Department itself.

To a proper understanding of the subject, it should be stated that the present wasteful extravagance in employing so great an excess of nonproducers and the inefficient system of doing business which has for years past been steadily increasing in our navy-yards is but the natural outgrowth of the constitution of the Navy Department itself. Each navy-yard is made up of a number of separate and comparatively independent establishments, little principalities, as it were, each owing allegiance to its own sovereign, the chief of bureau to which it belongs.

Thus each department has been gradually building itself up so as to be independent of all other departments. Each of the principal departments has its own body of artisans, its own machinery, its own steam generators, and its own peculiar method of doing business.

In this way it has come that some of our yards are filled up with machinery far beyond their actual needs, and it is no exaggeration to say that there is to-day enough machinery of various kinds in either the New York or the Boston yard to do the work of its own particular class of the entire Navy. We habitually speak of a private shipyard as a "plant;" but each of our national shipyards is a segregation of "plants," each having its own separate organization and each its own internal regulations. Many illustrations might be given to show how, through the want of concert of action among these several "plants," useless and vexatious delays occur, to say nothing of the waste of time and public money due to such diffusion.

To make such radical changes as we propose was no easy task, nor did we expect that they could be effected without considerable friction, not to say opposition; but supposing the changes to be made on a basis laid down by the commission, it is hardly to be hoped, that under present conditions they will be permanent. For whatever changes may be introduced now, and howsoever beneficial they may be, still the same causes remaining in active operation must inevitably produce the same result, and in time restore the system of independent plants with all its attendant evils. Hence we conclude that to organize our Navy on a just and permanent basis, to consolidate their several plants, to introduce thrift in the management and promptness in the methods of doing the work, with a proper system of accountability; to secure, in short, in each of our yards, unification, method, economy, and dispatch with an administration of its affairs agreeable to the principles of business as understood in civil life, it is absolutely necessary to begin within the Navy Department itself.

"It must be evident that there is something radically wrong with the Department," wrote the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to Congress under date of November 30, 1885, and he adds: "The universal dissatisfaction is the conclusive proof of this." He then proceeds to dissect the bureau system as it then existed with merciless precision, and gives to the world a record of mismanagement, of wasteful expenditure, of injudicious and ill-advised disposition of public moneys, such as should have led to immediate and salutary reforms.

For the seventeen years preceding his administration over \$75,000,000 had been substantially thrown away.

In 1895 the Secretary still further simplified the business methods of the Navy Department, but left the question of reorganization untouched.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy of November, 1903, alludes to the defective organization of his Department in no uncertain terms. He repeats substantially what was said eighteen years ago, of eight bureaus working independently of each other: "The distribution of a business among bureaus independent of and related to each other unquestionably creates a condition out of which grow conflicts of jurisdiction between the bureaus and a tendency to consider the interests of the bureaus rather than the interests of the Navy. The division of business in the bureaus * * * extends to the navy-yards, and even, to some extent, to ships in commission. This leads to excessive and cumbersome organization and lack of harmony of effort, resulting from the fact that there is no coordination, except by the voluntary action of bureau chiefs, short of the Secretary's office itself."

As further evidence of the appreciation of unbusinesslike methods within the Navy itself, I quote from a personal letter written me by a former Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"There is a more or less well-grounded opinion that shore stations are unduly expensive. Also everyone in the Navy, as well as out of the Navy, will agree that the shore stations are more numerous than is necessary for the care of the fleet. Those who are acquainted with the internal organization and working of the navy-yards are also aware that there has been duplication of organization and plant."

Such statements from gentlemen whose positions and daily work have made them especially familiar with the needs of the Navy is in itself sufficient to commend to your favorable consideration the resolution which I have presented to you.

But I wish to present to you a few concrete facts in reference to six yards and naval stations that no doubt of the need of business reorganization of the Navy may linger in any mind.

Let us first consider the Mare Island Navy-Yard. The Secretary of the Navy has said that this plant has cost the people \$17,000,000. It has a magnificent stone dry dock which cost \$1,175,000, but I have at hand a letter from the Secretary in which he states that "the present stone dry dock at Mare Island will not permit the docking of a battle ship," and not only is this true, but a battle ship can not get to the yard. In a letter dated March 11, 1907, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that "Due to the silt in suspension in the waters of San Pablo Bay, which settles at slack water, the natural tendency of channels in the vicinity is to shoal."

Ten years ago, in June, 1898, Admiral M. T. Endicott, then Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, said in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy:

"If keeping the navigation open for the depth stated above (28 feet) is impossible without a very large annual expense, amounting to several hundred thousand dollars, then the Government should take early steps to establish a navy-yard on the waters of San Francisco Bay at some point where such difficulties will not be encountered, where the yard will be safe from an attack from fleets on the sea, and where a permanent depth of navigation of 30 feet can be had between it and the sea."

Although Rear-Admiral Endicott practically recommended in these words the abandonment of this yard ten years ago, since that time \$728,886.12 has been spent on dredging alone, and \$5,124,712.49 has been appropriated and spent on this yard since then.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask the gentlemen, Is it not a fact under the same conditions larger amounts of moneys have been expended at League Island and at Portsmouth for dredging than at Mare Island?

Mr. CURRIER. Was ever a dollar expended for dredging at Portsmouth?

Mr. KNOWLAND. More money has been expended at Portsmouth and more money at League Island than has been expended at Mare Island.

Mr. SULLOWAY. I want to say to the gentleman that he can not point to where a penny ever was spent at Portsmouth for dredging. It has 60 feet of low water and 80 to 90 feet when you get out to the bay.

Mr. LILLEY. At low water the depth at the entrance to the channel, Napa creek, at the south end of Mare Island is 20 feet. Consider the depth of the Mare Island channel and compare the draft of our battle ships—a channel of 20 feet for the battle ship *Connecticut*, with its maximum draft of 27 feet 4½ inches; for the *North Dakota*, with its maximum draft of 29 feet 10 inches, and greater drafts for the battle ships of the future. I note the Scientific American, of February 22, 1908, states that "all of the Pacific fleet started out floating below their official full-load draft," and that "a battle ship can be loaded until she draws 30 or even 35 feet of water."

Of what use, then, is this navy-yard at Mare Island, with its channel of 20 feet, to the battle-ship squadron of to-day, to say nothing of that of the future?

But here are some striking figures of interest and especial significance to any business man. In the year ending 1907 the expenditures for labor were \$1,620,678.88, while the total amount of work done was \$928,582.97; in other words the workmen alone, with no consideration of the interest on and depreciation of a \$17,000,000 plant, were paid in one year \$692,095.91 more than the value of their product.

Key West is a place that has cost us \$1,238,038.41. It is 6 miles from the straits and the low-water depth in its channel is 26 feet, and \$101,000 has been spent there for dredging.

Here we have another of those labor expenditures that would bring a Carnegie out of his chair with a jump. At this yard, in the fiscal year ending in 1907, \$94,318.77 was expended for labor and the value of their total product was but \$7,126.18, or there might just as well have been tossed on the coral reefs \$87,192.59 as far as any return to the Government was concerned, and yet last session Congress voted to throw \$44,500 more of good money after the bad.

Portsmouth, N. H., or Kittery, Me., is a plant that has cost us over \$10,000,000. Since voters from two States labor here the expenditure for labor will, perhaps, be of interest. In 1907, \$792,760.05 was expended for labor and \$418,804.12 was the total value of the work done; or, were this a well-to-do corporation, it would mean an invasion of its surplus to the extent of \$373,955 for the fiscal year ending in 1907, but for most corporations it would mean bankruptcy before the end of one year.

At Kittery there is a dry dock which cost \$1,100,000. The dock is in readiness for the docking of battle ships, but the "approaches are in such a condition as to make it inadvisable to take a battle ship to that yard." This is the statement of the Secretary of the Navy.

Last summer when I visited Portsmouth with other members of the Committee on Naval Affairs aboard the *Dolphin* I was surprised that the captain did not go up to the yard. In answer to my inquiry, the commander, a most excellent and efficient officer, said that it was not safe to take even so small a craft as the *Dolphin* up to the yard, because of the dangers from the swift current and narrow channel. I note that the map of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey gives warning of the swift currents in the river and states that slack lasts about ten minutes.

Mr. CURRIER. May I ask the gentleman a question? I will ask you if you did not observe, when you went in on the *Dolphin*, that there were colliers nearly as large as battle ships coming in?

Mr. LILLEY. I did not see them.

Mr. CURRIER. I did. I was in Portsmouth, and I saw them.

Mr. LILLEY. It is especially dangerous and impracticable for a battle ship nearly 500 feet long to round Hendersons

Point, and the fact remains that the expensive dock has never docked a battle ship, and \$244,900 more was appropriated for this place the last session of Congress.

Mr. CURRIER. May I ask the gentleman another question? Does not the gentleman understand that with the removal of Hendersons Point, when that work is completed, the channel will be almost double in width what it is now?

Mr. LILLEY. It will be like the removal of Muscle Shoals, on the Tennessee River. They have spent years in doing that and it has never been completed.

Mr. CURRIER. Ninety-five per cent of this has been completed now. Does not the gentleman know that?

Mr. LILLEY. No; I do not.

Mr. CURRIER. I understand it to be so.

Mr. LILLEY. In answer to that question, I understand it will not affect the conditions at this place.

Mr. CURRIER. It widens the channel about 400 feet.

Mr. LILLEY. In answer to the question, Did they work at the New Orleans Navy-Yard in 1907? I give you these figures: \$78,274.05 was spent by the Government for labor, and the total product was \$1,046.01.

But the point that the business man would fail to comprehend is that \$10,000 was appropriated both sessions of the last Congress for new construction at New Orleans, for what advantage to the United States Navy God only knows.

We have here a dry dock which has cost us \$833,625. It has been used twice for battle ships. Fortunately it is a floating dry dock, and may and ought to be towed over to Pensacola or some other place where it may serve some use for the fleet.

It is significant that as long ago as 1876 a board of naval officers, of which the gallant warrior, Admiral David D. Porter, was chairman, recommended that "the naval ground at New Orleans be abandoned and dispensed with."

Since 1900 alone \$2,126,971.05 has been spent here. I have not the figures to show how much more would have been saved the people had the representatives of the people in Congress taken Admiral Porter's advice.

In the message from President Harrison to Congress, dated January 19, 1892, there is this statement:

The requisition for a dry dock, then, are a clear channel to the sea of a depth of at least 26 feet, etc.

Charleston, although built ten years later, after battle ships had already undergone a great increase in size, has but 25 feet of water in its channel.

Mr. LEGARE. Will the gentleman permit me? I just simply want to state that that statement is absolutely untrue, and the gentleman knows it, because the chart shows it has 31 feet at high water.

Mr. LILLEY. You are making your charge against the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Chairman, I am simply stating this from the chart published by the Government.

Mr. LEGARE. In my opinion, what you are quoting from the Secretary of the Navy is erroneous, incorrect, and untrue, and I told you so before.

Mr. LILLEY. You can state that to the Secretary. Yet Congress has appropriated \$1,198,984 to build there a magnificent dry dock. Not only is the channel too shallow, but there is no berthing room for vessels, and no ship of any description has ever been docked there.

The total establishment has cost \$3,394,300 and the dredging \$108,000. I find the most remarkable showing in the line of labor. Here during the past five years \$213,213.75 has been disbursed among laborers, and there has never been done for the Navy one cent's worth of work at this yard. Yet last session of Congress \$287,000 more was appropriated for this yard at Charleston.

On page 37 of Senate Document No. 156, Fifty-Sixth Congress, second session, are these words:

Senator TILLMAN. We will have to keep abreast of these other fellows. League Island now wants an appropriation, and we have got back into the Union we want our slice, too.

Senator CHANDLER. That is very apparent, Senator, and always has been since you got into the Senate.

I wish to quote you a few words from the report of that gallant officer, Rear-Admiral G. W. Sumner, which may be found in Senate Document No. 188, Fifty-sixth Congress, second session:

As to Charleston, it appears to me to be a place sui generis, a fossil, an antique, nonprogressive, and woefully and hopelessly in the rear, commercially and otherwise.

The river opposite any proposed site is too narrow for a large vessel to turn or maneuver in.

To accommodate many vessels in the stream, therefore, the water front of the station would have to be of abnormal length or extent.

Its health and sanitary conditions are shocking and disgraceful.

It has no proper sewerage system.

It has no adequate fresh-water supply.

It is the worst hurricane harbor in the coast.

It is not and can not be made a fit harbor for heavy deep-draft vessels, such as are common in this day.

Already over ten years of time and labor and \$4,000,000 have been spent on the Charleston jetties, and to what purpose?

From an engineering point of view, it would seem to be an absurdity to locate a naval station anywhere in Charleston Harbor. A harbor with a jetty is not one to select for naval purposes, for reasons already stated.

And I would call your attention to these words, the wisdom of which is now fully realized:

I do strongly advise against any change from Port Royal—especially any removal to any point at or in the vicinity of Charleston, S. C.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that naval officers are not free from Congressional restraint that the Government may be served with their best unbiased judgment in these matters, and it is an especial pleasure to find so able an officer so fearless and outspoken to Congress.

The naval station at Port Royal was removed to Charleston (1900-1903), but as late as 1907 \$14,724.66 was spent here for labor, and although abandoned the expenditures will go on to the end of time unless the property is sold, given away, or blown up.

Thirty-two years ago the Naval Board, of which Admiral Porter was chairman, stated:

The board see no propriety in recommending a permanent naval station at Port Royal.

Yet in the last ten years we have expended \$1,084,346.26.

The channel depth at Port Royal is 19½ feet. This yard might have been turned into an excellent naval training station, with barefoot weather the year round, at small cost. Congress saw fit instead to go to the Great Lakes, where five months in the year it is so cold that men must be trained for seamanship on house floors. An entirely new plant is necessary here, and the ultimate cost will undoubtedly be \$10,000,000. Still another disadvantage is the shoal water near the training station.

Annapolis would have made an excellent naval training station had Congress seen fit to leave the buildings, which were excellent for the purpose of a training station, rather than destroy them, and to move the Academy down the Chesapeake Bay below Annapolis, where there was an ideal site with a harbor that can safely anchor all the battle ships in the world, and thus saved the \$10,000,000 that is going to the Great Lakes.

In connection with Annapolis I wish to call attention to a few things, now ancient history, but none the less relevant.

For the construction of buildings at Annapolis the Government made forfeit time-limit contracts, but \$724,768.43 due the Government as forfeit for noncompletion within the time limits has been waived to the contractors.

In 1906 some of the ablest business men in the country assisted Congress on the Board of Visitors and gave their time to a thorough investigation. They reported as follows:

We find an unfortunate state of affairs which dates from the inception of the plans of the new academy, and we are impressed with the conviction that a grave error was made both in planning for and in inaugurating the actual work.

After reviewing several noticeable defects they say:

It seems proper to call attention to the frequent ineffectiveness of the recommendations of the Board of Visitors and the apparent disregard of Congress to them.

Annapolis, for which Congress has seen fit to appropriate sums that will reach a total of over \$10,000,000, is sunk in the mud. Battle ships can not reach the academy, and the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey reports show that the upper Chesapeake is fast filling up.

I desire to call the attention of the House to a few bills which have been introduced this session.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LILLEY. I would like to have about five minutes more.

Mr. SPERRY. I wish the gentleman might have the five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is not in control of the Chair.

Mr. LILLEY. Can the Chair tell me in whose control it is?

The CHAIRMAN. In the control of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss].

Mr. DAWSON. In the absence of the chairman of the committee from the Chamber, I would say that while I have no control over the time, I would gladly yield five minutes of the time that has been allotted to me for later in the day, if the Chair could recognize such an arrangement.

The CHAIRMAN. With that understanding the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. LILLEY] for five minutes more.

Mr. CURRIER. Has the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. LILLEY] been able to discover anything anywhere that meets with his approbation?

Mr. LILLEY. On December 2 Mr. TAYLOR of Alabama introduced a bill calling for a naval station at or near Fort Morgan, Ala.

On the next day Mr. COOPER of Texas called for the establishment of a dry dock on or near Sabine Pass.

On the 9th of December Mr. LAMAR of Florida came after "not more than \$2,000,000 for a dry dock at Pensacola."

On the same day Mr. SULLOWAY, of New Hampshire, was after a million and a half for Portsmouth, although a battle ship can not get to this yard in safety.

On the 12th of December Mr. SMITH of California came into the field with a proposition for a dry dock on the Bay of San Diego, California, for which he called for a million.

On the 19th Mr. GRANGER, of Rhode Island, put in his proposition for a dry dock and repairing station "at a suitable strategic point on the Atlantic."

On January 6 Mr. GREGG presented the demands of Texas for a dry dock at or near Galveston, Tex.

And then on January 20 came the proposition to buy the defunct Jamestown Exposition, fathered by Mr. MAYNARD, of Virginia, which, if adopted, would add \$2,500,000 to the grand total of waste on navy-yards.

Each one I imagine, like Senator TILLMAN, wants a "slice for his constituents."

A member of a recent Congress complained to me that although he had secured six millions out of the Treasury for his district an ungrateful constituency were supporting six competitors against him for renomination. I believe and I am certain the American people will believe that he should have given more attention to the country at large, rather than have kept an eye single to his particular district.

A noted professor [Wheeler] of history has made the statement that we had no democracy in this country before the civil war; that even when there was a majority from the North in Congress the superior political finesse of the politicians of the South thwarted their will. To-day political finesse is not dead nor confined to one section. I refer to the committee of conference, which, by time-honored custom, in case of disagreement between the two branches of the Legislature, may fix up these disagreements in this Navy bill to their own satisfaction, and usually they do not overlook their own districts. In case of a disagreement, the naval bill has gone to six gentlemen, a majority of whom have yards or stations in their districts, all of which ought to be abandoned, and one of these gentlemen has two in his district, neither of which, eminent naval experts have testified, should have been started.

Mr. Speaker, it is not likely that the constituents of these gentlemen will complain of pork that comes into their districts from Uncle Sam's barrel; but what about the rest of the country?

Three navy-yards care for Great Britain's large home squadron; we have testimony that New York or Boston could take care of ours. (Admiral Luce.) Compare our large number of yards, many of which are unnecessary, and look to the cause. Are we a national assembly of politicians, or are we here as the directors of the business of this nation for the people of this nation?

Why the waste of money at worthless yards year after year? I propose to you that the facts warrant the contention that no man should be a member of the Naval Committee who has a navy-yard in his district. Do judges try cases in which their own property is in question? Justice and the welfare of the nation can not be looked for when men act with the powerful influence of a navy-yard constituency hanging around them.

I have reference once more to the words of Rear-Admiral Sumner:

He says—

There is no sentiment, no sectionalism, rightfully attaching to a Government work of this kind; it is part of the national defense, a work of the first importance to the whole country.

There is little to be added to his patriotic words.

The incurring of avoidable expense, whether national or individual, does not commend itself to this community at the present time, nor does it commend itself to this country at any time.

Therefore I urge every Member of this House to vote against any appropriations for Charleston, Port Royal, Mare Island, Portsmouth, New Orleans, or Key West—at least not until a commission has investigated.

I ask you to oppose this waste of the people's money, because it is our sworn constitutional duty.

I have pointed out the waste in navy-yards that runs over years, but I would call especial attention to a proposed excessive profit for the Electric Boat Company of \$1,471,520 in the naval bill now under consideration.

On submarine boats in the past this Electric Boat Company has received an excess profit of \$1,519,738.58, making a past and proposed excessive profit of \$2,991,258.58.

These figures are not guesses or conjectures, but are based on

the statements of Admiral Bowles when a United States official, before he became a business man, the builder of these submarines for the electric-boat people.

I submit to the House statements which have gone to the select committee under House resolution 288:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 19, 1908.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Your committee has, I confess, somewhat to my surprise, permitted witnesses—both those who could by reason of expert knowledge know something of the construction, qualities, and cost of our present submarines, and also those who could have no possible expert or other knowledge as to the construction, performances, efficiency, and cost of these submarines—to give as part of their supposed testimony glowing accounts of the remarkable qualities of the Electric Boat Company's submarines, and having thus established the precedent, and in order that the question of the cost and efficiency of these boats may be presented on both sides, I submit the following, consisting of:

First. Extracts from the testimony of distinguished naval officers as to the cost of these boats, value of patents, etc., all of which testimony is of record in House documents therein referred to.

Second. A number of clippings from leading journals of the country setting forth in more or less detail the failure of the present submarines of the United States Navy in their experimental and other performances, which indicate that they are of but little practical value as defensive or offensive weapons as against any skillfully directed attack of a hostile fleet. It would appear as if the continuing failures of the present type of submarines in actual tests of efficiency is a complete answer to the somewhat ornamental and oratorical exploitation of them by the expert and nonexpert witnesses who thus appeared before your committee.

The newspaper clippings contained in the attached presentation are as follows: Army and Navy Register, March 14, 1908; New York Herald, June 5, 1907; Army and Navy Journal, March 14, 1908; Newport News Press, April 22, 1906; Newport News Press, May 4, 1906; New York World; Army and Navy Journal, October 26, 1907; New York Herald, February 22, 1908; Chicago Examiner, November 15, 1906; New York Sun, February 2, 7, 11, and 20, 1908; Army and Navy Journal, January 20, 1906; also House resolution No. 264.

Respectfully,

GEO. L. LILLEY.

Hon. H. S. BOUTELL,
Chairman Special Committee, House of Representatives.

HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE NAVAL COMMITTEE JANUARY, 1901—HOLLAND SUBMARINE BOATS.

(Page No. 38, notation No. 1:)

"Admiral O'NEIL. Congress already having authorized eight boats of the Holland type, at a total cost of about \$1,360,000 (\$170,000 each), may be said to have fulfilled all its obligations in this respect, and to have dealt liberally with the Holland Torpedo Boat Company, and has by its action afforded the Department ample means for experiment with boats of this particular type."

(Page No. 48, notation No. 2:)

"The CHAIRMAN. What is the cost of one of these boats?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. I should think that from \$75,000 to \$100,000 would be a liberal sum."

(Page No. 53, notation No. 3:)

"Mr. HAWLEY. What is the cost of the French boats?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. About \$116,000 apiece, I believe."

"Mr. HAWLEY. Are they not paying as much as \$150,000?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. I think perhaps they are for one or two of their largest boats."

"Mr. HAWLEY. They have one 185 feet long?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. I do not remember the cost of that."

"Mr. DAYTON. What is the size of the Holland?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. Fifty-four feet long."

"Mr. DAYTON. How much longer do they propose to make the new ones?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. They are to be 80 feet long, I think."

"Mr. HAWLEY. What size do they propose to make the new boats?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. The present boat is 54 feet long, and the new boat is to be 63 feet long. I was mistaken when I said 80 feet. They are to be 11 feet in diameter and 120 tons displacement under water and 104 tons when on the surface."

"Mr. DAYTON. This French boat that you spoke about that costs \$150,000—what is its size?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. I do not remember."

"Mr. HAWLEY. One hundred and eighty-five feet."

"Mr. DAYTON. Is there any reason why we should pay \$170,000 for a torpedo boat 63 feet long, when the French get a boat 185 feet long for \$150,000?"

"Admiral O'NEIL. As I have said, it depends upon whether you consider the cost of the boat alone or consider the amount of money spent for its development, and what you consider the device worth as a military device."

(Page No. 57, notation No. 4:)

"Mr. KITCHIN. From your estimate of the cost, it seems to me that the Government ought to get these boats at \$100,000 apiece."

"Admiral O'NEIL. That probably would be disputed by the company, but from my own observation, I think that would be a very liberal price for the Holland or the new Hollands."

REAR-ADMIRAL MELVILLE, CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

(Page 68, notation No. 5:)

"The CHAIRMAN. What, in your judgment, is the probable cost of the manufacture of a Holland boat?"

"Admiral MELVILLE. Between \$50,000 and \$70,000; \$50,000 for the lowest limit and \$70,000 for the highest. I have been calculating upon machinery for the last forty-five years—ships, hulls, and so forth."

(Page 3, notation 6, continued on page 12:)

"The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly give your name in full?"

"Mr. CREECY. Charles E. Creecy, Washington, D. C."

"The CHAIRMAN. Kindly state your business."

"Mr. CREECY. I am a lawyer by occupation. I have been connected with the Holland Torpedo Boat Company ever since some eight or ten years ago, and am thoroughly familiar with the history of it—all of its tribulations and trials—and I think I can answer intelligently any question that you gentlemen may desire to ask me on that subject."

"The CHAIRMAN. Are you the attorney for the company, Mr. Creecy?"

"Mr. CREECY. I am the representative of the company in Washington to look after their interests in the Departments and in Congress. I had so much faith in this boat that I have gone on the company's bond

to the extent of \$60,000. I am a stockholder in the company, and have been connected with it as a stockholder and as its representative, as I have told you, since its inception."

(See also page 12:)

"In assessing the value of such rights said board shall take into consideration not only the value of the property, but also the fact that the United States shall have afforded facilities for the development of the inventions covered by such rights by the appropriation of money to build the Plunger."

HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE NAVAL COMMITTEE ON SUBMARINE BOATS, 1902.

(Document No. 123, p. 1, notation 7:)

"Admiral O'NEIL. I know of no reason for changing the opinions expressed by me before this committee on January 15, 1901, with reference to submarine torpedo boats of the Holland type."

(Document No. 123, Melville, p. 13, May 26, 1902, on fair cost of Hollands.)

(Document No. 123, Melville, p. 22, notation No. 9:)

"Mr. DAYTON. Now, Admiral, you stated in your hearing before the committee last year that in your judgment the actual cost of a vessel of this kind would not exceed \$50,000 to \$70,000."

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. No, sir; that was my estimate for the Holland—the boat completed. The boats which are in course of construction are larger, and have a greater storage battery, and would naturally cost more money."

(Document No. 123, Melville, pp. 29 to 32:)

"Mr. RIXEY. You said a moment ago, in regard to the cost of this Holland boat, that you considered \$70,000 as a reasonable cost for it."

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. Yes, sir; that was the maximum amount that I estimated as the cost of constructing the Holland—that is, the submarine boat which we now possess. I said that the new boats would cost more, as they had more displacement and greater storage."

"Mr. RIXEY. Did that include what ought to be allowed for the use of the patents?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. No, sir. I attach very little value to the patents."

"Mr. RIXEY. What amount do you consider ought to be allowed for the use of the patents?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. In my opinion they do not possess a patent that is of substantial value. The boat is filled with commercial auxiliaries. As for the storage battery, there are quite a number in use, and I hardly believe that you could get an electrical expert who would state that any one type of battery is of such efficiency that it can be sold for an excessive amount."

"They may have a patent on the arrangement of their submerging tanks, and their claims may be allowed as to several arrangements of mechanical movements."

"I do not encourage infringement of valuable patents, but there is often more than one way of securing mechanical results. For this reason I believe it will be possible for a shipbuilder to contract for a boat of the Holland principle without his being compelled eventually to pay royalty of any kind. There is no doubt but that the Holland people believe that they have valuable patents; otherwise the company would not have been formed. As I have been asked my opinion of the value of these patents, I give an opinion that has been formed after considerable careful study."

"Mr. RIXEY. Suppose that these patents would be valid, what ought to be allowed for the use of the patent in the building of each boat?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. I do not know. If the Lake boat should prove to be the superior after competitive test, the patents could not have much commercial value."

"Mr. RIXEY. What would be a reasonable compensation?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. Practically nothing from my standpoint. I recognize the fact, however, that they have some market value, particularly after the boat has been favorably indorsed by conscientious and distinguished naval officers."

"Mr. RIXEY. On the question of a consideration of the use of the patents, I want to ask you this: If this is a valuable invention and the patents are probably owned by this company, do you mean to state that they ought to have nothing for the use of their patents?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. I hardly think I said that. I stated that I did not attach any value to them. Holding the view that I do, it is not probable that I would be asked officially for any opinion upon the matter. This will be a matter for the Secretary of the Navy or the courts to determine."

"Mr. RIXEY. I understand; but suppose they are valuable patents? You are talking about the value of the boat as it stands, the cost of the boat, outside of the question of its use. You stated that \$70,000 was a fair price for the boat. Now, I want to know if that included the patents. You said 'No.'"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. It was the Holland that I referred to as costing \$70,000; the new boats, being larger, should cost \$90,000. This does not take into consideration at all any royalties that might be due to the Holland Company. My estimation is based upon what I believe is their proper cost."

"Mr. RIXEY. If the boat is of no account, you would not want to pay \$70,000 for it; but if it is a valuable boat, what would you include in the price of the boat for the use of the patents?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. I believe that 50 per cent profit over the cost of construction should compensate the company adequately. This sum would include profits as well as pay for the use of the patents. The patents would have to be valuable for the company to ask such profits. For profits alone I would not allow over 25 per cent increase."

"Mr. RIXEY. That would be profit, but would that be compensation for the patents? You take the ordinary contractor who builds a battle ship, and you expect him to make 25 per cent on the cost of the ship, do you not?"

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. It may be that some of them make that profit. I am quite sure that all of them do not. I can only approximate as to what profit shipbuilding firms make."

"Mr. RIXEY. That does not pay the contractors for any patents."

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. No; but he has a plant that has cost him several million dollars, and he takes risks in putting such a large amount of capital in the business."

"Mr. RIXEY. There is profit upon his investment, but it is not for the patents."

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. Last year there were firms in this country who were capable of building battle ships who did not do so. The president of one shipbuilding firm told me that he was very indifferent about securing a contract for war ships. He could not have believed that there were such large profits in the work. If there is 25 per cent profit in the business, why is not the competition keener?"

"Mr. RIXEY. Suppose a battle ship were invented, protected by patents, you would have to pay something in addition for those patents, and my idea was simply to get at what the Holland boat ought to cost complete.

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. I agree with you, Mr. Rixey, that if the patent rights are worth anything they should be paid for.

"Mr. RIXEY. What would be a reasonable compensation for them?

"Rear-Admiral MELVILLE. I will have to go back to what I said before. Personally I attach no value to them. There is a special law whereby inventors of military appliances can be reimbursed for the use of their patents."

STATEMENT OF REAR-ADMIRAL F. T. BOWLES.

(No. 123—Bowles. Notation No. 11, page 4.)

"The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you, Admiral, if you have made any investigation as to the cost of these boats?

"Admiral BOWLES. Yes. I have gone carefully into the matter of the cost of these boats.

"The CHAIRMAN. I mean, of course, of the Holland boat.

"Admiral BOWLES. Of the Holland boats. I have made a schedule of the cost of the boats under present construction.

"Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Excuse me, Admiral, right here. Is that the last boat?

"Admiral BOWLES. The boats now building under contract, and I have prepared a schedule of what I think would be a reasonable price for the boats now building.

"The CHAIRMAN. Would that price give them a reasonable profit?

"Admiral BOWLES. Give them a handsome profit.

"Mr. MEYER. Does it embrace the cost of administration?

"Admiral BOWLES. I was about to say that the cost of a submarine boat largely depends on the amount of experimentation which has to be done. That is certainly very expensive. Now, my calculations show that a reasonable cost, with a handsome profit to the contractor for the boats now building, would be \$89,459.

"Of that I have allowed \$11,100 for trials and tests. This price includes a fair percentage for the usual margin of general expenses, such as are incurred in manufacturing work, but nothing more.

"Mr. LESSLER. You are going to put that all in, are you not?

"Admiral BOWLES. No. I will answer any question with regard to the cost of the relative parts of the boat, but this is my memorandum.

"Mr. LESSLER. Very well.

"Mr. RIXEY. Admiral, in the statement you proposed a little while ago, the appropriation carries \$125,000 for each boat, as I understand you?

"Admiral BOWLES. Yes, sir.

"Mr. RIXEY. You say \$89,000 would carry a liberal profit?

"Admiral BOWLES. Yes.

"Mr. RIXEY. Why do you provide an appropriation of \$125,000?

"Admiral BOWLES. I provide that because the provision requires the Secretary of the Navy to be satisfied that the boat is a substantial improvement upon anything now building. That, of course, will involve certain experimentation, and the provision says 'four or more,' that is, the price could not exceed \$125,000, but it might be less.

"The CHAIRMAN. You have examined the hull of the Holland boats, as I understand it?

"Admiral BOWLES. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. What do you estimate as the cost of the hull?

"Admiral BOWLES. I estimate the cost of the hull at \$13,835.

"The CHAIRMAN. What machines are there inside of her?

"Admiral BOWLES. The principal machine is the gasoline engine.

"The CHAIRMAN. What is that worth?

"Admiral BOWLES. I have allowed in my estimate \$60 a horsepower for that, which is a very liberal price, and that makes the total value \$9,600.

"The CHAIRMAN. What is the next important piece of machinery?

"Admiral BOWLES. The next important item is the storage battery.

"The CHAIRMAN. What do you value that at?

"Admiral BOWLES. I value it at \$12,000.

"The CHAIRMAN. What is the next important bit of machinery?

"Mr. VANDIVER. Let me ask right there, does that include the dynamo and all?

"Admiral BOWLES. No, sir. The next most important item is the dynamo and motor. They are in one machine. For that I have allowed, with all its fittings, \$3,850.

"The CHAIRMAN. What about the steering apparatus?

"Admiral BOWLES. For the steering and driving arrangements I have allowed \$4,868.

"The CHAIRMAN. The ventilating apparatus or the tubing for the air?

"Admiral BOWLES. For ventilation I have allowed about \$200.

"Mr. LESSLER. Does that include all the tanks necessary for the storage of the air?

"Admiral BOWLES. No.

"Mr. LESSLER. The torpedo apparatus?

"Admiral BOWLES. For the torpedo tube and gear I have allowed \$1,100.

"The CHAIRMAN. What are the other pieces of machinery that you have estimated on in a general way?

"Admiral BOWLES. The next largest item that I have not covered in my testimony are the flooding and pumping arrangements, the air-compressing gear, flasks, and piping, amounting to about \$13,000. Those are the principal items of the cost of the boat.

"The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any trouble in building this boat in a Government navy-yard, do you think?

"Admiral BOWLES. None whatever.

"The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you whether the machinery in this boat is or is not merchandisable articles?

"Admiral BOWLES. All the principal machinery can be purchased in the open market.

"The CHAIRMAN. You can go out and buy them in the open market?

"Admiral BOWLES. Yes, sir.

"Mr. RIXEY. Ask him whether he could build the boat without infringing on any patents.

"Admiral BOWLES. It might require a little manipulation. What I mean is this: Every principle that is involved in the building of the submarine boat and its operation is well known. The patents upon the Holland submarine boat are upon detailed methods of accomplishing certain particular things. Now, then, if we do not do those in those particular ways we do not infringe upon their patents.

"Mr. DAXTON. Can they be done in other ways?

"Admiral BOWLES. They can be done in other ways."

At the time Rear-Admiral Bowles made the foregoing statements as to the cost of submarines, he was Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair of the Navy Department, and necessarily had much to do with the construction of crafts of this character. At the present time he

is in charge of the construction work, etc., of the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, the builders of the Holland type of submarines. That he is authority on matters of cost of construction there is no doubt, otherwise a shipbuilding company as large as the one with which he is employed would not intrust their building to him.

Therefore, basing calculations upon the figures which Admiral Bowles states would give "a handsome profit" to the builders of the Holland boats; namely, \$89,459 for a 120-ton boat, or \$745.45 per ton—it will readily be seen by the following comparative statement that there has been an extra handsome profit of \$1,519,738.58 since the United States contracted for the first Holland, the *Plunger*, in March, 1899.

Boat.	Tons.	Cost per boat.	Cost per ton.	Excess over \$745.45 per ton.	Total excess profit per boat on a basis of \$745.45 per ton.
Holland.....	105	\$150,000	\$1,428.57	\$683.12	\$71,727.60
Adder.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Porpoise.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Plunger.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Pike.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Shark.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Moccasin.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Grampus.....	120	170,000	1,416.66	671.21	80,545.20
Octopus.....	274	250,000	912.42	166.95	45,749.78
Viper.....	170	200,000	1,176.47	431.02	73,273.40
Cuttlefish.....	170	185,000	1,088.23	342.78	58,272.60
Tarantula.....	170	185,000	1,088.23	342.78	58,272.60
	274	285,000	1,040.15	294.70	80,747.80
Octopus type (four boats).....	274	285,000	1,040.15	294.70	80,747.80
	274	285,000	1,040.15	294.70	80,747.80
	340	302,000	1,064.70	319.25	108,545.00
Octopus type (three boats).....	340	302,000	1,064.70	319.25	108,545.00
	340	302,000	1,064.70	319.25	108,545.00
Total excess profit on boats to date.....					1,519,738.58

This brings us up to the proposed submarine legislation as passed upon the House Committee on Naval Affairs, namely:

"The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized and directed to contract for eight submarine torpedo boats, in an amount not exceeding in the aggregate \$3,500,000, and the sum of one million is hereby appropriated toward said purpose, and to remain available until expended: *Provided*, That all such boats shall be of the same type heretofore determined to be the superior, as the result of the competitive tests held under the provision of the naval appropriation act approved June 29, 1906, and March 2, 1907, unless on or before October 1, 1908, a submarine boat of a different type and of full size for naval warfare shall have been constructed and submitted to the Navy Department for like trial and by such like trial by said Department demonstrated to be not inferior to the best submarine torpedo boat in the competitive competition above referred to."

Computing the excessive profit to the Electric Boat Company from the proposed legislation, as above quoted, on Admiral Bowles's figures, we have:

Eight submarines of the *Octopus* type at a cost of \$3,500,000, which means a unit cost of \$437,500 for a 340-ton boat, or \$1,286 per ton. Deducting from this proposed price the price per ton (\$745) recommended by Admiral Bowles, who, as I have stated, is the builder of these boats, and it is seen that the Government would be paying an excessive profit of \$541 per ton. In other words, the excessive profit on these eight boats of 340 tons each would be \$1,471,520.

It can be readily shown, I think, by the testimony of Admiral Capps, the present Chief Constructor of the Navy Department, if the committee desires to go into the matter of cost of submarines, that the cost to construct these boats does not hold good per ton as the size of the boat is increased; that is to say, any naval expert will testify that the cost per ton decreases in an increasing ratio as the size and tonnage of the boats are increased. For instance, a 200-ton boat would cost per ton considerable more than a 250-ton boat, and a 300, 350, 400, 450, or 500 ton boat would decrease in cost per ton in a continuing and accelerating ratio.

I submit a comparative statement of the bids submitted by the Electric Boat Company and the Lake Torpedo Boat Company for the construction of submarines on April 30, 1907, from which it appears that the submarines to be constructed by the Electric Boat Company are to cost on an average of about \$320 per ton more than the prices offered by the Lake Torpedo Boat Company under guarantees required by the Navy Department and subject to the performances of all tests prescribed or to be prescribed by the Navy Department as a condition precedent to their acceptance. By this statement it will also be seen that the lowest price of the Lake Torpedo Boat Company is \$800 per ton, which approaches very closely the price given by Admiral Bowles.

EXHIBIT "A."—Comparative statement of proposals for submarines.

[Submitted to the Secretary of the Navy April 30, 1907.]

	The Lake Torpedo Boat Co.				The Electric Boat Co.				Lake Co.'s advantage per ton.
	Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		
			Boat.	Ton.			Boat.	Ton.	
85-foot.....	1	235	\$225,000	\$957.44	1	274	\$323,000	\$1,178.83	\$221.39
	2	235	210,000	893.61	2	274	317,000	1,156.93	263.32
	3	235	198,000	842.55	3	274	315,000	1,149.63	307.08
	4	235	198,000	842.55	4	274	313,000	1,142.33	320.78
	5	235	198,000	842.55	5	274	312,000	1,138.68	296.13
100-foot, type A..	1	275	300,000	1,090.90	1	274	323,000	1,178.83	\$7.93
	2	275	275,000	1,000.00	2	274	317,000	1,156.93	150.93
	3	275	250,000	909.09	3	274	315,000	1,149.63	240.54
	4	275	250,000	909.09	4	274	313,000	1,142.33	233.24
	5	275	250,000	909.09	5	274	312,000	1,138.68	220.60
100-foot, type B..	1	250	235,000	940.00	1	274	323,000	1,178.83	238.83
	2	250	225,000	900.00	2	274	317,000	1,156.93	253.93
	3	250	220,000	880.00	3	274	315,000	1,149.63	269.63
	4	250	220,000	880.00	4	274	313,000	1,142.33	283.33
	5	250	220,000	880.00	5	274	312,000	1,138.68	258.68

EXHIBIT "A."—Comparative statement of proposals for submarines—Continued.

	The Lake Torpedo Boat Co.				The Electric Boat Co.				Lake Co.'s advantage per ton.
	Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		
			Boat.	Ton.			Boat.	Ton.	
100-foot, type A.	1	500	\$450,000	\$900.00	1	340	\$395,000	\$1,161.76	\$261.76
	2	500	425,000	850.00	2	340	385,000	1,132.35	282.35
	3	500	405,000	810.00	3	340	382,000	1,123.52	313.52
	4	500	405,000	810.00	4	340	380,000	1,117.64	307.64
	5	500	405,000	810.00	5	340	379,000	1,114.70	304.70
142-foot, type B.	1	425	395,000	\$38.82	1	340	395,000	1,161.76	302.94
	2	425	350,000	823.52	2	340	385,000	1,132.35	308.82
	3	425	340,000	800.00	3	340	382,000	1,123.52	323.52
	4	425	340,000	800.00	4	340	380,000	1,117.64	317.64
	5	425	340,000	800.00	5	340	379,000	1,114.70	314.70

Pacific coast prices—Lake Company's same for Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf.

	The Lake Torpedo Boat Co.				The Electric Boat Co.				Lake Co.'s advantage per ton.
	Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		Boats.	Tons.	Price per—		
			Boat.	Ton.			Boat.	Ton.	
100-foot, type A.	1	275	\$300,000	\$1,090.90	1	274	\$350,000	\$1,313.83	\$222.93
	2	275	275,000	1,000.00	2	274	348,000	1,270.07	270.07
	3	275	250,000	909.09	3	274	343,000	1,251.82	342.73
	4	275	250,000	909.09	4	274	341,000	1,244.52	335.43
	5	275	250,000	909.09	5	274	340,000	1,240.87	331.70
142-foot, type B.	1	425	395,000	838.82	1	340	438,000	1,288.23	429.41
	2	425	350,000	823.52	2	340	425,000	1,250.00	426.48
	3	425	340,000	800.00	3	340	420,000	1,235.29	435.29
	4	425	340,000	800.00	4	340	418,000	1,229.40	429.40
	5	425	340,000	800.00	5	340	417,000	1,226.47	426.47

Average price per ton of bids by Electric Boat Company..... \$1, 198. 33

Average price per ton of bids by Lake Torpedo Boat Company..... 877. 56

Average advantage per ton of Lake Torpedo Boat Company's bids..... 320. 77

The foregoing, as well as the following statement of the public press, show clearly that these boats have been most expensive instruments in warfare without rendering or demonstrating any practical value in return.

[Army and Navy Register, March 14, 1908.]

The report of the performance of the three submarines on the trip from New York to Annapolis has led to some question whether the 11-inch cylinder gasoline engines, supposed to be the largest afloat, with which the boats are equipped, are fitted for such work as they are called upon to do as the motive power of this type of vessel. They are suited for light work, such as running out from a dock and back again. The commanding officers of the *Viper*, *Cuttlefish*, and *Tarantula* will make special reports on this subject, and it is expected that the Navy Department will decide that certain changes should be made before similar engines are installed in the boats contracted for.

This article indicates that the boats are only suited for light work, and that they are having much trouble with their engines, etc.

[New York Herald, June 5, 1907.]

"SUBMARINES ARE USELESS"—SIGSBEE.—REAR-ADMIRAL ALSO DECLARES THAT AIR SHIPS AS ENGINES OF BATTLE ARE ONLY A DREAM.

Baltimore, Tuesday.—That the submarine torpedo boat is only a scarecrow, that battles among air ships in mid-air is a dream, and that every war benefits nations were the ideas expressed by Rear-Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee to-day.

"The submarine," said the Admiral, "is a vessel of opportunity. There may be a time when it will be a powerful engine of warfare, but you will notice that as rapidly as some new method of attack is invented a new method of defense is ready to oppose it.

"For the present nothing is to be feared from or hoped for the submarine. It is a vessel which must sneak up under cover of night, and even then its bubbles can be seen and its course detected so accurately that it is small matter to avoid it.

"I was eight days and eight nights before Santiago, and was not attacked by the torpedoes, and later, when I was attacked, our guns simply sank them and killed eight of the crew, while the rest had a hard time getting ashore with the wreck. No, it must not be assumed in developing an engine of attack that the other fellow is not in the tower. I never slept before Santiago."

"That the submarine torpedo boat is only a scarecrow." "That the submarine is a vessel of opportunity." "That at the present time nothing is to be feared or hoped from the submarine."

[Army and Navy Journal, March 14, 1908.]

The engines for the submarine *Octopus* will soon be completed, and it will not be long now before the boat will be turned over to the Navy Department and placed in commission. While this boat is the standard boat of her type, she has been unfortunate, and the *Cuttlefish* and *Viper*, which were begun after she was laid down, have been in commission six months. The *Octopus* during her acceptance trials at Newport last July sunk and her crew lost control of her, and at one time thought their lives were lost. In trying to get her up the engines were practically ruined. By means of the compressed-air apparatus the boat was got to the surface and a terrible catastrophe was avoided in the nick of time. The *Octopus* had, previous to this adventure, competed in the contest with the Lake boat for the \$3,000,000 hung up by Congress to be awarded in contracts to the company having the winning boat. It was on the result of this contest that the proposition was advanced in the House Naval Committee to give contracts for submarines to the makers of the *Octopus*, without competition by any other concern.

[Newport News, Va., Press, April 22, 1906.]

UNCLE SAM'S SUBMARINES AND THEIR DERRICKS.

We note with more or less interest a Washington dispatch which announces that special precautions are to be taken for the safety of the submarine boats now in the Navy, which practical men have come to believe are a menace to the men who handle them. For instance, we are told that "not only will there be with them at their maneuvers a tender, equipped with a powerful derrick and booms for lifting a disabled submarine to the surface, but it is proposed to furnish each submarine with a floating signal, arranged with a spool of light wire carried on the outside of the submarine shell and connected with the interior so that in time of disaster the imprisoned persons may release the floating signal, which will appear on the surface of the water and indicate that the submarine is in distress."

"It has been pointed out," continues the dispatch, "by an expert that a submarine might really be unable to get to the surface, and that by the nature of the exercises no one would be aware of the fact until it was too late to render assistance." We fail to see why it required expert knowledge to arrive at a conclusion established by more than one horrible and soul-sickening catastrophe on the other side of the ocean, and which might have been duplicated here but for the fact that the Navy's submarines have been towed from place to place and have seen very little real service under everyday conditions.

There is evidently something radically wrong with the submarine which requires such elaborate and costly apparatus to prevent it from becoming a death trap even under ordinary conditions following a summer day's maneuvers. Would it have a tendency to encourage the men penned up in such a craft to know that their comrades above knew that they were helpless on the bottom of the sea? Would it have a tendency to encourage that confidence and esprit du corps which is so essential in the satisfactory handling of a war vessel or any other war contrivance?

It seems to us that this trifling with the submarine question has been carried far enough. It is becoming quite apparent that the Navy Department made an egregious blunder in its original selection of a submarine, and all this derrick and signal business is designed to hide the merits of the case and to bolster up and try to make practical a boat which is built on dangerous principles to begin with.

Now, the question is, What does Congress propose to do about the matter? It would be the rankest sort of stupidity to continue buying submarines which have demonstrated their unfitness for practical service and which must be reinforced by derricks and signals, and must always have a convoy close at hand to keep it from being more destructive than the guns of an enemy's ship.

In view of these facts it is surprising that the Navy Department should persistently attempt to shut out any competition which would have a tendency to show a better submarine. Does that mean a lobby and an ultimate submarine scandal as odorous as that which sent some Government officials of the Post-Office Department to the penitentiary?

If some Member of Congress could just erect a derrick which would lift the Navy Department out of its preconceived ideas of submarine affairs, a greater service would be performed than by any mechanical contrivance which simply would pull a submarine out of the mud.

[Newport News, Va., Press, May 4, 1906.]

A SUBMARINE EXPLOIT.

An Associated Press dispatch from Newport, R. I., gives interesting details of one of the latest exploits of a Government submarine boat. The story follows:

"The Government tug *Mina* was rammed to-day by the submarine torpedo boat *Porpoise* during the maneuvers in Coddington Cove and the tug was forced to run full speed for the shore to escape sinking.

The *Porpoise*, Lieutenant Knowton, was making tests in the cove 4 miles above the city in Narragansett Bay, with the *Mina* acting as escort. The *Porpoise*, in coming to the surface at a good speed, struck the *Mina* on the starboard bow below the water line and stove a hole in her a few feet from the bow.

The forward compartment filled with water, but Chief Boatswain Sullivan, who was commanding the tug, swung her around and headed for the shore, at the same time ringing for full speed. The tug's bow was well down when she grounded on the sandy beach. The *Porpoise* was not injured."

A peculiar and somewhat disconcerting feature of most of the active operations of the particular type of submarines now holding sway in the United States Navy is their tendency to sink ships with which they are supposed to be cooperating and to turn turtle and suffocate the men who man them.

Recently naval experts have recommended that each of the submarines be attended by a convoy fitted out with a derrick, so that if anything should happen to the diver it might be hauled to the surface of the water. The performance of the *Porpoise* suggests that it may be necessary to furnish each submarine with two derrick-equipped convoys, for if there is to be this remarkable uncertainty regarding the course to be taken by a submarine as it comes to the surface, we have no assurance that the attending ship will not be put out of commission at any time. Then, too, the shock of the impact might also put the submarine out of business, in which event there would be pressing necessity for the other convoy with its derrick and its lifeboats.

We trust that the Navy Department will take this matter under consideration, and that the steps necessary to secure the additional convoy and derrick will be taken at once. Of course that would involve a good deal of expense, but if we are bound to have the present type of submarine (despite its shortcomings and its manifest dangers) we must have the necessary safeguards to protect the lives of the submarine crew and the derrick tenders. Besides, what is a little matter of money when it comes to hiding the bad judgment of the men who have been deciding these submarine issues according to their own sweet wills? It would be easier for them to provide the extra convoys and derricks than to admit that they have made a mistake. The taxpayers, however, may some day take a different view of the matter.

[New York World.]

JAPAN IN YEAR WILL BE READY FOR THE WORLD—SO SAYS JOHN P. HOLLAND, WHO COACHED HER ENGINEER IN SUBMARINE BUILDING—NEW CRAFT MARVELS—"WILL GO ANYWHERE A FLEET CAN, AND STRONG ENOUGH TO SMASH EVANS."

John P. Holland found time to-day to sound a note of warning to the warring members of the Naval Committee at Washington and to Uncle Sam regarding the prospects of a sea fight in which our submarines may figure. He said:

"All submarines in use to-day are copies of my original boat, many

of them poor apologies. The submarine fleet of the United States would be utterly useless outside of breaking a harbor blockade. They could not follow a fleet, like those which Japan is turning out every day.

"Japan has incomparably more superior submarine war men than we have. Mr. Matsu Kata, her national engineer, spent a year with me, daily learning the devices and secrets of the *Holland*. He returned to his country when no breath of hostility stirred the air. Unlike most peoples, the Japs work independently and indefatigably. They are building boats designed and fitted to accompany a fleet in any kind of weather for any distance and at any speed. Think of that! Admiral Evans's vast fleet would be blown from the seas with such submarine craft against him.

"Our boats can not travel with a fleet, and they can not venture from a port. Japan's boats work; they don't do stunts. Our submarines, I'm sorry to say, are now a joke. My patterns have been subjected to the treatment of young, inexperienced engineers, who professed to know more about problems I had battled with for years, and ruined.

"It is amazing how the United States Government can spend millions for submarines, and then get really nothing compared to what skillful Japanese engineers are building for their country.

"I am not wealthy, but I manage to keep the wolf from the door. I once had one-half of 1 per cent in the Electric Boat Company and the company which bears my name, but the promoters, men of great wealth, figured that some little schoolboy engineer could produce results with the product of my years of toil, and I was left in the cold.

"The American people are beginning to see the strangely unpatriotic heart which beats in the breast of a corporation. Uncle Sam is the victim, not I. I created a war weapon which, under my care and improvement, would have eclipsed any destructive machine in the world. England tried to improve on my plans and lost three submarine crews and three boats."

Mr. Holland, the inventor of the submarines, now in the service of the United States, and which boats bear his name, states in the above:

"Our submarines, I'm sorry to say, are now a joke. My patterns have been subjected to the treatment of young, inexperienced engineers, who profess to know more about problems I had battled with for years, and ruined."

[Army and Navy Journal, October 26, 1907.]

The Navy Department has not yet accepted the submarine *Octopus*, and some curiosity is shown as to cause for delay, as other boats built by her makers since this boat was completed have been accepted. Department officials explain that during the tests at Newport last spring an accident occurred to the machinery of the *Octopus*, and she went to the bottom and stayed there until by using the compressed-air apparatus the boat came up. As the engines were injured in the attempt to raise the boat on the occasion referred to, there has been delay in accepting her.

[New York Herald, February 22, 1908.]

SUBMARINES POOR, SAYS MR. HOLLAND—INVENTOR CALLS LATEST CRAFT OF ELECTRIC BOAT COMPANY "WORTHLESS"—WOULD STOP BUILDING—SAYS GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONSTRUCT NO MORE, AS THEY ARE "UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURE"—DENIAL OF ISAAC L. RICE—TAKES ISSUE WITH WASHINGTON REPORTS ON THE LESSLER INVESTIGATION BEFORE CONGRESS.

John P. Holland, inventor of the original Holland submarine boat, said yesterday at his home, in Orange, N. J., that he had no knowledge whatever concerning developments in connection with the building of submarine boats for the United States Government. He said that up to April 1, 1904, he had been consulting engineer of the Electric Boat Company, but since then had had nothing to do with that company. He did not want his name used in connection with submarines recently completed or being built, as they did not represent his patents or conform with his original plans.

"If I were placed on the witness stand before a naval investigating committee at Washington," said Mr. Holland, "I would urge that no more submarine boats be built like those that have recently been constructed. To my mind they are worthless as defensive boats, and therefore an unnecessary expenditure. What the people of the Pacific coast are thinking about when, as is reported, they petition for submarine boats I do not understand. Submarines can never effectually defend any coast, as is understood by naval authorities."

Mr. Holland said he saw Baron Matsu Kata last September and again in October, and that the Baron told him that the boats were being built at Kobe, but would not say how many were being constructed. He was given to understand, however, that a big *Hottila* was being built. Mr. Holland said that these boats would be able to cross the Pacific at a greater speed than Admiral Evans's fleet was now making and would be able to accompany any fleet of battle ships on any cruise. The submarine, Mr. Holland said, was no defense against a submarine and could be used only as a defense against a battle-ship fleet or to attack a battle-ship fleet or land defenses.

Isaac L. Rice, president of the Electric Boat Company, was desirous of getting his side of the alleged bribery in Washington before the public and asked to be allowed to explain the Lessler matter. To a Herald reporter he said:

"In connection with the Representative Montague Lessler matter, I desire to say it was disposed of completely by a very exhaustive examination made by Congress, covering 270 printed pages from House of Representatives Report 3482, Fifty-seventh Congress, second session.

"Your Washington correspondent says in yesterday's issue that 'Lessler came out of the investigation with flying colors, yet the committee reported there was no reliable evidence of corruption.'

"This matter being nearly five years old, and your correspondent probably not having the report before him, I think it only proper to say that any use of the word 'reliable' is not accurate.

"The actual language of the unanimous report was as follows: 'That there is no evidence to sustain the charge of an attempt by the Holland Submarine Boat Company or any of its agents to corruptly influence a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs respecting proposed legislation before said committee and the House.'

[Chicago Examiner, November 15, 1906.]

EVANS LAUGHS AT SUBMARINES—"FIGHTING BOB" SAYS UNITED STATES NAVY IS BEST IN WORLD—FIRES BROADSIDE OF TALK AT REPORTER—36,000 MEN IN SERVICE ARE NOT ENOUGH FOR SHIPS NOW BUILT.

"Fighting Bob" Evans anchored in Chicago yesterday, and here are some of his ideas:

The principal use of the submarine is to frighten nervous people.

Our Navy is third in size and first in excellence.

If we had a war, we would have to recruit fast.

The battle ship is the backbone of the Navy.

Our traditions are the soul of the Navy.

We need a general staff.

Avast lubber! Fighting Bob Evans is in town.

No; that hitch in his leg is not a sea hitch. It came from a wound received while storming Fort Fisher. He strode the deck at the Virginia Hotel yesterday and piped the Navy for fair. "Piped" is a sea-going word.

It lacked two bells of the time for the dinner flag to go to the mast-head at the hotel when the admiral saw a reporter salute the quarter-deck and come aboard. Here is what he said:

"The American Navy ranks third in point of size, but in point of excellence it comes first.

"There is no longer any difficulty in getting first-class men to man ships. If we had a war, however, we would have to do some fast recruiting. Before the Spanish-American war 96 per cent of the Navy was foreign born; now the percentage is exactly reversed.

THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND MEN NOT ENOUGH.

"We have at present 36,000 enlisted men in the service. The number is not sufficient to man the ships that are already built.

"The naval reserve is to the Navy what the National Guard is to the Army, and the naval reserves compares very favorably with the National Guard in organization and in discipline. Its object is to man the auxiliary cruisers in time of war, although it could be used to reinforce the crews of the regular ships.

"I do not see how the present large naval establishment can be managed without the organization of a general staff. We have none at present, but we could not successfully manage a war without one.

"We learned many things from the Japanese-Russian war. However valuable these lessons were, they did not materially alter the theories that have been previously held by naval men.

"They demonstrated beyond a doubt that the battle ship is the backbone of the Navy, and that no number of cruisers, however well handled or fleet, can possibly take the place of the battle ship. The limit in size of the battle ships has been reached, and I do not believe that anything larger than a 20,000-ton vessel will ever be designed for the Navy.

SUBMARINE AN EXPERIMENT.

"The submarine is principally good to frighten nervous people. It has not passed beyond the stage of experiment. The moral effect of these little fellows in war would undoubtedly be great, but their destructive power is yet to be shown.

"Everything has changed in the Navy since I entered it except seamanship, gunnery, and the traditions of the Navy. I came in forty-six years ago. Our traditions are the soul of the Navy. If our crews did not have the courage and the loyalty that animated the crews of the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Constitution*, the most powerful ships and the most improved armament would not avail us anything."

[New York Sun, February 2, 1908.]

SUBMARINES DO NOT GO OUT—WOULD JUST AS SOON HAVE CALMER SEAS FOR TRIP TO ANNAPOLIS.

The submarines *Tarantula*, *Cuttlefish*, and *Viper*, although it is their habit to navigate the depths far from superficial agitation, did not care to venture out into the southeast gale that was wrinkling the surface of the sea yesterday. They were scheduled to start in the morning, accompanied by the gunboat *Hist*, for Annapolis, on the longest ocean trip ever attempted by craft of their class. The distance, including more than 100 miles of the comparatively quiescent waters of Chesapeake Bay, is 420 nautical miles. Lieut. C. E. Courtney, in charge of the *Hist*, commands the expedition. The twelve men on each of the little ships are mostly machinists and electricians. Lieut. J. F. Daniels commands the *Tarantula*, Lieut. D. C. Bingham the *Viper*, and Lieut. E. J. Marquart the *Cuttlefish*. The submarines are not intended to be storm defiers and that is why Lieutenant Courtney decided to hold them in port until the weather was favorable to test their long-distance capacity. They may not start for Annapolis until to-morrow.

[New York Sun, February 7, 1908.]

SUBMARINES MAKE A START—AND THEN COME BACK AGAIN, FINDING THE SEA TOO ROUGH.

The submarines *Tarantula*, *Cuttlefish*, and *Viper*, preceded by the gunboat *Hist*, flagship of the expedition, bound for Annapolis on the longest trip ever attempted by vessels of their class, made a start for the open yesterday evening. It was the intention to send them away last Saturday, when there was a gale afloat, but Lieut. C. E. Courtney, who commands the *Hist* and is the admiral of the squadron, decided that they could not do the trick in bad weather.

The little ships left the navy-yard yesterday afternoon after maneuvering in the upper bay to see that everything worked shipshape. They headed seaward, passing out at Sandy Hook in a single column, with the *Hist* leading, at 6.05 o'clock. The marine observer at the Hook thought they were off, but they were not. He did not see them again, but Quarantine reported them passing in to anchorage off Tompkinsville at 8.50. Lieutenant Courtney had found very rough weather outside, although it looked placid enough in the lower bay when he headed seaward. He so informed by wireless Rear-Admiral Goodrich, in command at the navy-yard.

Will an attacking hostile fleet wait for fair weather? Of what use can these fair-weather boats be in an engagement fought through storm? Of what moral effect, even, would such boats have when all experts acquainted with our submarines know that about all they have proven is their weakness?

[New York Sun, February 11, 1908.]

SUBMARINES GO INTO DRY DOCK—THE ICE HAS PLAYED THE MISCHIEF WITH THE LIGHT-WEIGHT PROPELLERS.

The lookouts at Cape Henry may have to wait a long time before they get a glimpse of the submarine boats *Cuttlefish*, *Tarantula*, and *Viper*, which a dispatch from Norfolk published yesterday said had not entered the Chesapeake. The three little war ships were put in dry dock yesterday in the navy-yard at Brooklyn to have their twisted propellers straightened out.

They were scheduled to sail ten days ago for Annapolis, but a storm that stirred the coastwise course into unwonted turmoil kept them in. They sailed from the navy-yard on Thursday, and after maneuvering in the upper bay headed for the open, preceded by the gunboat *Hist*, flagship of the squadron, commanded by Lieut. C. E. Courtney. They got outside the Hook, where it was found that one of the submarines had a

twisted propeller blade and that the rest would have to accommodate their speed to that of the damaged ship if it was decided to make the trip. Besides this, the sea outside was a bit lumpy.

Now, one of the objects of the 400-mile trip is to create a speed record for craft of the diving sort, and as that would have been impossible with a disabled vessel, Lieutenant Courtney put back and anchored off Tompkinsville. He found lots of ice there in the next turn of the tide seaward, and it played the deuce with the squadron's propellers, which were not made to battle with arctic seas. He had to call for a tug from the navy-yard to help cut a lane for the submarines through the ice. They were towed to the yard and had more trouble with the ice in making dock.

It was suggested that the submarines might have avoided the ice by plunging under it; but that, the experts said, was impracticable in a crowded harbor like New York, and outside the harbor they do not have to dive, as there is no ice worth mentioning a few miles offshore. Going up the Chesapeake at this season the boats are likely to encounter about as much, if not more, ice than they met down the bay. The ice is sometimes so heavy in the Chesapeake that ice breakers, specially constructed steamers heavily shod with steel, are used to keep navigation open. It looks now as if the trip of the submarines will be postponed until there is a breaking up of the ice—which may not come for several weeks—in this harbor.

Each of the little ships is 93 feet long over all, has a displacement of 175 tons, and carries four Whitehead torpedoes.

[New York Sun, February 20, 1908.]

CRUISER TO AID SUBMARINE—DES MOINES SENT TO FREE HIST AND VIPER, STUCK IN CHESAPEAKE BAY.

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1908.

Capt. Charles J. Badger, superintendent of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., telephoned to the Navy Department to-day that the gunboat *Hist*, which is the tender to the flotilla of submarines which left New York last Sunday afternoon, is aground on Cove Point in Chesapeake Bay, about 40 miles below Annapolis, at the mouth of the Patuxent River. The submarine *Viper*, he said, is also aground seven miles below the Naval Academy. The submarines *Tarantula* and *Cuttlefish* are standing by the *Viper*.

The torpedo boat *Bagley*, Captain Badger, is said to have gone to the aid of the *Viper*, and the tug *Standish* left Annapolis yesterday to aid the *Hist*.

It was decided at the Navy Department late this afternoon to send the cruiser *Des Moines*, now at Hampton Roads, to the aid of the *Hist* and the *Viper*. The *Des Moines* will probably arrive early to-morrow morning and the little vessels will be hauled off without difficulty.

A telephone message was received at the Department to-day from Lieut. Charles E. Courtney, in command of the flotilla, saying that the submarines had good weather and made fair speed from the time they left New York Bay until the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay was reached. Upon entering the bay, he added, ice was encountered and there was a heavy snowstorm accompanied by thick weather. The *Hist* was driven ashore and the submarines endeavored to make the remainder of the trip to Annapolis without the tender. On their way up the bay the *Viper* ran ashore on account of a confusion of light-houses.

[Army and Navy Journal, January 20, 1906.]

Rear-Admiral Joseph B. Coghlan, United States Navy, in the course of an address before the Patria Club, of New York, on the evening of January 12, discussed the subject of naval expansion with the same vigor and frankness which have characterized his remarks on the same question on other recent occasions. He declared that while on paper the United States Navy in 1908 would be second in point of strength, yet if vessels now practically obsolete were stricken from the active list, the United States would rank only fifth or sixth among the naval powers of the world. Admiral Coghlan's views on the question of ship types were equally interesting. "There is," he said, "but one kind of fighting ship, and that is the speedy battle ship of the line. All other designs are doubtful quantities. Following the fads of various persons, we find among our twenty-seven fighting ships some millions of dollars wasted on four monitors. In the harbor of Manila I have seen one of them rolling twenty times a minute trying to hit something with a 12-inch gun—much as I have seen a woman trying to hit a hen with a stone. Three submarine ships came to the navy-yard last spring for repairs. Heaven only knows when they will get away. As soon as you repair one end of a craft the other end needs rebuilding. The insides have been wholly rebuilt, and the only thing I can see to do with them is to build new hulls. I shall object to doing that, however, when the subject comes up for consideration. I prefer to let them sink where they are. The battle ship is the ideal sea fighter, because it has the power of protection and the ability to carry its weapons within striking distance. But I consider the modern torpedo boat as the most deadly form of marine craft. I believe that there can be no final type of war vessel; we must always build—always keep repairing and realize that an up-to-date country should not only keep abreast of the times, but a little bit ahead. I believe that we should not follow too closely European standards in the construction of our battle ships. You will be surprised to know how quickly a ship becomes antiquated. Even now Dewey's ship *Olympia* would need a great amount of repairs to bring it up to date. The only man who ever can revolutionize war is he who will abolish it, and we are waiting for his second coming." Admiral Coghlan's remarks on the Naval Militia were equally to the point. He said: "It is often said that a few months will get our men into good shape. Yes; but where is the enemy who will give us even those few months? For such a one we will not need preparation. Some are trying to partly solve the problem by the idea of a naval militia. This may give us a few men, but they will be mostly men whose mode of life does not give them the stamina—physical, of course—to stand the strain and hardships. Even the best of these lack the 'sea habit' which would keep them good men during their first few weeks at sea. And so we are driven to the inevitable conclusion that our recruits in war must come from our deep-sea vessels—vessels engaged in foreign commerce."

"Three submarine ships came to the navy-yard last spring for repairs. Heaven only knows when they will get away. As soon as you repair one end of the craft the other end needs rebuilding. The insides have been wholly rebuilt, and the only thing I can see to do with them is to build new hulls."

The foregoing facts and conditions influenced me to introduce House resolution No. 264, and it is believed that an official statement of the facts asked for therein would go a great way to disabuse the illusions in the mind of the Electric Boat Company and their agents and representatives, technical and nontechnical, as to the practical merits of the boats they claim are so good.

Whereas, first, the following statements have been published in the public press: "It can be readily seen that the programme of the House committee at this session proposes to pay at least \$1,286 per ton for the submarines, against a reasonable price named by Mr. Bowles of \$745.40 per ton, or \$1,476,296.60 more than the present builder said they were worth when he testified before the committee in 1902." Also: "It developed to-day that on the seven Holland submarines commissioned in 1903, at a cost of \$1,190,000, the sum of \$439,119.09 has been expended in the last four years in maintenance and repairs. Of this amount three vessels alone have taken most of the appropriation. It is further ascertained that the *Grampus* and *Pike*, at Mare Island Navy-Yard, are now laid up, never having worked to the entire satisfaction of the Department, while Congress has just been asked to appropriate the following sums for repairs in addition to materials already purchased: The *Adder*, \$24,500; the *Grampus*, \$33,500; the *Moccasin*, \$38,500; the *Pike*, \$33,500. Must keep contracts secret. An investigation of the contracts under which the submarines are purchased by the Government shows there is a confidential paragraph in each contract by which the Government is bound not to reveal any data concerning plans, specifications, models, weight records, speed records, or any other information without specific authority from the manufacturers. In contrast to this secrecy, it is pointed out that millions of dollars of battle ships have been built and their performances and other data are duly chronicled in the Annual Register of the Navy Department." Also: "The trip of the submarine flotilla made up of the *Cuttlefish*, *Viper*, and *Tarantula*, and accompanied by the gunboat *Hist*, from New York to Annapolis Naval Academy has proved somewhat disappointing to naval officials." Also: "The *Octopus* is still in the shipbuilding yard having her engines, which were practically ruined in an accident during the acceptance tests here last spring, rebuilt;" and

Whereas, second, secret Government contracting is against public policy and the specific provisions of the Revised Statutes, sections 512, 515, 3744, 3745, which provide that papers on file may be examined by any person desiring to do so, and that copies thereof shall be furnished upon certain fees: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to inform the House of Representatives whether \$745.45 per ton is a reasonable price for *Octopus* type of submarines; what price per ton is being paid for *Octopus* type of submarines; whether the sum of \$3,500,000 is excessive for eight *Octopus* type of submarines; what repairs have been made on each submarine—why, when, where, and with what results; how many days each submarine has been in active commission; how many days each submarine has been out of commission, and why; what accidents each submarine has had, the nature thereof and causes thereof; what contracts have been made for submarines; what prices have been paid per ton for each submarine built or contracted for; what submarines are available for use; what submarines are not available for use, and why; and to transmit to the House of Representatives verbatim copies of everything on file in the Navy Department relating to submarine boats, with the exception of detailed plans thereof, but not excepting reports relating to the performance of each submarine, accidents thereto, repairs thereon, and condition thereof, and the specifications thereof.

The CHAIRMAN, Mr. LILLEY has also filed with the committee to be incorporated in the record the affidavit of one Clement E. Adams, of Bridgeport, Conn., relating to an article or articles printed by one J. F. C. Archibald, setting forth in this affidavit that Archibald told him the article was prepared at the request of one Lawrence Y. Spear.

At the suggestion of Mr. LILLEY this will be incorporated in the record in full, and any weight or importance attached to it in the way of evidence to be determined upon an examination of the person making it if it is deemed necessary.

BRIDGEPORT, March 16, 1908.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, County of Fairfield, ss:

Clement E. Adams, being duly sworn, doth depose and say that he resides in said Bridgeport and that in the summer of 1906 he was engaged in business in the city of Washington, and that during said summer of 1906 one J. F. C. Archibald came to him, the said Clement E. Adams, and represented that he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, was a war correspondent for Collier's Weekly and that he had been appointed by the President of the United States to visit certain cities and towns upon the Pacific coast of the United States to investigate and report to the President of the United States upon the condition of the coast defenses of the Pacific coast of the United States, and later he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, said to the deponent that he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, had visited certain cities and towns upon the Pacific coast of the United States and had reported thereon to the President of the United States, and that he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, had appeared before certain chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and other associations of business men and citizens in various cities and towns in States upon the Pacific coast and had addressed them, the said chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and associations of business men and citizens, upon the advantages to be gained by the States bordering upon the Pacific coast and the citizens of said States by the purchase by the United States Government of submarine torpedo boats, and that certain petitions and addresses made to Congress and the Members thereof by said chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and associations of business men and citizens in said cities and towns in States bordering upon the Pacific coast were caused by the work and efforts of him, the said J. F. C. Archibald, as aforesaid, and at a later time said deponent showed to the said J. F. C. Archibald a newspaper article on the subject of submarine torpedo boats wherein the Lake submarine torpedo boat was criticised, and the said J. F. C. Archibald said to deponent that he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, was the author of said newspaper article and did write the same, and that the criticism of the Lake submarine torpedo boat therein contained was incited and caused by the request to him, the said J. F. C. Archibald, made by one Lawrence Y. Spear, an officer of the Electric Boat Company, and that said request of the said Lawrence Y. Spear, made to him, the said J. F. C. Archibald, was by him, the said J. F. C. Archibald, acceded to because he, the said J. F. C. Archibald, was under obligations to the said Lawrence Y. Spear and the said Electric Boat Company.

CLEMENT E. ADAMS.

Subscribed and sworn to on this 16th day of March, A. D. 1908, before me.

[SEAL.]

CARL FOSTER, Notary Public.

The CHAIRMAN. Also a letter from Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, saying that he received a letter from Mr. Archibald. The clerk will read the letter in full and incorporate it in the proceedings.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 18, 1908.

MY DEAR MR. LILLEY: Referring to our conversation of this morning, Mr. Archibald never was appointed or employed by me, nor, so far as I know, was he ever appointed or employed by anyone else connected with the Administration. Some time about a year ago he came in and saw me for about two minutes and said that he was going to make an investigation of the question of submarine defense on the Pacific, especially, I believe, in reference to Puget Sound; and that he was immensely interested in the subject, having been a war correspondent for various papers, and that he would like to send me a report of what he found. I answered him that of course I should be very glad to receive such a report from him or any other man who might investigate the subject. He sent me a letter on the subject some weeks later, which I transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy. I have transmitted dozens of similar letters from men who have told me of investigations that they had made or of facts they had found or of suggestions which they believed were important. It is the usual course; it was followed in this instance exactly as in all similar cases.

Sincerely, yours,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Hon. GEORGE L. LILLEY,
House of Representatives.

If Congress insists that we have got to have submarines, let us build them in our own yards and do away with these subterranean methods that have pertained to submarine legislation. [Loud applause on the Republican side.]

I yield back the balance of my time to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. DAWSON].

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, we have to-day heard the ablest and most eloquent speech, perhaps, that ever was delivered in this House in favor of an extraordinary increase in the Navy. I do not believe that I can add anything to the very able answers that have already been made to its argument. No American in a case of necessity would stand back upon expense, but every American ought to take a common-sense view of every proposition, and the matter of expense is one of the things to be considered. The two battle ships carried in this naval bill will cost, in my judgment, \$11,000,000 apiece in order to put them in the sea in fighting condition. They will cost annually, probably, \$1,000,000 apiece thereafter for maintenance. The cost of these two ships—\$22,000,000—would build 440 public buildings in our smaller cities at \$50,000 apiece. We expend to-day on our Army and Navy, carried in the naval and military appropriation bills, more money than the 500,000 public school teachers, who teach 12,000,000 children, receive as their compensation. So it seems that the item of expense ought to be considered, although it ought not to be a dominating consideration.

To-day we have a navy that is seven and one-half times as large as our navy was when we declared war with Spain ten years ago. Also we have a navy that is nearly ten times as large as we had when President Cleveland sent his famous Venezuelan message. It is idle for gentlemen to tell us that a larger navy is essential to the preservation of the Monroe doctrine. We have preserved that doctrine for a hundred years nearly. That doctrine is grounded upon right, upon principle, and its correctness is its strength. Why, Mr. Chairman, what would the world have thought of this country twelve years ago if this Venezuelan message, which thrilled every diplomatic circle in the world, had been withheld on account of our small Navy compared with the navies of Europe, and especially with the navy of England, which would confront us in an emergency growing out of its subject-matter?

The history of the country shows conclusively that an immense navy is not essential to the preservation of the Monroe doctrine, for we have not heretofore had such a navy, either actually or relatively, when compared with the navies of Europe.

It strikes me that the error in the argument in favor of an immense increase consists in two or three matters. First, there is an assumption that as we are to-day the armies of Europe or of Asia could be landed on our shores. In my judgment, not a nation in the world or all the nations of Europe combined could land an army here. Our coast and harbor defenses, our submarines, our Regular Army, and our National Guard would prevent such an event. Mr. Chairman, submarines constitute the cheapest and most effective defense a nation can have, and we have to-day very few of them, compared with France and England. For the cost of two such battle ships as are authorized in this bill we could probably construct fifty submarines, which would probably protect, in addition to our present defenses, perfectly every harbor of the old United States as we were ten years ago.

There is no danger of war with England. The cotton fields of the South will guarantee peace with Great Britain. The grain fields of the West, and our beef and pork, and our hundreds of millions of dollars of commerce between England and the United States add additional guaranties of peace between

England and the United States. Three thousand miles of Canadian border constitute that Dominion a perpetual hostage against English hostility. So, as has been repeatedly admitted by gentlemen on the other side of this House, when considering the Navy you can safely eliminate the possibility of war with England.

We already have a Navy better and stronger than any other European country. Another error in the gentleman's brilliant and earnest argument is the presumption apparent between its lines that the Japanese have some sinister purposes against us. Why should any country in the world want the United States? If they should take us to-day, they could not hold us to-morrow. The balance of the world could not subjugate the eighty or ninety millions of American citizens. It would not pay them to undertake it. It could not be profitable to hold our brave, resourceful, and liberty-loving people, even if it were possible. Do they merely want war for the sake of a fight? We have a Navy 60 or 70 per cent stronger than that of Japan. Is there any evidence, however, that Japan has any hostile intentions against us. I submit there is not. I am not an apologist for the conduct of Japan.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Will the gentleman permit me to ask him a question for my information?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I am very much interested in this discussion. The gentleman says we have a navy 60 or 70 per cent stronger than the navy of Japan. I understood the statement of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] this morning to be that Japan's navy is stronger than ours in the Pacific to-day, with all of our fleet there.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. If the gentleman will consult the reports, he will see that the navy of Japan has 451,000 tons and that of the United States 771,000 tons.

I repeat, I am not an apologist of Japan, but I can easily see how, after a great war, in which hundreds of thousands of soldiers were engaged, when those soldiers were disbanded, they would desire and be compelled to seek homes and work. I can easily see how they would be attracted to Hawaii, without their going to that island in great numbers being considered a hostile act. Japan having recently added hundreds of thousands of square miles to her territory and millions of people to her Empire, having added thousands of miles to her coast line, having assumed greater responsibilities than she ever had before, I can see how she could increase her standing army and increase her navy without such increases being considered evidences of any hostile purpose against the United States.

And, as has been well said, in case of a war between Japan and America on account of the race question, there can be no reason to doubt that in such a conflict, for such a cause, the entire navies of Europe would fight on the side of America, because every European nation would know that if the Japs had undertaken to establish the supremacy of the yellow man throughout the world, our defeat, if you can imagine such a thing, would necessarily be followed by the defeat of one European nation after another. And so, if it is an unjust war upon us, and a war upon racial problems, then our knowledge of mankind must lead us to expect that every white race in the world would stand by the side of America against the yellow race in such a combat.

So I submit that the great reasons upon which the argument is based for an immense Navy are themselves in all probability baseless. And if you are going to suppose that England and Japan would ever join forces against us, if you are going to act upon such an improbable and almost impossible idea, why do you not go further and presume that there is probability of the entire balance of the world uniting against us, and then insist that we must have a Navy equal to the combined navies of the great powers of the earth? And again, if there is any imminent danger of a conflict between the yellow race and the white race, why limit your number of battle ships to four or even twelve? If the danger is imminent, if it is to be the policy that we are to have a Navy as large as England and Japan together, then we will require fifty more battle ships.

Why not declare that the policy is to have a navy equal to any two powers of the earth, and then go forward and adopt that programme? If you can satisfy the American people that there is any necessity, the American people will stand for it. We who think that this bill is liberal in providing for two battle ships are not against a great navy. We realize that our country ought to have a great navy. We insist that we do now have such a navy. We are in favor of every ship put upon the seas being the very best ship that skill and money can produce. We are in favor of it being manned by the best soldiers and the best officers. We are in favor of additional ships from time to

time to keep up a strong, great navy of splendid matériel and personnel.

The difference between us and the other side, it seems to me, is that we have more faith in the greatness and spirit of our people. It is the spirit of our people itself which would forbid any country or all countries from desiring to subjugate us if they could, because no nation could hold the American people in subjection profitably, happily, or peacefully; nor could any nation in the world hold the fruits of a possible temporary victory over us in any quarter of the globe. It is not a question, it seems to me, of patriotism, but of judgment. We have confidence in the people and confidence in our position. We have confidence in the principles and traditions which have been preserved to us for a hundred years. We have confidence in our resources and skill in time of emergency.

Again, while the civilized peoples of the world, as shown in their private utterances and as shown by their official representatives, are preaching the doctrine of arbitration and expecting international agreements to preserve the peace of the world, why should the greatest power in the world, with the strongest peace sentiment, with the strongest conditions to justify it in taking the initiative toward positive settlements by arbitration—why should it at this late day in its history undertake to outstrip the nations of the earth in warlike preparations? Why should it not rather, following the spirit of its civilization, take the lead of all the nations of the earth in a movement that will tend to the neutral disarmament of the great powers, that will tend to relieve humanity of the burdens of war, not only humanity in our country, but throughout the world? Why not let us adopt a policy and let the world know that we have adopted a policy that means not merely a profession of the principles of peace, but will mean something practical in the direction of peace and disarmament itself? I am not in favor of one disarmament while other nations keep up their armament, but I am in favor of letting the world know by practice, as well as by precept, that we are opposed to increasing the burdens upon the workers of the world in order to maintain implements of war, and then we only burden our citizens according to our necessities. Implements of war encourage not only opportunities for trouble, but the disposition to find trouble. Nations are not altogether different from individuals.

You would not expect a man in a civilized community to have a Maxim gun in his front yard and to put armor plates around his dwelling. In the uncivilized state you might expect him to carry a gun. In the civilized state, when some danger is imminent, you might expect him to guard himself and carry weapons, but in a civilized state, with no danger threatened, you do not expect him to be carrying an arsenal. One who has weapons is more ready to give offense and is more ready to find offense than if unarmed. I heard a gentleman in the cloakroom remark just now that it has been stated in this debate that if we had had four more battle ships ten years ago than we had at that time we would not have had any war with Spain. His comment on that was that if we had had four less we might not have had any war with Spain. I doubt both statements. I believe that conditions in Cuba had been a menace, and there was hardly an American statesman who did not expect, sooner or later, trouble with Spain over Cuba. That was the last cause of trouble for us with European nations upon this continent. When Spain vacated Cuba and left the Caribbean Sea not another single probable cause of war with any European nation remained on the Western Hemisphere.

While, of course, there is always a possibility of war, there is no reasonable cause to expect trouble with any Asiatic power. You ought not to presume that a civilized nation, such as Japan is, certainly in her ruling classes, a nation that is aspiring to be one of the foremost nations of the earth, whose people are peacefully inclined, that is trying to develop a great internal commerce and enterprise—you must not expect such a nation to be anxious for war with any power, much less with the mightiest power on the face of the globe. I heard with a thrill in my heart the eloquent story of war as depicted by my friend from Alabama [Mr. HOSOX], and I heard him conclude it by saying that any man who had been in war is against war. I could not but think then that these great armies in Japan who had witnessed the same suffering my friend knew of and who had gone through the experiences he depicted, hundreds of thousands of them, under his theory are to-day evangelists of peace in Japan and will throw their influence to withhold any warlike movement upon the part of that great country. [Applause.]

Mr. GILL. Mr. Chairman, some time has elapsed since the Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the House the letters, orders, and other papers relating to the appointment of Doctor Stokes to command the hospital ship *Relief* and to the resignation

of Admiral Brownson as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The facts uncovered by this report should have impelled prompt and vigorous action on the part of the House, but this report still slumbers in the archives of a committee. Therefore, I feel called upon to direct the attention of the Members of the House to two matters shown therein: First, to the injustice done to the veterans of the Army and Navy in the unjust and unfair condemnation by the President of one of their comrades, Admiral Brownson; secondly, to the violation of our laws, that should be just as sacred and inviolable to the highest administrative officers of the Government as we expect them to be to the humblest of our citizens. We should demand justice and fair play, not only in precept, but also in practice; and that he who is loudest in preaching the "square deal" should be foremost in practicing it. We should demand administrative respect for the law. Administrative contempt for the law, Mr. Chairman, is not only inherently vicious, but if permitted to pass unnoticed and unchallenged, is bound to serve as a pernicious precedent for similar conduct in the future, and must exert a corrupting influence upon the whole body politic.

In his letter of the 2d of January, 1908, to Secretary Metcalf, President Roosevelt says:

The action of the late Chief of the Bureau, Admiral Brownson, in tendering his resignation because he did not agree with the President and the Department regarding an order issued, before he came into the Bureau, by the Secretary of the Navy as to the control of the hospital ships was unseemly and improper. * * *

This reference by the President to an order alleged to have been issued prior to Admiral Brownson's appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and as to which Admiral Brownson had disagreed with the President, has created the impression that Admiral Brownson has refused to obey this order. For this supposed refusal Admiral Brownson has been severely criticised in many quarters. As a matter of fact, no such order as is referred to by the President in this letter exists, unless it has been inadvertently or otherwise omitted from the letters, orders, and other papers sent to the House by Secretary Metcalf in answer to the request of the House for all the documents and papers bearing upon the appointment of Doctor Stokes and the resignation of Admiral Brownson as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. That the President, in thus referring to an order, undoubtedly intended to specify the "indorsement" by Secretary Bonaparte on December 12, 1906, of the recommendations of the joint board of medical officers that naval surgeons should command naval hospital ships, is borne out by the statement in his letter of January 4 to Secretary Metcalf, in which he speaks of an order. But in calling this indorsement an order he was probably misled by seeing only one version of this indorsement—the one in which a vital paragraph was omitted. I desire to call the attention of the House to the fact that in Secretary Metcalf's letter to the House there are two versions of this indorsement—one on page 15 of this letter marked "Indorsement No. 9," which concludes with the following paragraph:

No immediate action by the Department is deemed necessary in the premises, but its conclusions will be communicated to the bureaus interested and to the general board of medical officers.

On page 18 of Secretary Metcalf's letter to the House the second version appears, under the head of "Precedents."

From this indorsement of Secretary Bonaparte the paragraph just recited was omitted. The concluding paragraph of the original indorsement stating that no immediate action by the Department, on the recommendations of the joint board of medical officers, is deemed necessary, expressly characterizes Secretary Bonaparte's approval of these recommendations merely as an approval of policy, and is a distinct disavowal of any intention by the Department to take immediate action upon these recommendations. It, therefore, can in no sense be considered an order. Why this concluding paragraph was omitted from Secretary Bonaparte's indorsement as it appears on page 18 of Secretary Metcalf's letter I do not know. This omission, however, gives to Secretary Bonaparte's indorsement the color of an order rather than a declaration of what the Department proposed to do when the proper time arrived, and the proper time could arrive only when the President and the Secretary of the Navy were duly authorized to act upon these recommendations by Congress, as such action is clearly prohibited by existing law.

Admiral Brownson, then, did not disagree with the President as to any order concerning the appointment of surgeons to command naval hospital ships, and could not have refused, as many have supposed, to obey any order issued by the Secretary of the Navy before he was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Indeed, so far as is shown by the letter of Secretary Metcalf no order was ever issued appointing surgeons to command naval hospital ships until Secretary Metcalf issued

an order on December 30, 1907, appointing Doctor Stokes to command the *Relief*, six days after Admiral Brownson had resigned and his resignation had been accepted. Undoubtedly Admiral Brownson differed with the Secretary of the Navy and with the President as to the wisdom and legality of putting into execution the recommendations of the joint board of medical officers that surgeons be put in command of naval hospital ships. That he had an undoubted right to do, Nay, more. As the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Admiral Brownson was the naval adviser of the Secretary of the Navy and of the President, and when he saw that this proposed policy appointing surgeons to command naval hospital ships was about to be put into execution, a course which he believed to be illegal, it was his duty to so advise the Secretary of the Navy and the President; and upon finding his advice rejected and finding himself out of harmony with his superiors he should have relieved them and himself, as he did, by resigning as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Could anyone expect a man possessing Admiral Brownson's firmness of character, devotion to duty, and exalted sense of honor to permit himself to be an instrument in the violation of the law which both he and his superiors have sworn to obey?

The honor and glory which Admiral Brownson has earned by forty-six years of diligent and faithful service in the Navy, the conspicuous courage and gallantry which he displayed in the capture and destruction of the pirate vessel and crew off the coast of Mexico, his judicious and vigorous conduct in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, in resenting an insult offered the American flag—all this did not deter the President from reflecting on his good name. Conduct less meritorious and gallant than Admiral Brownson's has elicited for naval officers the thanks and commendations of Congress and has won for them the sword and medal—tokens of a nation's gratitude and appreciation. But for Admiral Brownson has been reserved, at the end of his active career, the badge of disloyalty, placed on his breast by the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Shall we permit this condemnation and degradation, where honor and promotion should have been granted? Shall the charge of disloyalty to the interests of the Navy pass unnoticed and unchallenged by the representatives of the American people? Or are we restrained from the performance of our duty because, forsooth, there may be some who demand from us the recognition of some higher law than our Constitution and statutes, perhaps some unwritten law of lese majeste, a law which stamps opposition to the policies of the President as disloyalty to the country, a law which prescribes the dogma that the President, like the kings of old, can do no wrong? The doctrine of a higher law has been announced by the President, but it is a doctrine which the American people will never accept, nor will they recognize any law as higher or more sacred than our statutes, our Constitution, and the laws of God. [Applause.]

Mr. GOULDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILL. Certainly.

Mr. GOULDEN. What was the rank of Doctor Stokes when he was appointed to command the *Relief*?

Mr. GILL. I do not know his actual rank, but he ranks in the Navy as a surgeon. He has the actual rank with line officers, but this provision of law prevented him from exercising command as a line officer, as he must necessarily do as commander of the hospital ship. I have not the time to go into this matter so thoroughly as I would like.

Mr. GOULDEN. When was the authority given to President McKinley to make new rules?

Mr. GILL. In March, 1901; it was appended to the naval appropriation act of that year.

With Admiral Brownson I challenge the right of the President and of the Secretary of the Navy to issue an order like that of December 30, 1907, appointing Doctor Stokes to command the naval hospital ship *Relief*. With Admiral Brownson I claim that the issuance of such an order is a direct violation of the statutes of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, the country has most generously established and maintained a naval academy, where young men seeking to enter the naval service as line officers are thoroughly grounded in the various branches of naval science, in navigation, in seamanship, in gunnery, and of late in engineering. It is absolutely essential that officers of the line should possess, and only officers of the line are required to possess, a thorough knowledge of these subjects. Therefore the exercise of any command in the Navy which demands a knowledge of navigation or seamanship or gunnery or engineering is a military command or a command in the line. The command of any of the vessels or ships of the Navy, including hospital ships, necessarily requires a knowledge either of all or some of these branches, which only line offi-

cers are required to be proficient in, and are naval military commands or commands in the line, as much so as a command of a fort or a company or a regiment in the Army is a military command and command in the line of the Army. This view has always been sanctioned by naval practice, by naval regulations, and by statute law, which have permitted the command of all naval vessels only to line officers and prohibited the exercise of military command to officers of the Staff Corps. Before staff officers were given relative and actual rank with line officers they were excluded from the command of vessels by the provisions of section 1529 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:

The vessels of the Navy of the United States shall be divided into four classes, and shall be commanded as nearly as may be as follows: First rates by commodores, second rates by captains, third rates by commanders, fourth rates by lieutenant-commanders.

But after staff officers were given relative and actual rank with line officers, the staff officers were prohibited from exercising any military command or command in the line or other staff corps by section 1488 of the Revised Statutes:

The relative rank given by the provisions of this chapter to the officers of the Pay, Medical, and Engineer corps shall confer no authority to exercise military command.

And by the act of March 3, 1899, chapter 413, known as the "Personnel act," which provides:

That all sections of the Revised Statutes which, in defining the rank of officers or positions in the Navy, contain the words "the relative rank of" are hereby amended so as to read "the rank of;" but officers whose rank is so defined shall not be entitled in virtue of their rank to command in the line or in other staff corps.

By the appropriation act of March 3, 1901, the President was authorized to establish and to modify a classification of the vessels of the Navy and to formulate appropriate rules governing the assignments to command vessels and squadrons. Under no circumstances can this act of March 3, 1901, be construed as withdrawing the right to command from the officers of the line, or as conferring upon the President authority to assign any but line officers to command vessels of the Navy. This act merely gives the President the right to change the classification of the vessels of the Navy and to formulate appropriate rules governing the assignment of line officers to the respective vessels of the Navy. Under the authority conferred upon him by this act President McKinley in 1901 reclassified the vessels of the Navy and designated hospital ships as third-rates, to be commanded, under section 36 of the Navy Regulations, by lieutenant-commanders, officers of the line. Up to the present time President Roosevelt has followed in the footsteps of President McKinley in this regard. He has himself approved these regulations which designated lieutenant-commanders to command third-rates, including hospital ships. Under sections 21 and 22 of these regulations, issued by Secretary of the Navy Morton on the 30th day of June, 1905, and approved by the President, we find the following:

Art. 18, sec. 1. Officers of the line exercise military command.
Art. 21, sec. 2. No officer shall by virtue of rank and precedence have additional right to quarters, nor shall they have authority to exercise command except in their own corps.

And further, under the title of "Law and decisions on command and rank," article 53, section C, we find that—

The right of military command and to additional quarters is restricted by law.

It is quite clear, then, that under these statutes and regulations no staff officer may command a naval hospital ship. True, the President may change the rules for designating commands or assignments in the Navy, but such changes must be within the limitations established by the law as to military command. They must not conflict with the statutes prohibiting military command to officers of the staff. That the President can not issue any regulations on the subject which in any way conflict with the acts of Congress has been definitely established by the Symonds case (120 U. S., 146). Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

The authority of the Secretary of the Navy to issue orders, regulations, and instructions, with the approval of the President, in relation to matters connected with the naval establishment, is subject to the condition, necessarily implied, that they must be consistent with the statutes enacted by Congress in reference to the Navy. He may, with the approval of the President, establish regulations in execution of or supplementary to, but not in conflict with, the statutes defining his powers or conferring rights upon others.

At the international Hague conference of July 29, 1900, and at the Geneva conference of October 20, 1868, in both of which this country participated, two distinct kinds of hospital ships were recognized—military and nonmilitary hospital ships. Military hospital ships were at those conferences described as ships fitted out by a government solely and specially for the purpose of assisting the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, and nonmilitary hospital ships as those fitted up by societies such as the Red Cross or by individuals, with the sanction of a government,

for a similar purpose. The *Relief*, then, manifestly belongs to that class of vessels distinctly recognized in the treaties to which the United States is a party as military hospital ships. How, then, could the command of a naval military hospital ship be anything but a naval military command? Under these treaties a military hospital ship, when commanded by a surgeon, is not entitled to any greater immunities or exemptions than it is when commanded by a line officer. The *Relief* in time of war would not, under its present command, be entitled to any greater consideration than would be accorded it if it were commanded by an admiral.

Now, Mr. Chairman, having demonstrated that it is illegal for medical officers of the Navy to be assigned to command hospital ships, I do not propose in any way to discuss the policy, assuming it were legal, of enlarging the duties of the medical officers of the Navy so that they should embrace the command of hospital ships with civilian navigators. That is a matter which should be determined by the old sea dogs of our Navy, our admirals and our captains, not by landmen like myself or the Secretary of the Navy or our late colonel of cavalry, Theodore Roosevelt. The illegality of the appointment of a surgeon to command a naval hospital ship was fairly put by Admiral Brownson both in his letter of resignation and in his memorandum of November 18, 1907. "It is directly contrary to law for a medical officer to exercise military command in any other than his own corps," said Admiral Brownson. To this warning President Roosevelt replies with an order appointing Doctor Stokes to command the *Relief*. No opinion on the subject seems to have been sought from the President's constitutional adviser, the Attorney-General—not even an opinion from the legal adviser of the Secretary of the Navy, the Judge-Advocate-General. But that is not all. Without the intervention of a court-martial, the President, by the publication of his extraordinary letter, in which he admits that there may be an honest difference of opinion on this subject, proceeds to punish and condemn one of the most faithful and respected officers of the United States Navy by lashing him with such terms as "unseemly," "improper," "childish," "reprehensible," "personal pique," "wounded vanity," "factional feeling," "ruffled temper," "disloyalty to the interests of the Navy, and therefore to the country as a whole"—classical terms and phrases, indicating the use not of the simple muck-rake of the "Pilgrim's Progress" days but of an up-to-date and modern muck rake whose operations are directed by a greatly heated and sensational mind.

"Disloyalty to the interests of the Navy, and therefore to the country as a whole," is the President's verdict concerning the conduct of this faithful veteran who has given forty years of his life to the service of his country! But fortunately it is left to the people of this country to judge whether this verdict is just; whether this charge, most damaging to the character and good name of Admiral Brownson, if true, should be permitted to stand unrefuted. Shakespeare says:

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which nothing enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.

The good name of a soldier or sailor grown gray in his country's service, who by the faithful performance of that service sacrifices every opportunity to acquire either legitimate or predatory wealth, is his chief and most precious possession. The filching of that good name leaves him more abject than the poorest serf.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, that one violation of the law leads to another. The Secretary of the Navy, in his eagerness to place a naval hospital ship under the command of a surgeon, has violated our coastwise commerce law, known as the act of March 1, 1817, confining the coastwise transportation of merchandise to the American merchant marine. I understand from a statement made on the floor of this House by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations that the Secretary of the Navy, in order to put the *Relief* in commission, has seen fit to put two of the Government naval colliers out of commission. This left the Navy Department no alternative other than that of employing foreign vessels to carry coal for the fleet in place of those colliers put out of commission, as the Secretary of the Navy says that no American ship can be chartered at a reasonable price for this purpose. The employment of foreign vessels, as has been stated on this floor by the distinguished lawyer from Maine [Mr. LITTLEFIELD], is a violation of the law which I have just cited. It is the violation of one law for the purpose of facilitating the violation of another law. Moreover, the country is treated to the inter-

esting spectacle in which the Secretary of the American Navy is helping to maintain the auxiliaries of foreign navies, which in time of war may be utilized in an attempt to exterminate the American Navy.

Another striking illustration of administrative disregard of the law is presented to us in the appointment of Mr. Rossiter to supersede the Public Printer, Mr. Stillings, who was recently suspended by the order of the President. On presenting his commission at the Treasury Department for the purpose of being bonded, Mr. Rossiter was informed by a judicious and courageous official that his appointment was not in conformity with the law and that therefore he would not bond him. How soon will the head of this law-respecting official follow that of Admiral Brownson into the Presidential decapitation basket?

These repeated violations of the law are not the kind of examples that can be fashioned into clubs with which to "whack" the heads of undesirable citizens to beat into them a wholesome respect for the law.

These violations of our statutes and the carelessness with which they are regarded are dangerous, not only as vicious examples, but as corrupting precedents which may sap the very foundations upon which our dual form of government rests. It is but one step from the violation of the provisions of the statute law to the violation of the most sacred provisions of our organic law. If we connive at the contemptuous spirit in which our laws are dealt with in high administrative circles, it will not be long before attempts will be made by the Federal Government to usurp the powers clearly reserved by the Constitution to the several States. If we recognize the wisdom which animated our patriotic forefathers when they erected the framework of our Government, if we appreciate the blessings of a Government founded upon law and order, if we are eager to conserve the security and well-being of the people of this great country, then we must boldly and unflinchingly demand of our high administrative officers the same respect and veneration for our laws as we expect from the humblest citizen in the land.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that though the President of the United States has twice asserted his determination not to be a candidate for a third term, it is currently reported throughout the country that his last message was a bid for renomination. Indeed, so strong is the impression among the masses that President Roosevelt is seeking a third term that it has become the source of topical songs in our music halls, the refrain of one of them being—

It's Taft or I,
And that's the cry
In Washington.

By many it is claimed that the President is the only man who can harmonize the conflicting interests and tendencies of the reactionary and the progressive camps into which the Republican party is split. On one occasion, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gladstone was asked to explain the difference between the words "misfortune" and "calamity." He replied with this illustration:

Suppose that Disraeli fell into the river Thames—that would be a misfortune; but suppose that somebody dragged him out—that would be a calamity.

If the Republican party should nominate President Roosevelt for a third term that would be a misfortune to the Republican party. If, however, President Roosevelt should be reelected for a third term it would be a calamity for the country. [Applause.]

I append the following letters of Admiral Brownson to the Secretary of the Navy:

INCLOSURE A.

DECEMBER, 24, 1907.

SIR: In April last I was detached by your order from the command of the United States Asiatic fleet and ordered to Washington and appointed Chief of the most important Bureau in the Navy Department, the Bureau which under the Secretary is charged with matters relating to the personnel, the discipline, and the efficiency of the fleet.

This transfer from a command which ranks second in importance afloat, to one which is second to none on shore, coming on the eve of my retirement from active service while not to my personal liking was deeply gratifying to me as it appeared to be an evidence of your confidence in my professional ability.

In order, however, that any efforts of mine to maintain a high standard of efficiency and discipline in the service be attended with success, it is absolutely essential that I should have the confidence of the service at large as well as that of higher authority. The efficiency of the fleet can only be maintained when the officers and men feel that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation has the confidence of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and when a strong military spirit exists in the service. Anything that shows a lack of confidence or that tends to break down this military spirit, which has been the safeguard and principal asset of the Navy since its beginning, can but impair such efficiency.

The recent order placing a medical officer in command of a hospital ship is, in my opinion, and as I have endeavored on several occasions to point out to you, clearly opposed to the intent of the law; is a radical departure from established naval usage and is fraught with danger to the efficiency of the fleet, will tend I believe to break down the military spirit of the service and shows a want of your confidence in my advice regarding a matter so vital to the best interests of the service.

I am left, therefore, with no alternative but to tender my resignation as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, much as I regret to sever my active connection with the service to which I have been devoted and to which I have given my best efforts for over forty-six years.

Very respectfully,

W. H. BROWNSON,
Chief of Bureau.

INCLOSURE 7.

NOVEMBER 18, 1907.

COMMISSIONING OF THE "RELIEF" FOR DUTY AS A HOSPITAL SHIP.

Respectfully forwarded to the Department.

The Bureau appreciates the fact that at the present time the necessary accommodations for the sick on the Pacific coast are inadequate, and, as stated in a recent indorsement by this Bureau on a communication from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Bureau intends to recommend the commissioning of the *Relief* as a hospital ship in order that the vessel may be available when the battle ships arrive at Magdalena Bay.

The Bureau earnestly requests that the question of providing the officers and crew for the *Relief*, particularly as regards the command of the vessel, be reconsidered by the Department, and begs to submit the reasons which, in the opinion of this Bureau, should influence the Department in reversing its previous decision.

An examination of the accompanying papers shows that the decision of the Department dated December 12, 1906, which states, among other things, that a hospital ship when placed in commission shall be under the command of a medical officer, appears to be the outcome of the recommendation of a joint board of medical officers of the Army and Navy, convened by order of the Secretary of War. This board was appointed to "consider improvement in the first-aid dressings and uniformity of equipment in the medical departments of the two services."

While the Bureau freely admits that the question of the medical equipment of a hospital ship is one on which the medical officers of the Army and Navy are eminently qualified to express an opinion, the Bureau begs to submit that the question of manning a seagoing vessel is one which sea line officers of the Navy are best qualified to decide.

While a hospital ship is a vessel of peculiar international status and can only be employed in time of war for a specific purpose, the fact still remains that, whether it is a hospital ship or not, it is a seagoing vessel, and in order to accompany the fleet to fulfill the purposes for which it is designed, it must be navigated and handled in the same seamanlike manner which is required of all vessels to insure safety on the high seas.

The Bureau begs to submit that, however qualified medical officers may be in their profession, there is, on the other hand, nothing in the training of a medical officer which fits him to command a seagoing vessel.

The contention of the Surgeon-General that a medical officer should command a hospital ship appears to be based entirely upon the assumption that such a ship is a floating hospital, as he states: "It must be borne in mind that a hospital ship is a floating hospital and that the most finished professional training in navigation, ordnance, and seamanship does not render line officers well fitted to command hospitals."

The Bureau is well aware that it does not require professional training in navigation, ordnance, and seamanship to command a hospital, provided such hospital is located on shore, or even if such a hospital were a hulk securely and safely moored and not required to move; but the fact must not be lost sight of that the use to which a vessel is put has no effect whatever in lessening the dangers which will be encountered in navigating such a ship in all kinds of weather and under various circumstances.

It requires just as skillful a navigator to pilot a hospital ship as it does to pilot a man-of-war, a mail steamer, or a yacht. The difficulties of piloting, navigation, and handling a vessel are wholly independent of its internal arrangements or the uses to which the vessel may be put.

The statement of the Surgeon-General that a hospital ship "is not a man-of-war, but a hospital," does not give a complete statement of the case. Without doubt a hospital ship is not a man-of-war but has a peculiar status which is clearly defined by the Geneva convention. On the other hand, to call it a hospital does not fully describe the ship. It would be more nearly correct and descriptive of its true character to state that a hospital ship is a seagoing vessel having a large hospital on board, and it is for the general administration, navigation, and handling of the seagoing vessel that a sea line officer should be ordered to command. As to the control and administration of the medical department of such a vessel, existing regulations give medical officers all necessary authority to control and care for their department on board ship.

The Surgeon-General again states that "the command of the medical officer should be absolute" and that the captain should not be a naval officer, but should belong to the merchant marine and should have entire control of the navigation of the ship and of the civilian crew and regulate discipline and matters pertaining to them. It would seem from this statement that in the opinion of the Surgeon-General the navigation, safe conduct, and general administration of a seagoing vessel are secondary as regards the responsibilities of command.

Telegraph operators or cable engineers are not put in command of cable ships nor are postmasters put in command of mail steamers. A battle ship can with propriety be called a floating fort, but artillery officers are not fitted for the command of them. It must not be forgotten that a ship is an inanimate object and requires at all times a competent officer in command to insure the safety of the vessel at sea.

Long experience with merchant crews and officers on board naval colliers, tank ships, transports, supply vessels, etc., shows that officers of the merchant marine do not perform this duty as efficiently as naval officers.

Some years ago on the Asiatic Station the auxiliaries were manned in three different ways: First, a number with full naval crews; second, others with merchant crews, and third, several with a merchant crew and officers and one line officer of the Navy in command. In addition to the line officer there was a paymaster.

As the result of experience with the various systems all in force at the same time and under similar conditions officers who have had experience with naval auxiliaries agree that the most efficient organization is obtained when these vessels are manned with a full naval crew, and it is only the fact that at present there is such a shortage of officers and men that naval auxiliaries are not so manned.

Of the three systems above noted that which caused the greatest number of complications and was the least efficient was the third, i. e., a naval officer in command with a full merchant crew and officers. On

board such vessels the crew and officers are amenable only to the navigation laws of the United States. They are shipped and discharged in the presence of a United States naval officer or the shipping commissioner, or in a foreign port in the presence of a United States consul or United States naval officer. Neither the United States Navy Regulations nor the navigation laws of the United States contemplate any such division of authority as exists on board a vessel so manned. The following is an extract from a letter addressed by the commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet to the naval officers in command of the colliers *Iris* and *Nanshan*, defining the status of the officer in command and the master:

"The naval officer in command will be held responsible for the navigation, safety, movement, preservation, and cleanliness of the vessel to which he is attached, and he shall relieve the master of such responsibilities whenever he finds it necessary to assume direct control himself."

"There are peculiar conditions existing on the Government vessels carrying merchant officers, with naval officers on board who have been placed there in the interest of the Government. By merchant laws all punishments, shippings, and discharges of crew must be made by the master under existing laws. In addition to these, there are many functions on board these vessels that may not be exercised by the naval officer in command. But the naval officer in command is to be obeyed in all orders that he sees fit to give, and he will be held responsible for any orders promulgated by him that are incompatible with the merchant laws of the United States, except as set forth in paragraph 1 of this letter, which are essential for the best interests of the Government."

"The foregoing instructions being absolute, the naval officer in command will endeavor to arrange matters, through the master, so that everything may work harmoniously, and that the master may not seem to lose any of the privileges or authority due him by the merchant shipping laws of the United States."

"A copy of this letter shall be furnished the master of the vessel you command. He must agree to the conditions herein set forth, or be discharged from his position if he is not satisfied with these decisions."

The following letter was also addressed by the commander in chief to the masters of these vessels:

"A commissioned line officer of the United States Navy having been ordered to command the vessel of which you are master, you are hereby informed that all functions, duties, and responsibilities regularly belonging to you as a duly installed master, under the laws governing the merchant marine of the United States, are retained by you."

"The naval officer in command is, however, a higher authority, and you will obey him, as the representative of the commander in chief, in the same manner that you would obey a private owner of the vessel. All orders, however, from outside authority regarding the vessel will be given to the commanding officer; and you will also make reports and communications concerning her to him."

Notwithstanding the fact that these instructions appear to be explicit, complications constantly arose, not only as regarding the navigation of the vessels but also in respect to the administration of affairs including relations with the crew.

As regards the navigation of the vessel, the case of the *Iris* running ashore on Sikijor Island may be cited and the case of a disturbance created by the second officer of the *Nanshan* in the harbor of Hongkong may also be mentioned as regards the relations of the naval officer with the crew.

A brief description of both these instances may be of interest. The U. S. S. *Iris* was, in 1901, making a passage from Cebu to Tacloban, in the Philippine Islands, and ran ashore on Sikijor Island. A board appointed to investigate the grounding found it due to the ship's overrunning the patent log, westerly current and leeway, thick weather, and poor judgment in setting the course. The board also found that the naval officer in command "did not take all precautions to assure himself of the proper navigation of the ship, but owing to the anomalous position of a naval officer on board the *Iris* with a merchant crew and officers, subject to the orders of the master, and owing to the duties and responsibilities and authority given the master by the United States laws for the merchant service, the board is of the opinion that no further action should be taken in the case of * * *, but that master * * * should be discharged."

Owing to the fact that there was divided authority on board the *Iris*, the commander in chief and the Department approved the finding of the board. In this connection it may be stated that the naval officer was an officer of experience and unquestioned professional ability.

The case of the *Nanshan* was as follows: The *Nanshan* was at anchor in the harbor of Hongkong. The second officer during the evening became intoxicated and noisy. The naval officer in command sent word to the master for him to pipe down. This the second officer not only declined, but failed to do. After several warnings, the naval officer directed the master to put the second officer in irons. This the master declined to do, stating that his crew and officers were shipped under the navigation laws, which prohibited such action on his part while the vessel was in port. The naval officer then asked the master what he would do were he in actual command of the vessel without a naval officer on board. The master replied that he would send for the harbor police. The naval officer then directed him to request the harbor police to take charge of the second officer. The harbor police declined to interfere, as the *Nanshan* was a Government vessel under the command of the naval officer. At this juncture the second officer retired to his room, locked the door, and threatened to shoot anybody who tried to force an entrance. After firing four shots through the door the naval officer took the law into his own hands, broke down the door, and disarmed the second officer.

It will be noted from the foregoing that a situation existed on board the *Nanshan* which no one was legally competent to cope with.

Owing to the legal complications involved, the only action taken was to discharge the second officer the following day in the harbor of Hongkong.

If a hospital ship were merely a floating hospital, as the Surgeon-General states in his indorsement, and the ship were securely moored and not called upon to move from point to point, it would perhaps be well not to have any sea line officers on board. It would appear, however, that in addition to the navigation of the vessel and ship administration connected therewith the discipline of the crew has been entirely lost sight of. Both the law and the Navy Regulations state that officers of the line exercise military command. On board a hospital ship when in commission for sea service and cruising in company with a fleet, there will always be a certain number of enlisted men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and, perhaps, of the Army, who are convalescent, many of them practically well and nearly ready for duty. The temptation for these men to commit infractions of discipline will be various on board a hospital ship, and in addition to ordinary infractions they will be liable to get into difficulties with the merchant crew of the vessel; the latter

(if the vessel is manned in accordance with the recommendation of the Surgeon-General) are amenable only to the navigation laws of the United States. The Bureau fails to see how there can be any complete control over the discipline of the personnel on board a hospital ship when part of such personnel is amenable only to one set of laws, the other to the Navy Regulations; the officer in command being an officer who by law is forbidden the right of exercising military command except in his own corps, the master of the ship being a civilian with no legal right to control men in the Navy.

Officers entrusted with the command of United States vessels, whatever their rank, must, while properly in such command, have full command, authority, and precedence over all officers and persons of whatever rank serving in such vessels. The efficiency of every military organization requires of the commanding authority, besides the general duties of command and direction, the additional duties of organization, police, and inspection; all these appertain to and go with the command. The officer in command of a vessel is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its official responsibilities, which can not be assumed by or fall upon any other person.

By the force of naval law, and regulations made in conformity therewith, the above principles are established and exist as essentials of all naval military service, without which there can be neither command, discipline, nor responsibility.

The following extracts from the statute law of the United States have a direct bearing on the exercise of military command by medical officers:

The act of Congress approved March 3, 1871 (Stat. L., vol. 16, p. 537), states:

"Commanding officers of vessels of war and of naval stations shall take precedence over all officers placed under their command."

Section 4 of the act of Congress approved August 5, 1854, fixing the rank of medical officers of the Navy, states:

"This order confers no authority to exercise military command and no additional right to quarters."

Section 7 of the "personnel act" (which became a law March 3, 1899), in amending the Revised Statutes so as to confer upon staff officers positive rank with the line, contains the limiting clause:

"But officers whose rank is so defined shall not be entitled in virtue of their rank to command in the line or in other staff corps."

These laws are prohibitive of the full exercise of command by a medical officer, and he could not, therefore, legally command the paymaster, the crew, the commissary force, etc., which the vessel, as an adjunct to the fleet or acting singly, must necessarily have.

A comparison of the system advocated by the Surgeon-General and that recommended by this Bureau as regards discipline speaks for itself. Assume that a hospital ship (manned as recommended by the Surgeon-General) has on board: (a) Merchant crew and officers; (b) Hospital Corps of the Navy; (c) enlisted men of the Navy (patients); (d) enlisted men of the Marine Corps (patients); (e) enlisted men of the Army (patients); (f) enlisted men of the Navy (commissary branch); (g) officers of the Navy (patients); (h) a pay officer.

The merchant crew and officers are amenable only to the navigation laws of the United States and subject only to the orders of the master.

The Hospital Corps men are amenable to Navy Regulations and subject to orders from the medical officers, but in case of a disturbance they would be subject to the orders of the senior line officer present (should there be one embarked as a patient).

The enlisted men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army are all amenable to the Navy Regulations while embarked, but the law and regulations do not permit a medical officer to exercise military command, nor do they permit the civilian master to enforce Navy Regulations.

With a line officer of the Navy in command (with a full Navy crew and officers), any situation that might arise is not only fully covered by the Navy Regulations and the officer in command is one who by his training is fully competent to handle the situation.

The Surgeon-General states that "with a medical officer in command occasions for conflicts and differences of opinion on questions of expediency and methods of procedure affecting the ship as a hospital would be removed."

The Navy Regulations clearly define the exact status of medical officers on board ship as regards their duties, prerogatives, and responsibilities. With a line officer in command no situation can arise which is not fully covered by the Regulations, but with a medical officer in command a situation is at once created which is not only contrary to existing law, but which has no precedent in our service.

It appears clear to the Bureau that by removing the line officers the "occasions for conflicts of authority" will be multiplied instead of diminished.

Revised Statutes of the United States define the master of a vessel as follows:

"In the construction of this title (Rev. Stat., 4501-4613), every person having the command of any vessel belonging to any citizen of the United States shall be deemed to be the 'master' thereof" and also:

"The word 'master,' as used in this title (Rev. Stat., 2517-3129), may include any person having the chief charge or command of the employment and navigation of a vessel."

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Revised Statutes regard the master as entrusted with the chief charge or command of a vessel, and the law holds him responsible for the enforcement of certain rules and regulations, not only in relation to the navigation of the vessel, but in enforcing discipline. The law, however, only contemplates that he will be required to enforce discipline as regards civilians.

The Surgeon-General again states "the discipline of the medical branch should be in the hands of the medical officer in command."

The Surgeon-General seems to have overlooked or disregarded the question of the control of the paymaster, the disciplining of the enlisted men embarked in the hospital ship as patients and the members of the crew of the vessel.

The Bureau takes strong exception to the following statement of the Surgeon-General:

"The command is eminently a noncombatant one, is consequently not desired by officers of the line, and falls naturally to a medical officer whose knowledge and experience in all matters relating to the administration of quarters for the sick and the treatment and handling of patients fit him for the command of a ship which is not a man-of-war, but a floating hospital."

The Bureau is of the opinion that the above is not a logical deduction, for were it so that "knowledge and experience in all matters relating to the administration of quarters for the sick and the treat-

ment and handling of patients" fit a man for the command of a seagoing vessel (employed as a hospital ship) it would also follow that the manager of a large, well-run hotel would be competent to command a large trans-Atlantic liner engaged in the passenger trade, which is also not a man-of-war but a floating hotel.

The Bureau concurs with the Surgeon-General in the opinion that "experience in such matters is a better guide than theory," and begs to quote from the annual report of the present Surgeon-General for the year 1898:

"The *Solace* is fitted out under the requirements of the Geneva convention and flies the Geneva cross flag. She is the pioneer in her work, and indicates a step in advance that it well became the United States to take. * * * The vessel has been fortunate in her personnel. Commander Dunlap is an ideal commander, and the medical officers of the vessel, Surgeon Streets and Passed Assistant Surgeons Stokes, Smith, and Bogert, have shown themselves thoroughly competent and efficient in caring for the many sick and wounded who have been under their charge. Three hospital stewards, one of whom was a skilled embalmer, 8 trained nurses, a cook, 4 messmen, and 2 laundrymen were especially designated in the medical department."

Extract from the report of Surgeon Streets, the senior surgeon on board the *Solace*, 1898:

"I can not give too much credit for the good results obtained to my able assistants, Passed Assistant Surgeons Charles F. Stokes, G. Tucker Smith, and Edward S. Bogert. Every member of the Hospital Corps has performed his duties in the most efficient manner. Every effort of mine has been cordially seconded by Commander A. Dunlap, United States Navy, the commanding officer of the *Solace*."

The experience gained with naval auxiliaries on board of which divided authority existed is fully set forth in the inclosed report from the senior squadron commander of the Asiatic fleet and has a direct bearing on the present point at issue. It would appear, therefore, that if, as stated by the Surgeon-General, "experience in such matters is a better guide than theory," the result of experience in our Navy shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that naval auxiliaries (of which hospital ships are not the least important) are least efficient when manned as recommended by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

From the foregoing it will be apparent that the commissioning of a hospital ship for sea service as recommended by the Surgeon-General will be fraught with endless complications, the chief of which are as follows:

1. It is directly contrary to the law for a medical officer to exercise military command in any other than his own corps.

2. Divided responsibility leads to confusion and poor administration.

3. Experience both with the *Solace* in the Spanish-American war and with auxiliaries on the Asiatic Station shows conclusively that the only organization for the fleet auxiliary is to have a full naval crew and officers.

4. A seagoing ship to be efficient must of necessity be commanded by a seagoing officer.

In conclusion, the Bureau has to state that this is a matter of vital importance to the naval service, and it is requested that the Department's former decision be revoked and that instructions be issued for the commissioning of the *Relief* with a full Navy crew and officers.

Very respectfully,

W. H. BROWNSON,
Chief of Bureau.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Mr. DAWSON. Mr. Chairman, we have heard the naval subject discussed here this afternoon from a scientific standpoint, a sentimental standpoint, and, I am almost tempted to add, from a hysterical standpoint. I would like to ask the committee at this hour to consider it from the business standpoint, and to direct attention to one of the most important questions in the whole naval service—the question of naval administration.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a sentimental proposition; this is a great business proposition, involving as it does the expenditure of the \$100,000,000 which we appropriate annually for this great arm of the national defense. Upon this problem of administration rests the question of whether these millions are expended economically and wisely or whether they shall be expended wastefully and extravagantly. But this question of naval administration, Mr. Chairman, is even more than a business proposition. It is a question which goes to the very root of the efficiency of the naval service itself; it has a most important bearing upon the efficiency of the material of the Navy; it is vital to whether or not we will have good guns, good ammunition and good ships; it is vital likewise to the personnel of the Navy, because on the question of administration depends the esprit de corps of the officers and men of the entire Navy.

It may be a matter of surprise to some Members of the House to know that the present administrative organization of the Navy Department is almost seventy years old. Is it any wonder, Mr. Chairman, with the tremendous advances that have been made, both in naval and in commercial matters, during these seventy years that the present administrative system in the Navy Department does not measure up to present-day business standards? I say, is it any wonder that this system of administration is outworn, out of date, and obsolete?

The present plan of administration in the Navy Department was adopted in 1842, and the law has been only slightly amended since. At that time, upon the recommendation of Secretary Upshur, Congress passed a law creating five bureaus in the Navy Department. Since that time three other bureaus have been added, with some rearrangement and readjustment of duties, and now we have in the Navy Department eight separate bureaus, as follows:

Navigation, having charge of the personnel and the movements of the fleet, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

Yards and Docks: The construction and maintenance of public works in navy-yards and at naval stations.
Supplies and Accounts: Provisions, clothing, small stores, accounts, and pay of the Navy.

Medicine and Surgery: Its name explains its duties.
Construction and Repair: The ships' hulls, turrets, ammunition hoists, etc.

Steam Engineering: Steam-propelling machinery of the ships.
Ordnance: Guns, ammunition, and parts of the electrical machinery on the ships.

Equipment: Equipment of ships, and supplying most of their electrical apparatus.

It should be remembered, Mr. Chairman, as we go along, that the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Equipment are the ones principally concerned in the construction and the repair of ships.

Under the law as it stands now it is provided that the orders of these chiefs of bureaus, pertaining to their respective duties, shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and "shall have full force and effect as such." Mark that. The orders of each chief of bureau shall have the full force and effect as though the orders had been issued by the Secretary of the Navy himself. In other words, instead of one head of Department we have under this old organization nine heads operating within one Department.

There is nothing in existing law which provides for any co-operation or any coordination among those several bureaus. Each is entirely independent, subject only to the Secretary himself. They all stand on an equal footing. Under the law each bureau may proceed in its own way according to the chief's idea of what is for the best interest of that bureau. The system is lacking in that one feature that is most essential for good administration and best results—there is no single controlling influence below the Secretary to correlate the work of the different bureaus. Thus responsibility is divided among eight different heads, which has the effect of there being practically no responsibility at all for the work as a whole. Secretary Moody, when he was at the head of that great Department, recognized and set forth in his annual report some of the defects of the system as he found them. What did he say?

The distribution of business among bureaus independent of and correlated to each other (except through the action of the Secretary) unquestionably creates the condition out of which grow conflicts of jurisdiction between the bureaus, sometimes injurious, and a tendency to consider the interests of the bureaus rather than the interests of the Navy. The division of business in the bureaus extends to the navy-yards and even to some extent to ships in commission. This leads sometimes to excessive and cumbersome organization, and lack of harmony of effort resulting from the fact that there is no co-ordination except by the voluntary action of the bureau chiefs.

That is testimony of one who was in the Department long enough to familiarize himself with conditions there. But, Mr. Chairman, how does this system operate, both in the Department and in the navy-yards throughout the country? Perhaps we can best determine the character of its operation by examining its work in the repair of ships, which is conducted at these navy-yards. Last summer the Committee on Naval Affairs made a tour of inspection of all the navy-yards on the Atlantic coast from Norfolk north to Portsmouth, and we went in and examined carefully the condition at each of these yards. This examination disclosed a wasteful duplication and multiplication of plants, buildings, and equipment which can not be otherwise than extravagant in the expenditure of the public money, and it emphasized the necessity for some consolidation of bureaus. Each of the four bureaus which have to do with the repair or the construction of ships had at the different navy-yards a separate and independent plant. Each had sought to build up its own bureau there, that it might be entirely independent of all the others. Thus, at every one of these navy-yards, instead of finding one complete, fully organized, well-trained enterprise, we found what was virtually four separate plants at each yard.

Each of the bureaus has its own force of workmen, each has its own machinery, its own buildings, and its own peculiar method of doing business. For instance, at the navy-yard at New York we found that the Bureau of Construction and Repair had a paint shop, and so did the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Equipment, and the Bureau of Steam Engineering—Equipment maintaining a shop with three painters, while the Steam Engineering had another shop in which was employed one lone painter. The same was true of the carpenter shops, except the Ordnance Bureau had one in addition to these other four, making five carpenter shops in a single yard. Of those five shops, three were employing less than ten men each. And so it went. What was true of paint shops and carpenter shops was equally true of pattern shops, blacksmith shops, coppersmith shops, and foundries.

Will anyone contend that this is anything except a most wasteful and extravagant method of carrying on a purely in-

dustrial business, because the repair of ships is not military in its character, it is purely the industrial side of the Navy? Such a plan of course requires a useless duplication of machinery, of buildings, and of supervising force. But this condition is only the natural result of a system which makes each bureau independent of the other, and where at every navy-yard each bureau is watching every other bureau with jealous eye. With Congress making separate appropriations for each of these bureaus, it becomes, as one naval officer tersely stated it, simply a game of "grab." If a given bureau has secured an appropriation for a new building at a certain yard, the following year each of the other bureaus are supplicating Congress to treat it with like liberality.

This whole bureau system, as exemplified at the navy-yards, is unbusinesslike; it is cumbersome and extravagant and, as Secretary Long so well said in one of his official reports while he was Secretary of the Navy, "No private business in the world would be run on such a wasteful and inharmonious plan."

But how does the present bureau system operate in the Navy Department itself? The public has had many striking instances within the last year of the friction and contentions that arise in that Department by reason of the fact that there are eight separate and independent bureaus, each practically supreme in the duties which are assigned to it by the Secretary of the Navy. The heads of these bureaus are but human, and it is too much to expect that they will not take advantage of every opportunity which occurs that will increase the magnitude or the importance of their respective duties. As Secretary Moody says, the operation of the system has a tendency to cause the bureau chiefs to consider "the interests of the bureaus rather than the interests of the Navy."

I hope gentlemen will understand that I am not criticizing individuals. I am simply offering these suggestions regarding a system which prevails, in the hope that we can accord to the Navy Department in due course better and more modern machinery with which to conduct the work of that great Department.

I need not relate in detail the incidents which have arisen from time to time, and some of which have been alluded to in this debate, showing the clashing of interests and authority under this system of independent bureaus, each, mind you, with the power to issue independent orders of the same authority as those issued by the Secretary of the Navy himself.

If we are in any doubt as to the workings of this system in the Department, let us summon a witness here who is eminently qualified to speak with authority, one who by experience, by knowledge, and by courage is entitled to the consideration of this House. I allude to the Hon. John D. Long, who for five years was Secretary of that great Department, and it might be added parenthetically, that he was in charge of that Department for a longer period than any other man who has held that portfolio in the last decade. He was there long enough to understand the workings of that Department and to master its defects. He recognized the faults of the existing bureau system, and in his annual report for 1899 he recommended that three of these bureaus, these three bureaus that have to deal with the construction and fitting out of vessels, should be merged into a single bureau. That recommendation was as follows:

CONSOLIDATION OF BUREAUS.

In the opinion of the Department it would be in the interest of good business organization and economy to consolidate the three Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment under one head—the Bureau of Ships. These Bureaus have to do with the construction and fitting out of vessels; in one word, the material of the ship. It is an integral work. When a contract is made for the construction of a ship, it is made with one builder. It is not given part to a constructor of hulls, part to a steam-engine manufacturer, and part to an outfitting firm. Whatever various trades enter into the work are all under one head. This is the method of private shipyards which build the largest ships and which are not left to the administration of three heads between whom delicate questions of respective authority and responsibility are liable to arise, resulting in delays and too often in friction and lack of harmony of cooperation.

Each of the above Bureaus has now, during the construction of naval vessels, its separate inspectors at each yard. A consolidated bureau could, of course, be run much cheaper than three bureaus, and a great saving made by a reduction of the now three separate working forces, both clerical and mechanical, especially in our navy-yards. Fewer naval officers would be needed, as there would be but one staff instead of three, so that more officers would be available for other duty. Under the present system one Bureau brings its work to the point of readiness for the work of another, which is not always ready for it. There is necessarily a lack of that adaptation and harmony of movement which one head would secure.

If this consolidation were effected, the matter of furnishing coal and other current supplies, which is now under the direction of the Bureau of Equipment, could be easily transferred to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and such other incidental changes made as became necessary.

The foregoing suggestion is made solely with a view to an improvement in departmental organization, and with the highest appreciation of the ability and dutifulness with which these Bureaus have been administered under their present heads. Efficient as they have been, however, their consolidation is recommended, because it is believed that if consolidated under the direction of any one of their present heads,

or of any competent officer, that efficiency would be still greater, less expense incurred, and a better business organization would succeed.

The terms of office of the chiefs of the three Bureaus will all expire in a little more than a year, one of those officers then going upon the retired list, and it is due to them all, as an assurance that the change is recommended on systematic and not personal grounds, to suggest that if made, it shall not go into effect until the beginning of the fiscal year after the expiration of their said terms.

It is most interesting, in the consideration of the workings of the present system, to note what he has to say in his annual report for the year 1900 when he renewed that recommendation. Here is what he said:

CONSOLIDATION OF BUREAUS.

The recommendation heretofore made that the organization of the Navy Department be simplified by the consolidation of the three Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment is renewed. Under the present system, from the inception of its design until completed and placed in commission, the plans and specifications of a naval vessel are in the hands of three bureaus, each with a distinct organization, each having exclusive jurisdiction within certain lines, and all charged with the duty of carrying on work within, but not beyond, their respective provinces, as nearly as may be at the same time.

Such a system is, in practical administration, cumbersome and expensive, and from its very nature tends to develop controversies respecting the scope of each bureau's duties and to occasion friction, delay, and want of harmony in doing whatever approaches border lines of jurisdiction. It is to the credit of the officers in charge of the bureaus concerned that work upon ships now under construction has been carried on without more friction; but the system itself is none the less objectionable, and is a source of inconvenience, delay, largely increased cost, and occasional confusion.

The present divided organization is the outgrowth of conditions which no longer exist. The hull, the propelling machinery, and the articles of equipment of a modern steamship no longer constitute simple, distinct, and separable elements in construction, but, on the contrary, in their multiplicity of details are so interwoven as to render embarrassing their supervision by three sets of independent administrative officials.

The union of these three bureaus, the chief function of which is to deal with the material of the ship, into one bureau, which might appropriately be called the "Bureau of Ships;" the consolidation of their several corps of assistants and inspectors, and the conduct of the really integral work of building and equipping vessels, under the management of one responsible chief instead of three chiefs, would promote the efficient and economical administration of this important part of the business of the Navy Department.

A chief of bureau is practically an assistant secretary. The proposed consolidation would not only reduce three of these assistants to one, but in like manner reduce the supervising, mechanical, and clerical forces in every navy-yard, and thus save great and unnecessary expense. At present each of these bureaus in question has at each yard its separate shops, inspectors, foremen, and workmen, all often doing the same kind of work. No private business is run on such a wasteful and inharmonious plan. I renew the recommendation in this respect of my last annual report.

Let me cite to the House one or two instances to show the complications arising out of the present divided organization in the Navy Department to which Secretary Long alluded. In the installation of the fire-control apparatus on a battle ship—and you all understand what the fire-control apparatus is; it is, in comparison with the other elements of the ship, a very simple matter—it would naturally be supposed that one bureau would be sufficient to install the fire-control apparatus, and yet under the existing system three separate and distinct bureaus have cognizance of the installation of this apparatus on a battle ship. Again, we find that the Bureau of Steam Engineering owns the steam pipes on the pumps and the engines which are under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Construction and Repair. The Bureau of Steam Engineering likewise controls the deck hatches and gratings leading to the boiler and engine rooms, and also that part of the hull-drainage pipes that drain these compartments. Countless other instances might be cited to show that the lines of authority between the different bureaus within a single battle ship are mixed in bewildering confusion. These are not faults of the bureau method, but they are faults of the bureau system which, in its present form, can not be adjusted to suit the natural divisions in shipbuilding which have come about by reason of the change from wooden sailing vessels to steel steamships.

I am not one of those Members of this House who believe that he has done his duty in any matter when he has pointed out the defects. It is easy enough to criticize; anybody can find fault. I believe it is equally a part of his duty to come forward with some remedy to correct existing defects as he may find them. In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, the remedy for the present situation which exists in the administration of the Navy Department rests in reorganization and in the consolidation of certain bureaus in that Department. [Applause.] And after a careful examination of the whole subject I prepared and introduced on January 7 last a bill seeking to put the Navy of the United States upon a business basis, both as a weapon of war and as an industry. The bill to which I refer is as follows:

A bill (H. R. 12425) to reorganize the Navy Department of the United States.

Be it enacted, etc., That the business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed by the Secretary of the Navy between a Division of Personnel and a Division of Material.

SEC. 2. That the Division of Personnel shall comprise all that relates to the Navy personnel, its training, discipline, and detail; all of the officers, enlisted men, and cadets, ashore or afloat, and such civilian clerks as may be provided by law for departmental work in said division, and of material of every kind and description that is transferred to the Division of Personnel for use in the service until it is by said division returned to the Division of Material, to be put out of commission or for repairs or for sale by condemnation proceedings.

SEC. 3. That the Division of Material shall comprise all that relates to the design, construction, equipment, and maintenance of ships, ordnance, machinery, yards and docks, and all material of every kind and description, or the purchase and manufacture of the same and the control of the same until it is transferred to the Division of Personnel for use.

SEC. 4. That the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint two Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. The First Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be a naval officer not below the grade of captain, who shall have charge of the Division of Personnel.

That there shall be created in said Division of Personnel three bureaus, as follows: The Bureau of Navigation, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the Office of Judge-Advocate-General of the Navy. The Bureau of Navigation shall perform the duties and business of the present Bureau of Navigation, and in addition thereto shall have charge of the Naval Observatory, the Nautical Almanac, and the Hydrographic Office; and the Chief of the Hydrographic Office shall hereafter be called the Hydrographer of the Navy.

That the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation shall be appointed from the lists of line officers not below the rank of captain and junior in grade of the Assistant Secretary.

There shall be at such navy-yards and naval stations as the Secretary of the Navy may designate, a naval officer who shall be known as the Commandant of Personnel, who shall have charge of the personnel that may be ashore, under such regulations as to the use of any portions of said navy-yards or naval stations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, not in conflict with any portion of this act.

That the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery shall perform the same duties as the present Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the Office of Judge-Advocate-General of the Navy shall perform the same duties as the present Office of the Judge-Advocate-General.

SEC. 5. That the Second Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be a civilian, and he shall have charge of the Division of Material. In the Division of Material there shall be three bureaus, as follows: The Bureau of Ship Construction, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

That the duties and business heretofore performed and transacted by the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Equipment, and Yards and Docks shall be performed and transacted by the Bureau of Ship Construction.

That in the Bureau of Ship Construction there shall be three divisions, to be called, respectively, the division of construction, the division of machinery, and the division of yards and docks.

That the duties and business of the Bureau of Ship Construction shall be distributed among the three divisions as the Chief of the Bureau, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy, may direct.

That the Chief of the Bureau of Ship Construction shall be appointed from the lists of line officers or naval constructors not below the grade of commander, and if below the grade of rear-admiral shall, while holding said office, have the rank of rear-admiral. The chief of the division of construction shall be appointed from the list of naval constructors, the chief of the division of machinery from the list of line officers having skill as engineers, and the chief of the division of yards and docks from the list of line officers, in each case not below the grade of commander, and shall, while holding said office, receive the highest pay and allowances of a captain in the Navy; and if below the grade of captain have the rank of captain.

That the provisions of law and appropriations for establishing, maintaining, and conducting, and all authorities, jurisdiction, and powers vested in the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Equipment, and Yards and Docks shall, except as they conflict with the provisions of this act, remain in full force, and are vested in and made applicable to the Bureau of Ship Construction.

That at each navy-yard and naval station there shall be appointed a civilian, under the title of superintendent of navy-yard or naval station, who shall have entire charge and control and general direction over every department in said yard or station, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy, and will be held responsible for the preservation of all buildings and stores contained therein, and for the judicious application of all labor.

That the Bureau of Ordnance shall perform the same duties as the present Bureau of Ordnance, except that the ship design work in connection with the ordnance and the installation thereof on ships, heretofore performed by said Bureau, shall henceforth be performed by the Bureau of Ship Construction, and the shops at navy-yards heretofore under the control of the Bureau of Ordnance are hereby placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Ship Construction.

That the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts shall perform all the duties relating to, requiring for, or preparing provisions, clothing, small stores, and contingent stores of the pay department; the purchase of all supplies for the naval establishment, except supplies for the Marine Corps, and the keeping of a proper system of accounts of the same, and shall have charge of all disbursements of money, both for the Division of Personnel and the Division of Material.

All authority by Congress for officers and men shall be executed by the Secretary of the Navy through the Division of Personnel, and all authority for material shall be executed by the Secretary of the Navy through the Division of Material.

SEC. 6. That the provisions of this act shall take effect and be in force on January 1, 1909, and all moneys heretofore or hereafter appropriated for the use of the Navy, under whatever name of bureaus or divisions, shall be transferred and made available for similar purposes under the new divisions herein established.

SEC. 7. That in making up the estimates of appropriations for the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, the same shall conform to the divisions established by the provisions of this act.

SEC. 8. That section 419 of the Revised Statutes is hereby repealed, as well as such portions of any and all other acts in conflict with the provisions of this act.

In brief, the bill proposes to divide the Navy into two grand divisions—a Division of Personnel and a Division of Material, the former to be administered, under the Secretary of the Navy,

by a First Assistant Secretary, who shall be a naval officer, and the latter by a Second Assistant Secretary, who shall be a civilian.

The Division of Personnel would include all matters relating to the officers and men of the Navy, and the use of the Navy as a weapon. This division would include the Bureau of Navigation, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the Office of the Judge-Advocate-General.

The Division of Material would include the Bureau of Ship Construction, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The Bureau of Ship Construction would absorb the present bureaus of Yards and Docks, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment. These bureaus, as Secretary Long pointed out, are now doing practically the same character of work and causing much confusion and delay by overlapping each other. Each navy-yard and naval station is to be in charge of a civilian.

In the discussion which followed the introduction of this bill, the significant fact developed that there is a widespread public sentiment throughout the country in favor of some such legislation. This sentiment is reflected in the editorial utterances of the press; and without attempting to quote any considerable number of different newspapers, let me submit one from the East, one from the South, a couple from the Middle West, and one from the West—all from representative papers—to show the public feeling in the different sections of the country on the subject:

[From the Chicago Tribune.]
NEEDED NAVAL REORGANIZATION.

The unpleasantness which has developed among officials of the Navy Department may furnish the occasion for a study of the organization of that branch of the Government. Its work is still done under a plan adopted in 1842. When Secretary Upshur entered Tyler's cabinet he found that his Department had practically no organization at all. The Secretary was forced to give his time and attention to trifling details of administration. The larger problems had to be neglected because of pressing routine. The plan of centralized control by a single individual under which the Department had developed had broken down because of the multiplicity of details.

On his recommendation the principle of division of labor was introduced. An act of Congress provided for five bureaus in the Navy Department. These were to have charge of navy-yards and docks; construction, equipment, and repairs; provisions and clothing; ordnance and hydrography; and medicine and surgery. There was no arrangement for organizing the heads of these bureaus into a board with corporate powers. Instead each chief was responsible to the Secretary alone. Collective responsibility was entirely lacking.

These five bureaus subsequently were increased in number, with some rearrangement and readjustment of duties. The names of the bureaus suggest at once the possibility of friction and clashing of interest and authority. As the years have gone by these bickerings have made much of the history of Department administration. There has been no strong coordinating principle which has compelled unity of action for the best interests of the Government. A trivial incident frequently has caused unpleasantness, not to be understood without a knowledge of the fundamental weakness of organization.

A department of government which handles a large amount of money annually and is so important a part of the administrative machinery of the nation ought to be organized in accordance with the most approved methods of modern business concerns. The bureaucratic system in itself is all right. The details of the department are too numerous to be handled directly by one man. There is plenty of room for intelligent division of labor. What is needed is coordination of effort.

There has been a great deal of duplication of machinery. As the practically independent bureaus have developed each makes expenditures for things which might be secured with far less outlay under systematic control. There are many places where consolidation and centralization would effect important savings. What ought to be done is to have some of the working principles of industrial combination applied to the department. The experience of any large business house would afford many suggestions in the direction of economical and efficient administration.

The business side of government is being emphasized a good deal nowadays. The individual and the firm use far more judgment and common sense in management than Uncle Sam often does. No department of national administration affords as many opportunities for intelligent business reorganization as the Navy does. If needed reforms should follow the present clash of the bureaus, it would be a good thing.

[From the Boston Transcript, January 11, 1908.]

LEGISLATING FOR THE NAVY.

Two important bills have been brought forward in Congress dealing with the administration of the Navy, one by Mr. HALE in the Senate and the other by Mr. DAWSON, of Iowa, in the House. The former respects the existing bureau organizations and seeks to do away with "general boards," as complicating administration. It affirms the authority which the line has always claimed to sole command of all vessels of the Navy, whatever may be their special purpose. Conservatism is its characteristic, but it may be offered simply as a convenient medium for bringing the whole subject of naval administration before the committee, for Mr. HALE repeatedly disclaimed pride of opinion as to its details or a set purpose to secure all or nothing.

Mr. DAWSON is a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, and it is to be presumed that his proposal for securing a greater approach to unity of direction is based upon careful observation. He proposes to consolidate eight bureaus into two, one to deal with the personnel and the other with material, a logical line of cleavage. At the head of one is to be an assistant secretary, who is to be an officer of the line, while another assistant secretary, a civilian, will be in supervision of the second, both to report to the Secretary of the Navy. Here is at least a simpler administration with the authority of the head of the

Department emphasized. At present in the Navy Department there are eight bureaus—Yards and Docks, Equipment, Navigation, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery. Opportunities for duplications, collisions, and friction abound. Bureau chiefs are human, and the disposition of each to look upon his bureau as a sort of imperium in imperio has recently been illustrated. Many Secretaries of the Navy have been convinced of the necessity of concentration of bureaus, but none has been able to bring it about. Service opinion is divided as to the bureau system, but the bureaus have been so strongly entrenched hitherto that they have felt safe in disregarding criticism. Lack of unity has been the burden of this criticism, epigrammatically pointed by one civilian shipbuilder, who said, "A merchant owner hereabouts builds a vessel at Boston, say, The United States would have the hull designed at Pittsfield, the engines at Provincetown, and the two put together at Worcester, after interventions at points between," an exaggeration, but only an exaggeration of a system which involves a division of labor among half a dozen bureaus.

[From the Cleveland Leader, January 9.]

NAVAL REORGANIZATION.

If the reorganization bill offered by Mr. DAWSON, of Iowa, would really do what its author promises for it—put the Navy "on a business basis as a weapon and an industry"—it ought to be enacted without undue delay. The measure, in part, is aimed at the bureau system that has gained unpleasant notoriety during the past month, and may expect, of course, the active opposition of those who defend the old order of things in the Navy Department. The bureau plan of doing business, indeed, is not abolished by the new bill, but the work is systematized, wasteful duplications of duties are avoided, and the Department brought nearer the degree of working efficiency that one is accustomed to expect in a private enterprise.

[From the Denver Republican, January 9.]

REORGANIZING THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

The bureau system in the Navy Department has stirred up so much opposition and called out such severe criticism from men of prominence that Representative DAWSON, of Iowa, a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, has introduced a bill for a complete reorganization of the Department.

Investigations made by Mr. DAWSON and other Members of the House have shown the existence of much red tape and expensive duplication of work. It has also been found that the bureaus into which the Department is divided act more or less independently of one another, and that as a result there is not merely duplication of work, but also much friction.

Mr. DAWSON's plan is to make two great divisions of the Department, each to be under the direction of an Assistant Secretary. One of these will have to do with the personnel of the Navy and the other with material matters. This is the system which has given much satisfaction in the French navy, and it is believed that by consolidating several of the bureaus and making them directly responsible to a single head much of the existing ground of criticism will be removed.

If nothing more were accomplished by the proposed changes, the breaking up of the old bureaucratic system would of itself justify a reorganization. The constant tendency of such a system is to crystallize, and thus become indifferent to outside criticism. The longer it endures the more fixed it becomes, until in the course of years traditional methods acquire almost the force of law, and subordinate officials and employees conclude that nothing can dislodge them from their places or compel them to improve their ways of doing business.

A thorough reorganization of the Department would put an end to such dreams and make possible the introduction of improvements, together with a great reduction in expense.

[From the Fort Worth (Tex.) Record, January 10, 1908.]

NAVY REORGANIZATION.

Representative DAWSON, of Iowa, a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, has introduced a bill in the House of Representatives having for its object the reorganization of the Navy Department and the destruction of the bureau system, the workings of which recently prevented the sailing of the hospital ship *Relief* with the fleet bound for the Pacific.

Mr. DAWSON's bill is modeled on the workings of the French naval establishment, and provides two grand divisions of work—the "personnel" and the "matériel"—all matters relating to one of these general subjects going to that division, the two divisions being so organized as to preclude the possibility of conflict between them, and each to be under the direction of an Assistant Secretary, responsible to the member of the Cabinet holding the naval portfolio.

The plan is said to command the unanimous approval of the Naval Committee in the House, and to be the outcome of a whole summer's investigation of the defects in the existing bureau system, covering all the navy-yards between Norfolk and Portsmouth.

Under the present plan of having eight bureaus no correlation of work is possible. Each bureau chief has his own plans worked out without consultation with the head of any other bureau, and the result is constant duplication of work with accompanying friction. The committee came to the conclusion that of the \$10,000,000 expended each year at the navy-yards 10 per cent was wasted through unnecessary duplication.

It needs no argument to point out that the Navy naturally divides itself into a division of personnel and a division of material.

The personnel, embracing the officers and men, comprehends the military part of the Navy. The division of material just as naturally comprehends the industrial side of the Navy. It seems logical to me that the military end of it should be under the direction of a military officer who is provided for by this new assistant secretaryship. These two Assistant Secretaries, one in control of the military arm of the service, the other in control of the business and industrial branch of the service, working under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, would bring about that correlation of the bureaus which is so essential to good results. Instead of eight heads of bureaus, having authority to issue orders of the same force and

effect as orders from the Secretary of the Navy, there would be one central head of each of these two grand divisions and the responsibility would be lodged in one place. I would take the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which has charge of the hulls of the ships; the Bureau of Steam Engineering, which has charge of the propelling machinery of the ship, and the Bureau of Equipment, which supplies the necessary equipment of the ship, and include them in a single bureau. Then you will have some correlation between these different bureaus engaged in the same sort of business, and whose lines in the intricacies of modern shipbuilding are constantly crossing to the embarrassment of the Department and the Navy itself.

I need add nothing more, I think, to the arguments of Secretary Long, which I have already read, as to the wisdom of consolidating those bureaus which deal with the material of the ship. The present divided authority respecting a single unit of naval administration abounds in opportunities for duplication, collisions, and frictions.

I do not claim any perfection for this bill, but I do claim that it is based upon right principles; that it makes a reasonable and logical division of the work of the Navy Department; that it would effect the consolidation and the concentration in a way to result in a great saving to the Government, and that it would bring about that correlation and that coordination which is now so sadly lacking in that Department of the Government.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. How long has this complex condition existed?

Mr. DAWSON. Since 1842. Congress passed a law at that time fixing five bureaus, and at a later period, during the civil war, three more bureaus were added, making eight in all.

There is another provision in this bill which I believe will commend itself to the judgment of men who have given any thought or attention to this subject, and that is the provision which places each navy-yard under civilian management. As it is now a naval officer who is entitled to perhaps two years' shore duty is assigned to one of the navy-yards or naval stations, and at the end of that period he is sent away. Thus you rob those navy-yards, which are only great industrial concerns, of that continuity of service which is so essential in the economical and efficient conduct of a business enterprise.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Would this complex condition exist if the Government made its own ships at its own yards?

Mr. DAWSON. The question of building ships at navy-yards has no direct relation to the administration of the Department.

Besides that, the average naval officer who is assigned to these navy-yards in the capacity of a superintendent has had no training as a business man. He is trained as a fighting man. I remember on our trip last summer a distinguished naval officer explained the situation to our committee with commendable frankness. After he had set forth how many hundreds of thousands of dollars they wanted us to appropriate for that particular yard, he was asked if he could suggest any way by which we could economize at that yard. In answer this distinguished naval officer very frankly said that he was not educated as an economist, but as a naval officer; that he was not educated as to how to save money, but that all his training in the service had been as to how to spend money.

And so it goes at these navy-yards. For the most part they are under the control and direction of naval officers, who are temporarily assigned to duty there.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, can the gentleman tell us how much will be saved by the adoption of his plan?

Mr. DAWSON. I can not give the figures in dollars and cents, but I believe it would be a very large sum. I saw a statement in the newspapers not long ago to the effect that a naval officer who had examined into the subject believed that if the service were put upon a business basis we could at least save the price of one battle ship a year, and maybe more.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. That is about \$10,000,000 is it not?

Mr. DAWSON. Yes.

I do not claim any originality in this matter, as this question of remedying the defects in the bureau system is one which has engaged the serious attention of Secretaries of the Navy and of naval officers for many years. As far back as 1885 William C. Whitney, then Secretary of the Navy, called attention to the inadequacy of the system and recommended a reorganization.

Since that time we find the question of naval administration and Department organization treated in numerous papers in the proceedings of the United States Naval Institute by many eminent officers. In 1901 the prize essay of the United States Naval Institute was one written by Lieut. John Hood, and I intend to print this at the end of my remarks, together with

brief extracts from the favorable comment made in the discussion of his essay by such eminent officers as Captain Chadwick, Captain Goodrich, and Lieutenant Chandler. In the proceedings of the institute for 1905 we find two very luminous papers on this subject—one by Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce and the other by Naval Constructor T. G. Roberts—and I shall include portions of both these papers as an appendix to my remarks. The remedies suggested by these officers are in a large measure along the same lines as those proposed in the bill to which I have referred.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. I am enjoying the gentleman's speech very much. Will he tell the committee why it is that Congress has not adopted this reform? It looks to me like a very sound, business proposition, and I want to congratulate the gentleman on putting it so plainly to the House.

Mr. DAWSON. I will say to my friend from Tennessee, that the Naval Committee at this time has started upon a plan looking to consolidation and to better administration in the Navy Department.

Two or three years ago the Naval Committee decided upon the consolidation of all of the power plants at these various navy-yards, and since that time the appropriations have been made with a view to having one central power plant at each navy-yard instead of a separate power plant for each of these four or five different bureaus.

I am very glad to say that after this subject of naval administration was brought to the front at the beginning of this year the Navy Department set about to effect a consolidation of the duplicated shops in the navy-yards of the country. They began at the Brooklyn yard, about the middle of February, by consolidating the four paint shops, the five carpenter shops, and the five blacksmith shops under the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and the three coppersmith shops, and the three iron and brass foundries under the Bureau of Steam Engineering. The general policy of the Department in this concentration at the different yards is to consolidate these various shops under the jurisdiction of that Bureau having the greatest number of employees in the particular trade.

I want to commend Assistant Secretary Newberry for his business judgment in this movement. The consolidation has been extended to all the navy-yards along the Atlantic coast, and is, I am told, to be extended also through the yards down the Pacific coast.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. If the gentleman will pardon me, did I understand him a moment ago when I understood him to say that a naval officer who was the man who purchased the material for the shop confessed in effect that it was a business man's business to do that, and that he was not a business man?

Mr. DAWSON. The man to whom I have referred happened to be not merely at the head of a Bureau in a navy-yard, but he was the commandant of the yard. He was not merely the superintendent of a single bureau, but the general superintendent of the entire yard.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. I can see how that very easily would make a ship exceedingly expensive.

Mr. DAWSON. This action of the Navy Department, in my judgment, is a step in the right direction. I have no doubt that this consolidation of shops will result in a considerable saving in the long run. While it is a step in the right direction, it does not go to the root of the fundamental question involved in the matter of naval reorganization. It may, and doubtless will, dispense with the duplication of shops and tools at the various navy-yards for the time being, but we will still have at every one of these navy-yards the four separate bureaus, each clamoring for appropriations from Congress. We will still have those conflicts of jurisdiction and authority—exemplified in that instance cited, where three bureaus have jurisdiction over the installation of the fire-control apparatus on a ship—and other conflicts like it. This same question came up a number of years ago, and the Secretary of the Navy, not satisfied with the business methods at our navy-yards, had the subject investigated by a competent board of officers. I desire to quote the concluding statement of this board, made after a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the whole subject. They say:

We conclude that to organize our navy-yards on a just and permanent basis, to consolidate their several plants, to introduce thrift in the management, and promptness in the methods of doing the work, with a proper system of accountability—to secure, in short, in each of our yards unification, method, and dispatch, with an administration of its affairs agreeable to the principles of business as understood in civil life—it is absolutely necessary to begin within the Navy Department itself.

The subject, as I stated in the beginning, is one of tremendous magnitude. It is not one which can be worked out in a day or a month. The Naval Committee has already taken hold of it, as I explained to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr.

GAINES], and I hope that the subject will receive the thoughtful and earnest consideration and investigation by the Members of this House, in order that in the end we may work out for the Navy Department a system of administration that will be businesslike in its management, and will bring the United States Navy to a higher standard of efficiency than it has yet attained.

I am not one of those who would revolutionize the Department in an attempt to correct the present defects in the system, but I believe that we should go forward step by step until we have secured that measure of unity, correlation, and cooperation in the organization that will develop and make certain the highest possible standard of efficiency and economy. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed all his time.

APPENDIX.

[From Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, March, 1901.]
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION—MOTTO: THE COUNTRY—THE SERVICE—THE INDIVIDUAL.

[By Lieut. John Hood, United States Navy.]

It is with considerable hesitation that the writer selects so broad and comprehensive a subject as naval administration and organization for the theme of an essay, but existing conditions leave so much to be desired in both the administration and organization of the Navy that any honest effort for improvement, however imperfect, may do some good, and at least will do no harm.

The treatment of so extensive a subject in a limited space permits of only very general ideas being given and very broad lines being drawn, and the remarks that follow are not offered as a structure complete in all its parts, but rather as a mere framework of suggestion to those who have the interests of the service at heart, in the hope that able hands may take up the work and carry it to full completion.

As it stands to-day the Navy could hardly be said to be more than an aggregation of individuals, without proper cohesion or unity of purpose. The individuals are excellent in themselves, whether they be men or ships; but something more than an aggregation of them is needed to make the service the complete, harmonious, homogeneous whole that it should be, working with one purpose for the advancement and glory of the country. That is the final end for the attainment of which all lovers of the service should strive, and the remarks and suggestions that follow are a feeble effort in that direction.

ADMINISTRATION.

Naval administration, to the mind of the writer, includes all things pertaining to the direction of the naval policy of the country; the organization of the Navy Department, or central office of naval administration, and its apportionment into the proper divisions and subdivisions; the direction and control of the naval personnel, and the formation, direction, and control of fleets.

Up to the present time it would be more than bold to say there has been any naval administration at all in the true sense of the term. Certainly there has been no fixed naval policy, nor any logical, consecutive system of development. As new needs have arisen from time to time, a new bureau or a new office has been created here and there and grafted on the whole system without any proper coordination or logical plan for future development. The result has been a heterogeneous mass of old and new, without cohesion of parts or unity of design, and with frequent rivalries between the parts where there should have been nothing but cooperation. The law of its growth has been the expediency of the moment, and reason, logic, and foresight have had little or no part in its development. It may be said to exist only by the force of custom, and to attain any degree of efficiency only by the strength and character of many eminent bureau chiefs.

The spirit of following the law of expediency, rather than logical plan and system, permeates the entire naval establishment, but more especially its administration, and has done more to delay true naval growth than any other cause. It is founded on the moral weaknesses of some, the personal ambitions and jealousies of others, and the want of foresight and ideas of false economy of all; and the sooner it is swept aside, and reason and logic substituted therefor, the better it will be for both the country and the service.

It may be accepted as an axiom that all creations—whether of the intellect or the hands—that are destined to live and bear good fruit are founded on reason and the natural order of things; and since we wish our naval administration to be a living force in itself, and not dependent entirely on the force and character of passing individuals, let us see if it is not possible to organize it on a natural and logical basis, to the end that naval development may be continuous and progressive, despite the shortcomings and failures of any individual heads or chiefs.

It is a necessary consequence of our form of government that the official head of the Navy shall be a civilian who usually goes into office nonconversant with naval duties, customs, and traditions. While this has its disadvantages, in that it frequently exposes questions of a purely technical character to the decision of one necessarily ignorant of their bearings, it has the undoubtedly great advantage of supplying the Navy with a head free from the contamination of service cliques and corps, and of giving it an impartial arbitrator in service disagreements. In many ways it would tend much more to thorough efficiency if the head of the service knew and felt all its aims and needs, and were in full personal sympathy with it; but this same result can be attained, to a great extent, by the proper selection of subordinates; and our system of placing a nonnaval and nonmilitary man at the head of the Navy is, perhaps, the wisest that could be designed. However, whether it be wise or unwise, the system will always be followed, as long as our Government lasts, and further discussion of it is useless, and we will proceed to the consideration of what improvement may be accomplished under him.

As at present constituted, the affairs of the Navy Department are administered by a number of independent, or semi-independent, bureaus and offices, sometimes working together, but more frequently at odds, and with little or no military subordination and sequence or natural and logical groupings. If the matter be looked at broadly, from either a statesmanlike or military point of view, the whole comprehensive

subject of naval administration naturally and logically divides itself into two, and only two, great divisions: First, that of the personnel; and second, that of material. Therefore, logically and naturally, the affairs of the Navy should be administered under these two heads, and under these two only, for all division of responsibility beyond that required by reason and logic tends to weaken the responsibility and promote carelessness, diffusion, and general inefficiency.

The Division of the Personnel should comprise all that relates to the naval personnel, its training, discipline, and detail; all that relates to preparation and plans for war and action; all that relates to the direction and control of commissioned ships and fleets; or, generally, all that pertains to the Navy as a military and fighting organization.

The Division of Material should comprise all that relates to the design, construction, equipment, and maintenance of ships, ordnance, machinery, yards, docks, etc.; or, generally, everything that pertains to the creation and maintenance "in being" of the most efficient and largest fleet allowed by the laws.

Just as naturally as the whole administrative system divides itself into these two great heads, these divide themselves into certain subdivisions that will be discussed under their appropriate heads.

PERSONNEL.

Taking the divisions in the order of their importance, we will consider first the personnel. This division should have for its chief an officer who would be the true military head of the Navy. He should be carefully selected from the highest grade of the line, and, as chief of personnel, should be the ranking officer of the Navy. He should be the chief adviser of the Secretary in all matters of naval policy, and should direct and be responsible for all the matters above enumerated as comprising the Division of Personnel.

No one thing has done more to foster laxity of discipline, develop insubordination, and check the growth of a proper military spirit and "esprit de corps" than the want of this military head, and until such is established all hope of thorough reform and of molding the Navy into as perfect a fighting machine as human nature permits is vain.

Heretofore the duties of a semimilitary head have been performed by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but his scope has been far too limited and his position too anomalous to accomplish much good in a military sense. What is needed is a genuine military head, recognized by the law and by the service as such, and such a head should be the Chief of Personnel.

For the administration of naval affairs relating to personnel the Division of Personnel should be composed of the following branches or subdivisions:

"1. The General Staff: This most important of the subdivisions of personnel is yet all to be formed, except such small parts of its duties and functions as have heretofore been performed by the War College and Office of Naval Intelligence. From the nature of the requirements of a general staff its formation in completed perfection can only be an accomplishment of time. Hence its development should be begun at once."

The official and legal recognition of a general staff and the selection of a proper chief, with a limited corps of assistants and with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the War College placed under him, would be a long step in the right direction.

The Chief of the General Staff should be next in rank in the personnel branch of the service to the Chief of Personnel, and should occupy toward that chief the same position that the latter does to the Secretary. He should be the chief adviser of and replace the Chief of Personnel in case of absence, sickness, or temporary disability.

"2. Bureau of Naval Organization and of Detail: This bureau should have charge of the organization of ships' complements, of squadrons and fleets, of all drills and systems of military instruction, of keeping the records of all officers and men in the naval service, and of the detail of all officers and men to ships and stations for the utilization of the varying talents of all to the best interests of the service."

Perhaps there is no subject connected with naval administration that requires more tact and fine judgment than the detailing of officers and men to fill the positions for which they are best fitted and for the best interests of the Government, and there is none that has usually received less attention, especially in the lower grades. Our present system requires all men to be all things, and attempts to eliminate human nature from the most human of all problems—the control and handling of men. It would be difficult to find an officer of twenty years' experience who has not at some time in his career salled with an executive officer who could not execute, a navigator who could not navigate, and a watch officer who could neither control the crew nor handle the ship. Each of these officers may have been excellent on some other line of duty, but the system required that he should fill a position for which he was unfitted, to the loss of discipline and efficiency or the hazarding of the lives of a ship's company and the safety of the ship. The duties of the Navy are so varied that there is room for talent of all kinds, and the "detail" duty of this bureau should be one that receives the most careful consideration and the personal supervision of its chief.

"3. The Office of Naval and Military Law and Discipline: This Office should have cognizance of all matters pertaining to the administration of law and justice in the Navy and the enforcement of discipline under the laws. It is essentially a branch of the personnel, and should therefore be placed under the direction of its chief. The head of the office should be known as Judge-Advocate-General, and should be chosen from the active officers of the Navy well versed in military law and in close touch with naval customs and the needs of naval discipline. This close touch with naval customs and needs as being essential to the efficient administration of naval justice and discipline as a knowledge of the law, the term of office of the Judge-Advocate-General, should never exceed eight years, and would be better limited to four."

One of the first duties of this Office should be the preparation for submission to Congress of a new code of laws for the administration of justice in minor offenses, the clearer separation of minor and grave offenses, and the general simplification of the administration of law as conducted in the Navy to-day. The necessity for this simplification and of the proper classification of offenses and punishments by law is at the present time one of the most urgent needs of the Navy for the maintenance of discipline.

"4. The Hydrographic Office: This Office, as now, should have charge of the collection and dissemination of nautical information of all kinds and the preparation of the charts, books, etc., needed for the proper navigation of the active fleet in all parts of the world. The work of this Office is purely professional and has no connection whatever with the material of ships. Therefore it is difficult to see why it should be placed under an essentially material branch of the service, as at present, when logically it should come under the control of the division that should naturally apportion and direct its work."

MATERIAL.

Before taking up the detailed discussion of this great division of the Navy it might be well to preface it with some general remarks on the advisability of its consolidation.

As the Department is at present organized, the affairs of the material of the Navy are administered under the Secretary by a number of equal coordinate independent heads, frequently disagreeing among themselves from that ineradicable trait in human nature that causes almost every individual to magnify the importance of the part of any joint work designed by himself. These disagreements—most usually on technical questions and arising from honest differences of opinion—must be referred for decision to the Secretary, who, however great his ability, has rarely the technical education and training that would fit him to decide them to the best advantage.

The parts of a modern ship are so various, and involve so many distinct professions, that many minds are necessarily engaged in evolving the finished vessel. The constructor, the engineer, the ordnance officer, have each and all been necessary to form the completed whole, and many compromises have been made between them from the inception of the plan to the time the finished ship is ready for service. That in the adjustment of these compromises many disagreements should arise is only human; and, in the opinion of the writer, their settlement, and the general building of the Navy, would be much facilitated if there were a common head to all the branches engaged in work on material with sufficient technical knowledge and experience of ships to decide the question intelligently, and with sufficient authority to settle them. Not only would the work be much facilitated, but the Secretary would be relieved from a most onerous duty, and one that he must have frequently felt himself unqualified to fill.

Although men of the high attainments, broad technical knowledge, and administrative ability necessary to fill successfully the responsible position this head must occupy are not common in any profession, there are, and always will be, a rare few in the Navy, as there are in all other great professions; and from these few the head or chief of material should be chosen. It is the same type of men that are found filling the positions of general managers and superintendents of all the great industrial enterprises of civil life.

Though a chief of specialists, he need not be a specialist himself, but must be, however, a man of extensive mechanical ability, and of broad experience of ships at sea under all conditions of service; and, above all, of great executive ability.

He should by law be the officer next in rank in the Navy to the Chief of Personnel, and should be the chief adviser of the Secretary in all matters relating to the creation and maintenance of fleets, and should have control and direction of all navy-yards and repair stations.

Consolidated under this authority, instead of being the independent coordinate powers they are to-day, should be the following subdivisions:

"1. The Bureau of Construction: This Bureau should have cognizance of all the affairs of material relating to the design, construction, and repair of ships, docks, and stations, and should have the care of all navy-yards and repair stations. Its chief and assistants should be constructors and constructing engineers of the highest type obtainable; and the chief should bear the same relation to the Chief of Material that the Chief bears to the Secretary."

The present Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the system that has heretofore prevailed of laying out and designing our navy-yards and stations under many heads, would seem to be illogical, and has certainly led to much unnecessary expense and confusion. The placing of the whole navy-yard system under the one head that controls the great bulk of the work done in them would seem to be reasonable and would undoubtedly lead to economy, efficiency, and to the adoption of a systematic plan in the arrangement of shops and buildings.

"2. The Bureau of Engineering: This Bureau should comprise everything relating to the design, construction, and management of all machinery in the Navy, both ashore and afloat, except that relating to ordnance. Its Chief and assistants should be mechanical engineers of the highest order; and, to be such, can be nothing else.

"3. The Bureau of Ordnance: This Bureau should have cognizance of the design, building, and care of all ordnance, ordnance material, and appliances, and of all armor used in the Navy; and have control of all naval gun foundries and proving grounds."

The handling and management of naval guns and all their appurtenances being distinctly among the primary duties of the line, the Chief and assistants of this Bureau should be chosen from that branch of the service from among those who have made a specialty of ordnance matters by natural predilection.

Moreover, excellence in design and construction can only be attained by the application of the intimate knowledge and experience gained in the actual use of the guns and their appliances in all the varying conditions of active service. This knowledge and experience can only be gained at sea; and therefore the ordnance expert must be also a seagoing officer and should never be segregated from the seagoing line into a distinct and individual corps.

"4. The Bureau of Equipment: This Bureau should control the fitting and arrangement of the entire equipment of vessels except that of ordnance and machinery."

The Chief and assistants of this Bureau should be taken from the line of the Navy, as full knowledge of the necessities of ship equipment can only be acquired by those who actually go to sea in ships and learn from daily experience, in the varying conditions of sea life, which is actually needed for thorough efficiency.

In addition to the subdivisions enumerated above the administration of the Navy requires two other important branches, which are not so logically classifiable as being wholly of either the personnel or material as those already mentioned, and are yet not of the primary importance that requires the establishment of separate and independent divisions in the administration for the proper conduct of their administrative duties. These two branches comprise the duties now administered by the Bureaus of Medicine and Surgery and of Supplies and Accounts.

While the peculiar duties of these two branches render them both more or less independent of the natural classification of all the other branches, they are both of a subordinate character, and are adjuncts rather than primary powers in the administration. Therefore, it would seem more logical and in the right order of things to class them under the one or the other of the two great divisions with which they are the more nearly assimilated, than to form two more divisions of the first order in the administration for two essentially subordinate branches.

The duties of the surgical branch of the Navy bring it in close alliance with the personnel, and, therefore, it would seem logical to class that branch with the personnel, and the Bureau of Medicine and Sur-

gery as the fifth subdivision of personnel. It should be organized as at the present time, except that it should act through the military head of the Navy instead of as an independent power.

On the other hand, the pay branch of the Navy in the purchase, transportation, and care of all the material of the Navy is, in its administrative duties, far more closely allied with the material; and hence the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts should be classed as the fifth subdivision of that great division in the organization of the administration.

No other branches of the naval administration than those indicated above are either necessary or logical; and the division into the two—and only two—great divisions of the personnel and material would seem to be so natural and conducive to efficiency and unity of action, that the administration must long have since been formed on these lines but for the continued reign of the law of expediency and the influences of personal ambitions and of politics.

The suggested organization of the naval administration, then, is:

"First. The head, the Secretary of the Navy.

"Second. The Division of Personnel, whose Chief would be the military head of the naval service, and who would be the chief adviser of the Secretary in matters of naval policy and in all matters affecting the Navy as a military entity.

"Third. The Division of Material, whose Chief would be the chief adviser of the Secretary in all matters relating to the construction and maintenance of fleets, yards, docks, and stations."

For the consideration of questions of naval policy of a wider and more deliberate nature, the Chief of Personnel, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Bureau of Detail and Organization, and their principal assistants should form a permanent board on policy and naval strategy, under the presidency of the Chief of Personnel, for the assistance of the Secretary in creating and formulating the naval plans of the nation.

For the assistance of the Secretary in formulating plans for the creation and maintenance of the fleet, for deciding the types and sizes of ships, their armaments, speed, etc., or, generally, everything connected with putting "in being" the most efficient fleet possible, the Chief of Material, Chief Constructor, Chief of Engineering, Chief of Ordnance, and Chief of Equipment should form a permanent board on construction, under the presidency of the Chief of Material, who should have the deciding voice.

The Secretary would thus, at all times, have at his disposal the experience and advice of the chiefs of the two great divisions of the naval administration; and in matters of graver import, requiring further deliberation and discussion, should convene either the Board of Policy and Strategy or the Board of Construction, or both, according to the nature of the question.

In general the Secretary should hold the chiefs of the two great divisions responsible for the proper performance of all matters relating to their respective divisions, and leave them to hold their subordinates to a like responsibility, for responsibility, properly carried, is the sure test of efficiency. It can be properly carried only when it proceeds from the head down, for in any efficient organization the head is always responsible.

It would be impossible to develop a complete scheme of naval administration in the narrow limits of an essay, and this branch of the subject-matter of the title will be closed with the few broad suggestions offered above, for the majority of which no claim of originality is made. But it would seem that an administration organized and developed on the lines suggested would be following the laws of logic and reason, would prove efficient, lead to a unity of purpose, develop the best in all branches, and promote a spirit of emulation and military "esprit de corps."

DISCUSSION.

Capt. F. E. Chadwick, United States Navy: I wish first to thank Lieutenant Hood for a most thoughtful, able, and philosophic paper. The organization of administration has always been a weak point in our system, and it has been weakest where, by the complex nature of the subject, it should be strongest—in the Navy. Nothing could be more haphazard, disconnected, and, so to speak, offhand, than the law establishing our present organization. * * * I agree, in the main, most cordially with the author's views.

Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich, United States Navy: * * * An old officer once said to me that the bureau system was not so bad in itself, but that the Navy Department needed some office, or officer, or commission, to knock together the heads of the bureau chiefs and make them agree. This idea would appear to have been in the essayist's mind as he wrote. The bureaus were originally intended to divide the Navy's civil business among them, and so relieve the Secretary of much of the burden of his financial and other responsibilities. To-day the bureau chiefs are so overwhelmed with the minutiae of their several charges that they can not properly give sufficient time to the consideration of those broad questions which concern the service as a whole. The essayist's plan may not meet with universal acceptance, but it offers at least a well-reasoned means of reaching an end which is generally conceded to be greatly needed. * * * To combine all that concerns the personnel under one head and all that concerns the material under another head must commend itself to the judgment.

Lieut. L. H. Chandler, United States Navy: I find myself in hearty accord with the essayist's views as far as the question of administration is concerned, and I believe that such an arrangement as he describes would, in general, prove an ideal one.

[From Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, March, 1905.]
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY—MOTTO: "TO IMPROVE THE STREAM
BEGIN AT ITS SOURCE."

[By Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce, United States Navy.]

The discussion as to the best form of naval government has been carried on in these pages for some years past, but with indifferent results.

Let us now place the Department itself on the stand and learn from original sources what it has to say in its own behalf. To this end we may bring the testimony of some of the distinguished gentlemen who have presided over the Navy during the past few years. They are the most competent judges of the workings of their own office. They can speak with an authority vouchsafed to few, for each Secretary of the Navy was in turn the Department. By concatenating certain of these expert opinions (not all, indeed, for that would far exceed our limits) we may be enabled, each one for himself, to judge of the true character of the Department, as revealed by itself; of its ability to map out a far-reaching and comprehensive naval policy; of its capabilities for

governing and guiding the military operations of the fleet, and of the degree of efficiency and economy secured by this particular form of administration.

First, as to the composition of the Department.

The act of April 30, 1798, which called into existence the Department of the Navy, provided for a Secretary of the Navy, whose duty it was to execute such orders as he should receive from the President; for a principal clerk, and for such other clerks as might be thought necessary.

Not a very complicated piece of machinery, perhaps, but it illustrates the very crude notions of that day relative to naval organization.

To-day we find the Navy Department composed of one Secretary of the Navy, an Assistant Secretary, eight bureaus, a Judge-Advocate-General, and a proportionate number of clerks.

About twenty years ago the Secretary of the Navy, not satisfied with the business methods of our navy-yards, propounded the following query: "Whether a given navy-yard is fully equipped with the necessary appliances for the prompt and economical execution of such work as may be required; and, if not, what will be required to place it in proper condition for the probable demands of war?"

A portion of the answer of the board of officers to whom the question was addressed is given herewith at length, as it goes to the very root of the matter and shows clearly that the unbusinesslike methods which obtain in our navy-yards have their origin in the defects inherent in the Navy Department. The logical conclusion—the conclusion from which we can not escape—is, as there stated, that reforms in our navy-yard methods must begin in the Department itself.

After making certain recommendations, the report of the board continues: "The third query invites an expression of our views as to whether 'any improvements can be made in the system of performing the work at the navy-yards which will promote efficiency and reduce expenses.'"

Answer: "To a proper understanding of the subject it should be stated that the present wasteful extravagance in employing so great an excess of nonproducers, and the inefficient system of doing business which has for years past been steadily increasing in our navy-yards, is but the natural outgrowth of the constitution of the Navy Department itself. There can be no manner of doubt of this. Each navy-yard is made up of a number of separate and comparatively independent establishments, little principalities, as it were, each owing allegiance to its own sovereign, the chief of the bureau to which it belongs. The heads of departments of a navy-yard have extensive and responsible duties and a large patronage, and are naturally jealous of the interference of anyone but their own chiefs.

"Thus each department has been gradually building itself up so as to be independent of all other departments, and is constantly striving to do all its own work. Each of the principal departments has its own body of artisans, its own machinery, its own steam generators, and its own peculiar method of doing business. As an illustration, we take from official 'schedule of wages' (Form 9) of civil engineer's office the following ratings: Boiler makers, boiler makers' helpers, calkers, cooper, cabinetmakers, core makers, ship joiners, ship carpenters, machinists, machinists' helpers, molders, oakum pickers, and pattern makers—a little shipyard in itself.

"In this way it has come that some of our yards are filled up with machinery far beyond their actual needs, and it is no exaggeration to say that there is to-day enough machinery of various kinds in either the New York or the Boston yard to do the work of its own particular class of the entire Navy during peace. We habitually speak of a private shipyard as a 'plant'; but each of our national shipyards is a segregation of plants, each having its own separate organization and each its own internal regulations. Many illustrations might be given to show how, through the want of concert of action among these several plants, useless and vexatious delays occur, to say nothing of the waste of time and of public money due to such diffusion.

"To make such radical changes as we propose in our memorandum was no easy task, nor did we expect that they could be effected without considerable friction, not to say opposition; but supposing the changes to be made on the basis laid down by the Commission, it is hardly to be hoped that under present conditions they will be permanent, for whatever changes may be introduced now, and however beneficial they may be, still the same causes remaining in active operation must inevitably produce the same result and in time restore the system of independent plants with all its attendant evils. Hence we conclude that to organize our navy-yards on a just and permanent basis, to consolidate their several plants, to introduce thrift in the management and promptness in the methods of doing the work, with a proper system of accountability—to secure, in short, in each of our yards unification, method, economy, and dispatch, with an administration of its affairs agreeable to the principles of business as understood in civil life—it is absolutely necessary to begin with the Navy Department itself.

"Upon the consummation of so desirable an event, which need not necessarily change the general character of the present organization of the Department, the scheme for consolidation, the proper classification of duties, and the abolition of all unnecessary employees in the navy-yards can be carried into effect without difficulty and with the essential element of permanency insured."

One copy of this report was sent by the Secretary of the Navy to the Senate, under date of January 14, 1884, and one copy to the House of Representatives. It was referred to the respective Committees on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed. It is clear, therefore, that the members of those committees were fully informed on the subject. It does not appear, however, that it elicited any attention or that the charges it contained have ever been refuted or a single statement challenged.

On the contrary, during a succeeding administration and one of a different political complexion, the Secretary of the Navy himself took up the subject and exposed, with relentless candor, the wasteful extravagance which characterized the business methods of the Navy Department.

"It must be evident that there is something radically wrong with the Department," wrote the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to Congress under date of November 30, 1885. And he adds: "The universal dissatisfaction is the conclusive proof of this." He then proceeds to dissect the bureau system as it then existed with merciless precision and gives to the world a "record of mismanagement, of wasteful expenditure, of injudicious and ill-advised disposition of public moneys," such as should have led to immediate and salutary reforms.

For the seventeen years preceding his administration over seventy-five millions of money had been expended "on the construction, repair, equipment, and ordnance of vessels, which sum, with a very slight exception, has been substantially thrown away."

To illustrate "the follies of the Department," the Secretary cites the case of the *Omaha*, an old wooden vessel of obsolete type, that was rebuilt at a cost that would have paid for a modern steel ship of the same rating. The curious part of this piece of extravagance was that the responsibility was so diffused over several bureaus that it could not be laid at the door of anyone in particular.

In respect to navy-yards the extravagant system is fully detailed—"a state of things which," the Secretary adds, "it is almost impossible to correct under the present organization of the Department." These last words, coming, as they did, from a Secretary of the Navy of marked ability, are significant, and fully confirm the views of the Board hereinafter quoted. And, finally, to secure desired results, "a reform to our organization is indispensable."

Even with such overwhelming evidence of its necessity no reorganization was attempted, but an improvement in the methods of transacting business of the Department by placing purchases of the several bureaus under the Paymaster-General was introduced.

The next administration succeeding took up the same question of the organization of the Department. Under date of November 30, 1889, the Secretary laid bare the glaring defects of the bureau system in language so clear and pointed that the wonder is it failed to attract the attention of Congress.

"The details of administering the Navy, as an existing force," he reports, "its vessels in commission, its officers, and its crews, were scattered, without system or coherence, among a variety of offices, bureaus, and boards. The assignment of officers to duty, and, to a limited extent, the movements of ships in commission, were in charge of an 'office of detail,' at the head of which was the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which Bureau was, at the same time, supplying compasses, chronometers, and navigating instruments, electric-light plants, ship's libraries, and other miscellaneous articles." The Secretary then proceeds to show how business is distributed among other bureaus and adds: "To all these fragments of authority there was no central unity of direction except such as could be given by the personal attention of the Secretary, to the exclusion of that broad and general supervision over all executive business which is required by a Department as comprehensive as the Navy; and cases were not infrequent where a ship received simultaneous orders from three separate bureaus, which were so directly contradictory that it was impossible to execute them."

"To attempt to reach a conclusion by means of three coordinate bureaus working independently," remarks the Secretary of the Navy, "without unity of direction, and without any established organization by which differences may be harmonized and an agreement reached, must produce delay, confusion, changes of plans, and additional expense. To remedy this serious defect, the only plan which the law admitted was adopted." This was the origin of the Board of Construction, created by General Order No. 372, in 1889.

In 1895 the Secretary still further simplified the business methods of the Navy Department, but left the question of reorganization untouched.

But with all this public exposure of the fallacy of bureau methods, and with the shameful case of the *Omaha* as a warning, equally unfortunate were the cases of the *Puritan* and *Terror*, monitors, ten years later. The hulls were rebuilt by one bureau and the worn-out engines and defective boilers were allowed to remain by another bureau, so that in the Spanish war these otherwise fine vessels, with their high military value, could not steam fast enough to "get out of their own way." The warning furnished by the *Omaha* was disregarded.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy of November, 1903, alludes to the defective organization in his Department in no uncertain terms. He repeats substantially what was said twenty years ago, of eight bureaus working independently of each other: "The distribution of business among bureaus independent of and unrelated to each other (except through the action of the Secretary) unquestionably creates a condition out of which grow conflicts of jurisdiction between the bureaus, sometimes injurious, and a tendency to consider the interests of the bureaus rather than the interests of the Navy. The division of business in the bureaus * * * extends to the navy-yards, and even, to some extent, to ships in commission. This leads sometimes to excessive and cumbersome organization and lack of harmony of effort, resulting from the fact that there is no coordination, except by the voluntary action of bureau chiefs, short of the Secretary's office itself." And more to the same effect.

After exposing the defects of the existing state of affairs, the Secretary goes on to make a distinct recommendation looking to an improvement in the constitution of his office. This led to a state of affairs which can hardly find a parallel in the naval history of any country.

The insufficiency of the personnel of the Secretary's own office had long been felt. The necessity to a Secretary, fresh from civil life, of an intimate and confidential relationship with some one officer or officers of rank and acknowledged fitness for the position, had been fully acknowledged. This phase of the question was very clearly stated in the report of the Secretary of the Navy in 1885. Moreover, the very large increase in our naval establishment and correspondingly increased expenditures, together with the greater military value which now attaches to our squadrons, imperatively demand that the office of the Secretary of the Navy should no longer be left without a professional assistant. However well that arrangement may have suited in 1798, it is not practicable now.

The President, recognizing these several considerations, desired that the functions of the general board should be made permanent, under another name, by legislative enactment, and so expressed himself. "It is eminently desirable," he wrote to Congress in December, 1903, "that there should be provided (by Congress) a naval general staff." * * * "We need the establishment by law of a body of trained officers, who shall exercise a systematic control of the military affairs of the Navy and be authorized advisers of the Secretary concerning it."

This judicious recommendation of the President, ably seconded, as it was, by the Secretary of the Navy, met with violent opposition. And while it can not be said that the President's object was actually defeated by those upon whose support he had every moral and legal right to count, yet it may be affirmed that such opposition to constituted authority was not an example calculated to improve the morale of the naval service. The case is exceedingly valuable, however, as furnishing a good illustration of our peculiar methods of naval administration and the total absence from it of the military character—that very character the President saw was wanting.

Out of its own mouth shall the Department be judged. * * * What is needed is legislative action based on a liberal and enlightened consideration of the whole subject of naval organization, from both the military and the civil point of view, to the end that the several parts may be evenly balanced and nicely adjusted, that our naval administration may become a model of efficiency and economy.

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THE TRUTH ABOUT NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.

[By Naval Constructor T. G. Roberts, United States Navy.]

In connection with this paper I wish to cite two ancient arguments and answer them in order, viz:

1. They say "that after consolidation the duties must again be subdivided among the various experts, which is the same practice as now; hence, nothing will be gained thereby." "That such a condition already exists in a commandant and his heads of departments, and you will only get back to where you started from."

This fallacy is simple, although it has been a puzzle for amateurs during many years past. It is a fact that personnel in any office must be assigned to duties in accordance with individual aptitude, and even subdivided to suit the class of work. Such is found in any business office anywhere. The flaw lies in the failure to perceive the difference between a single office and a single set of account books, executive orders, shops, and workmen, and a collective industrial establishment of six separate offices, each a power unto itself, duplicating each other and making work for each other. The difference in the application of expert services in the two cases is immaterial and cuts no figure in the governing considerations. The main thing is to have an expert head of the single industrial department who will bear the responsibility for the cost of the work. A commandant must exercise military control over the whole naval station, one unit of which should be the industrial department, the other units being the naval hospital, marine barracks, pay office, general storekeeper's storehouses, receiving ships, observatory, pharmacy, ships in ordinary, and ships in commission under repair, respectively. By this arrangement a commandant would have his hands full doing precisely the same things as now, and would have the same control as now, the only change being a consolidation of units under his control.

2. They say, "It is a good thing to have separate bureaus, since professional rivalry induces excellence in results."

That is an argument whose greatest vogue existed in the days of the anteaemulation line-engineer wrangles. Professional disputes in navy-yard industry have never been recommended as a time and money saving device. No well-regulated establishment in civil life would permit for a moment a controversy-breeding state of affairs among its employees. That would be considered the first signal of collective inefficiency.

Finally, I wish it clearly understood that in this paper my criticisms do not apply to bureaus or departments or individuals as such; none of the above deserve criticism from me in this connection, it being evident that each must operate as best it can under the system in which it finds itself. The fault is in the system as a collective institution, and I hope, therefore, not to be misunderstood.

INTRODUCTORY.

There seems to be a spirit of dissatisfaction all over the country with the alleged shortcomings of our methods of naval administration, and at the present time the available testimony from all sources tends to give a confusion of ideas that is apt to lead us astray should we make a wrong diagnosis of the case.

Testimony of the highest and the lowest authorities has laid the cause at the door of the administrative system of navy-yards, which is conceded to be cumbersome, unwieldy, and expensive, due to the divided authority distributed among several heads of departments. The foregoing are established facts proved by the superabundance of evidence that has accumulated for many years past. The circumstantial evidence with which the Congressmen most interested have become impressed is found in the duplication and triplication and quadruplication of separate plants within a navy-yard, each department being, or endeavoring to be, complete in itself and independent of the others. No amount of conflicting testimony can prevent the inevitable conclusion which American men of intelligence must form in this epoch of business combinations. There is no doubt about the cause of the present state of affairs; the only problem is the remedy.

The foregoing conditions have been brought to the front entirely from considerations outside the service proper, but in the midst of this unsettled state of feeling comes a hue and cry from within the Navy by the advocates of a general staff, which they say is warranted to cure all the existing ills. It is claimed that a permanent body of line officers, in addition to those already on hand, should be established within the Navy Department for the purpose, primarily, of furnishing a "mere civilian Secretary" with hand-picked knowledge of strategy to direct the fleet and "wield the Navy as a weapon," and incidentally to coerce the multibureau system into uniform ideas and economical habits by the power of military rank and authority. I think that is the gist of it. The purpose seems to be to confine these operations to the mental and paper machinery inside the Navy Department at Washington. The motif of this campaign, with high rank and emoluments dangling around it, has been brought into question by the current literature on the subject.

The foregoing facts constitute the summary of the present conditions as they exist, and it shall be my purpose to analyze the situation from its various bearings, and to endeavor to find a remedy.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.

It is necessary to recognize, in the first place, that three separate and distinct methods of administration are found within the operations of the Navy Department, comprising what we understand as naval administration. These three divisions may be classified under the heads (1) political, (2) military, and (3) industrial.

The political system is represented by the head of the Navy Department, who is, and ever will be, a civilian, because the spirit and essence of our Government is based on a subjection of the military to the civil institution.

The political administration, as above classified, is frequently referred to as civil administration, which it is; but so also is industrial administration, and to avoid confusion, the foregoing classification will be adhered to throughout.

Military administration refers to that under the line officers, who alone are eligible to the supreme command of a ship, a squadron, or a fleet. Line officer means a naval officer in the line of promotion to such command. The functions are purely military, and the purely military field of operations finds its most correct example on board a ship or in a fleet. Shipboard administration will be considered the exact expression of military administration in the Navy. The strategy and directing power of a fleet are included in the same definition.

By industrial administration is meant that portion engaged in the production and manufacture of a ship and its accessories, which may be more closely defined as those departments engaged in procuring materials and operating civilian mechanics in producing the ship. Navy-yard administration is industrial in all that applies to workshop and

civil employees as found to exist in the analogous institution of a private shipyard, being military only by virtue of the supreme authority vested in a commandant.

(1) POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION.

The Secretary of the Navy represents the political administrator. Politics is our method of securing government of the people, by the people, for the people. The politically successful man is one selected by the majority as their representative, because of personal attributes most acceptable to the people, whose actions the people believe will be most agreeable to themselves concerned. He is, presumably, the embodiment of our form of government, and to his authority the military and industrial considerations must bow.

The political feature finds its expression in various ways in naval administration, over and above all other considerations contemplated in the military establishment as laid down in the Navy regulations. If a ship must be overhauled and repaired and two navy-yards desire to get the work, the workmen's representatives that clamor loudest usually get it, that being the will of the majority that cares anything about it. Within the service the opinion always holds that such matters, as all others, should be determined by the absolute merits of the case, regardless of clamors. The military administrator must determine his actions by merit, that being the root and foundation of his education and training, and he cares little about the will of the people where his position is not influenced by such a regard. A naval officer is not in the best position to be a political administrator—he can read from the mercurial barometer an approach of a storm at sea, but he is handicapped where it comes to feeling the pulse of the people from the touch of the political barometer.

Political administration finds its way into the service in shifting ships and work from one station to another, in shifting personnel in like manner, in the location of navy-yards and naval stations, in appropriations for new buildings and new expenditures of all kinds at the various stations; it determines whether vessels shall be built or repaired at navy-yards. In time of war political considerations divert naval vessels from the fleet to patrol the coasts in the vicinity of frightened political communities. It has given high position to political favorites and has determined the command of ships and squadrons. Sometimes it goes even further and influences the actions of naval boards in their duties under the regulations. Boards have been known to have their recommendations returned for revision until they meet the political desires, or another board may be called to reverse their actions, and so on until the desired results are attained. This operates to promote personnel in some cases, or discharge or retire it in others. It operates sometimes to increase the pay of the navy-yard mechanic. Its existence has been alleged in political contests against nonpartisan shipbuilders in the trials of vessels, and it shows itself in various forms in the distribution of contracts for new ships, and is constantly at work in the purchase and acceptance of all sorts of materials for Government use. The head of a Government Department is sensitive to the representations of the people; if he is not, some one soon takes his place who is. Of course there have been abuses, as in every other department of life, but a good administrator knows enough not to try to reform the people or the political system of which he is a part; he does his part best if he recognizes facts as they exist; and he concedes to political demands, if they are logical, where it makes no material difference otherwise, and where it does not interfere with the object for which his institution was created.

I am not attempting to lay down rules, but merely to place an estimate on what appears to have been the guiding features of political administration from the evidences that have come to notice in the past.

Is such a political government an abuse? Should the people rule the people? If the public's wishes be disregarded, the Government becomes autocratic by definition, and how else can their wishes be made known except through their representatives? If reform, who will attempt it, and how? Would the creation of a general staff, or any other sort of a mechanism inside the Navy Department destroy, limit, or influence in any way the politics of the head of the Department as it applies to the military and industrial establishments? It may as well be conceded, in the light of history, that the political administration, whatever its good or evil, will remain untrammelled as long as our form of government exists.

(2) MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

Only on board a naval vessel does military discipline hold complete sway. The order of the captain is the law and must be obeyed without question, argument, or appeal to a higher power. The captain must confine his actions to the limits prescribed by law, but inside those limits he can cover almost any sort of overbearing conduct toward those beneath him, officers and men alike. He can not strike them, or punish them physically beyond the lawful limit; but he can harangue them and institute such a personal bearing toward them as to punish them mentally beyond degree. There is no appeal from an order, which must be obeyed with alacrity whether right or wrong, and he who refuses classifies his actions with the mutineers, the limit of which, in grave cases, is death. He who answers back goes to prison, but he can not resign or be discharged. I am merely specifying the limits in order to distinguish more clearly between military and industrial administration and to show that a trained military administrator is as different from an industrial as from a political administrator.

Our bureau system is represented in miniature on the ship. The captain represents the Bureau of Navigation, which directs his own actions and the movements of the ship. Although the other bureaus are represented, not one of them has any right or power of appeal that would modify in the least the perfect and absolute control of the directing administrative bureau and its captain in the wielding of the ship as a fighting machine. In this point it differs from navy-yard administration, as we shall see presently. The executive officer represents the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and the ordnance, equipment, medical, pay, and marine officers represent the corresponding bureaus. In the operation of the bureau system in the use of tools, stores, etc., there are no conflicts; they are used where needed indiscriminately by shipboard authority or without. If one bureau's machine breaks down another bureau's force repairs it, if more handy. The bureau representatives themselves are not expert in the lines of demarcation and cognizance of the bureaus, a line officer representing a staff bureau, and there is no provision for appeal beyond the ship if one should so desire. In other words, the captain has complete control of the ship and all her accessories, and the bureau system divides the duties of officers into a convenient distribution of the work. Military efficiency is attained by drilling, innate intelligence, alacrity in obedience to orders, and the good example and rigid discipline that must be maintained by the officers at all hazards. Admiral Farragut laid down a military rule for all time when he said to his officers: "What-

ever is to be done must be done quickly." Shipboard efficiency consists in preparedness and alacrity. It has little to do with dollars and cents. Military economy is exercised in taking care of the materials and avoiding waste, in about the same way as one would take care of a new suit of clothes, or would eat sparingly of his provisions during a long journey. It has nothing to do with saving money by a judicious distribution of the laboring forces, to obtain the best returns for the money expended, which forms the essence of industrial administration.

On the contrary, shipboard administration contemplates expending the maximum amount of labor in order to fill up the time. Those who have been to sea know the monotony of having nothing to do, which tends to generate the spirit of unhappiness. Hence, the sailor's proverb that the best commander keeps his crew happy by keeping them busy. Happiness is healthy for the mind, labor is healthy for the body, and these essentials permit of the attainment of military preparedness, alertness, and efficiency. Industrial economy is a different profession. It is a law of humanity that a man is most proficient in the line of his ambitions. The highest ambition of a line officer is to command at sea. In that position the eyes of the whole world may be turned on him in war, and his name may be in every mouth. He may bring honor or disgrace to his country. He must be a specialist in the strictest sense, but not a general practitioner. Besides familiarity with the methods of wielding the men and the tools at his disposal, he must be familiar with strategy, international law, naval history, navigation, and tactics. None can afford to be an indifferent expert in these branches, for a single blunder in one might lose all. No profession in civil life forms any sort of analogy or comparison to that of a line officer, and it is a matter of current belief that the easy habits and disciplinary notions of naval training unfit an officer for civil pursuits; and it is likewise apparent that civilians never have been, and can not be, eligible to the position of a line officer without the necessary course of training. It requires no analytical mind to discern the irreconcilable differences between industrial and military administration.

(3) INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION.

The peaceful arts of the shipbuilding mechanics comprise the industrial features of naval administration, as is represented by a navy-yard. The business of such an institution is to manufacture, repair, or assemble the vessel and her outfit. The production of the vessel belongs purely to civil industry, being the product of the shipbuilding trades under the cognizance of labor unions. The pay of a sailor is merely nominal in comparison with that of the mechanical tradesman, which furnishes an opening for a considerable loss of funds unless the quality of administration secures the best combination in outlay of plant, in the purchase and handling of materials, and most important of all in the distribution and handling of the difficult and very expensive labor that fills up the navy-yards. The workmen may not be tongue lashed, nor put in the brig, but they may be discharged if the administrator has a good case.

Now, let us examine the operations of the bureau system as it applies to the industry of a navy-yard. The local representatives of bureaus comprise the corresponding departments of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Equipment, Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery. The Bureau of Navigation is represented by the commandant.

The division of work assigned to each bureau or department is a development of the natural and convenient divisions that existed in shipbuilding when the bureaus were first formed in 1842. The original Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair controlled practically all the industry that was required to build a ship. It included all that is now represented by the three bureaus Construction and Repair, Equipment, and Steam Engineering, the latter subdivisions having been made in 1862 during the stress of war. Had the Construction Bureau not been thus subdivided there would be a different tale to tell about the cost of navy-yard administration to-day. But no one could have foreseen the effect at that date. The subdivisions were natural ones, inasmuch as the Chief Constructor before that time had an engineer as assistant to look after the steam machinery of the new motive power.

The wood-ship builder viewed with suspicion the advent of steam, and the motive power of the future passed out of his hands to those who were willing to master it. A ship was then a simple affair, and there was no question as to where the propelling machinery left off and where the ship began. The Equipment Bureau undertook to relieve the Construction Bureau of assembling movable articles not strictly a part of a ship, but corresponding more nearly to the furnishings, such as sails, rigging, anchors and chains, the electrical outfit, and the like. With the changes that have come about in modern shipbuilding, the steel ships of to-day, with their complex machinery, have merged all professions into one. The wood-ship builder, as represented in the modern shipwright, has been driven almost out of business. His cognizance included the whole vessel in 1842, while now he is limited to the decks and the outside sheathing, if any. The steam engineer finds himself replacing his own auxiliary machinery with equipment motors, and he has to tolerate rival steam engines that form essential portions of the equipment and construction machinery. Likewise the Equipment Bureau finds rivals with electrical machinery in the Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction.

The original natural divisions of these three bureaus have become unnatural and very complex and illogical. All three operate both steam and electrical machinery, and generally throughout are trying to do similar work that now falls under one profession. I shall not endeavor to relate all the unreasonable subdivisions of the work in these bureaus, but will cite only a few samples. As new methods have been adopted, each bureau has claimed as much of the work as possible, and each head of department, disagreeing, has written out his case, and all the papers have gone to the Secretary of the Navy for decision. In the meantime, in many instances the work has waited several months until the matter was settled. The decisions have not followed any rule, but the bureau in most favor at the time has generally won. If the question was referred to a board composed mostly of line officers, the decision was given very frequently to the line officer contestant, if there was the slightest possible justification for it. I would remark here that with a general staff of pure line officers to pass on such questions, the bulk of industrial administration would pass from the staff bureaus into the hands of the military administrators, in case human nature should not unexpectedly reform. To-day the department of Steam Engineering owns the steam pipes of Construction pipes and engines, the deck hatches and gratings and their fastenings leading to the boiler and engine rooms, and also that portion of the hull drainage pipes that drain these compartments; Equipment owns the dynamos, and the dynamo foundations if there are any, and the railing around them if attached to these foundations. Shall I go any

further? Suffice it to say, that the lines of cognizance between these bureaus are more mixed up than the present Navy pay table. The fault is not in the bureau method, but in the fact that the bureau system has not been readjusted to suit the natural divisions of shipbuilding as they exist since the steel ship has created a revolution in shipbuilding methods.

Shipbuilding was originally made up of several professions, but to-day it has merged into a single profession, and it not only includes the production of the whole ship, but it operates the shipbuilding plant, by which it controls the profit which forms the measure of efficiency in industrial administration. The remedy is the simplest business proposition in the country—consolidation. There is no economy in shifting cognizance from one bureau to another, as now organized; each department has developed according to its needs, by virtue of experience, and to shift its power, plant, or shop to some other department only acts to deprive the one that needs it and prevents the responsible party from controlling its own profits. There is a great deal of talk about consolidating the power plants of a navy-yard. The idea seems to be that only the power plants are duplicated. That is a very great error. Everything is duplicated and multiplied. In the navy-yard with which the writer has been associated for the past five years there are in the several departments the following shops, viz:

Six power plants, eight machine shops, five joiner shops, five paint shops, five laborers' lobbies, four blacksmith shops, four pattern shops, four tin shops, four fuel-oil plants, four testing laboratories, three electrical workshops, three copper shops, three riggers' gangs, three polishing shops, three fuel-gas plants, three foundries, two steel-plate shops, two electroplating shops, thirty-two storehouses under separate roofs, fifty material fields, or piles of materials not under cover, and thirteen coal sheds and bins under separate roofs.

Some of the foregoing shops exist only in miniature, being parts of other shops, but are separate organizations doing similar work. A more exact idea of the extent of these repetitions may be gathered from the following:

Power plants: Construction and Repair owns two, one main and one auxiliary; Steam Engineering owns one; Yards and Docks owns two, one main and one docking plant (in the same building with the Construction and Repair plant); and Equipment owns one.

Machine shops: Construction and Repair has two main and one emergency (and two floating, not counted above); Steam Engineering has one main and one emergency; Equipment has one, and Ordnance has one.

Foundries: Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment have one each.

Smitheries: Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Yards and Docks, and Equipment have one each.

Joiner shops: The five departments have one each.

Pattern shops: The four departments, excluding Ordnance, have one each. Two of these have not separate shops, but do their pattern making in their joiner shops.

Tin shops: The four departments, excluding Ordnance, have one each, some doing tin work with tinsmith machinery as parts of other shops.

Paint shops: The five departments have one each, two of them employing one, two, or more men, sufficient to do their own painting.

Copper shops: Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance have one each.

Steel-plate shops: Construction and Repair and Yards and Docks have one each for working plates and shapes.

Electrical workshops: Construction and Repair, Yards and Docks, and Equipment have one each.

Laborers' lobbies: The five departments each employ their own laborers' gangs and implements.

Fuel-oil plants: Construction and Repair has two, and Steam Engineering and Yards and Docks, one each. Two of these are small units.

Gas plants: Construction and Repair has one, and Equipment and Supplies and Accounts (testing laboratory) have a small unit each.

Testing laboratories: Construction and Repair, Yards and Docks, Steam Engineering, and Supplies and Accounts have one each.

Polishing shops: Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment have one each.

Electroplating shops: Construction and Repair and Equipment have one each.

Riggers' gangs: Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment each employs its own gang of riggers.

The thirty-two storehouses comprise buildings and shops containing stores of any kind, whether in the possession of the general storekeeper, or of the department having cognizance of them.

The fifty material piles include every sort of material of value in separate lots, or different varieties, as distributed near the storehouses or shops where it is most likely to be used.

It may be noted that in each case of shop duplication above the Construction and Repair Department has one, that being usually the largest one.

Now add to these the corresponding sets of foremen, clerks, and draftsmen in each department, and you have seventy-five foremen, eighty clerks, and thirty-six draftsmen. By foremen is meant master mechanics, quartermen, and leading men combined—i. e., men who superintend work. There are thirteen foremen machinists, of whom four are master machinists. Of the seventy-five foremen, forty occupy positions in charge of their respective gangs. Of the eighty clerks, thirty-three belong to the general storehouses. By clerks I mean all those who would be so termed in civil life.

In one department there is a leading man pattern maker in charge of four men; in another it requires a master pattern maker and a leading man for seven men. In one there is a quartermen molder for fifteen men; in another a master molder for eighteen men, etc.

There is no necessity for more than one shop of each class and kind, as proved by the private shipyard, and no private shipyard could afford to have so many directing officials.

The shops and forces of the departments being duplicated, it follows that the heads of departments, and hence the departments themselves, are pretty nearly duplicated, which is, actually, from a shipbuilder's point of view, a fact. Nothing short of industrial consolidation will be worth while, and the establishment should not only be consolidated, but it should be divorced from the military, so to speak; that is to say, the one shipbuilding department should be a unit under the one shipbuilding head, responsible for the economy of the work. Our navy-yards would then be as in France. We are moving toward the French methods. We tried the British Admiralty Board from 1779 to 1781, but abolished it. It was tried again from 1815 to 1842 in the form of the Navy Commissioners, but it was again abolished as being unsuitable. Every young nation tries the British Admiralty method. It suits England for reasons purely English. The posts of honor and command are kept in the aristocracy for the benefit of the

younger sons of the nobility. The line of the British navy is sought by them as a profession. The "Board of Commissioners for the Execution of the Office of Lord High Admiral of His Britannic Majesty's Navy," belongs to a privileged class. In this country we expect a man to be responsible only for what he knows; our lords of industry are the engineering nobility who have won their titles by actual achievement in their own particular line.

We have left the British Admiralty method far behind long ago and are approaching the French system. We hear of a general staff—that is what we sometimes erroneously translate the French *état-major* to mean. We hear that we need a "bureau of personnel" and a "bureau of matériel." That is all French in name and method, and all our own bureaus are adopted and named after the French. Then let us have the French "bureau of matériel" precisely as it exists, which consolidates all industrial shops and works under the one head of "naval construction;" its directing "personnel" is composed of "Ingenieurs des constructions navales." It includes also all ordnance workshops and fittings in navy-yards. Unlike our ordnance, theirs is manufactured by civil industry and shipped to navy-yards, where it is handled and installed by the department of naval constructions. French navy-yard industry is confined to the one department, which combines every shop and tradesman under a single head, and that not a military head, nor a number of mixed military and industrial heads, but rather an industrial head who is competent to take the responsibility for the things he knows, the things of his special education and training, the things of his pride and ambition, the only things by virtue of which eminent ability may permit him to rise to any sort of distinction. Not that he needs distinction and should be allowed to attain it, but that the human composition is such that the best efficiency can not be attained by any other inducements in a system where hope of reward must be the stimulus; where neither capital, salary, nor interest, from a personal investment, are at stake. "Individual responsibility" reposing in the head who instructed in the things he is responsible for is at the root of efficiency. Our bureau method is preeminently such a method, and is the most perfect yet devised, but has become uneconomical for the plain reason that the system of the bureaus has not been readjusted to suit the natural subdivisions of the present times, until the supposedly "sharply defined duties and responsibilities of overspecialized bureaus," to adopt Captain Mahan's diction, have become interlaced, interwoven, and intertangled to such an extent as to exist only in theory and imagination, but have no semblance in reality.

The Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Equipment, and Yards and Docks should be combined under the heading of Bureau of Naval Construction; the Bureaus of Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery to remain practically as at present; excepting that, as in France, the Bureau of Naval Construction should have cognizance of its own materials so as to control the economy in their purchase and handling.

The Bureau of Ordnance should remain as now, excepting that its duties should end with the manufacture and shipment of ordnance and armor; its plans should be limited to these items and should not include any portion of the vessel to which they are applied. This is in order to unify the manufacture of plans at the Navy Department and the plans and building work at shipyards as the nearest approximate measure of economy. Strictly speaking, ordnance and armor belong to the broad Division of Material, along with the rest of the ship, by definition, and by the example of the Navy furnishing us with the term, and hence, logically, should be combined with the other bureaus of material. In that event it would become advisable to detail line officers as inspectors, since in this country, unlike some other countries, naval ordnance has been developed and manufactured almost purely by line officers, and it would not be advantageous to take it out of their hands. This renders it less advisable to include the Bureau of Ordnance in the consolidation; but since the ordnance and armor factories are not situated so as to duplicate work of any kind, a result almost equal to consolidation will be obtained by consolidating the design and building of ship and machinery, exclusive of ordnance and armor, under the single industrial bureau. This arrangement need not exclude the inspector of ordnance when guns are being installed on shipboard, but should require his presence as in France.

There is sufficient evidence to believe that the Bureau of Navigation has grown too large and that it should be separated into two bureaus, the new one to be called the "Bureau of Personnel." This bureau should take over the items suggested by its name, and other kindred duties that will leave only the items concerning strategy to the Bureau of Navigation. The latter bureau would retain, of course, the Intelligence Office, the War College, the direction of the fleet, war plans, and all those functions which go to make up the sum total of "the wielding of the Navy as a weapon," and besides would inherit, from the defunct bureaus, the Naval Observatory, coaling stations, other naval stations, and in fact everything else except navy-yards, stations, and docks engaged in the building or repair of vessels. I merely suggest, not advise, the latter subdivision. It can not, in any wise, affect industrial administration.

The present necessity is the unification of navy-yard industry, so that it can not duplicate itself, and so that naval industrial administration may operate in the full benefit of modern methods as developed with such eminent success in the private industries of this country. All power plants, shops, heads of departments, assistants, draftsmen, clerks, foremen, leading men, and mechanics may be combined into one set of each class or kind. The result would effect a reduction of the number of buildings in use, the working forces, and the total cost of the establishment by an amount that would be startling to predict. The military authority should remain supreme in a commandant, but the industrial establishment, being in subjection to the military, need not be subdivided into a number of mixed administrations interwoven as now, but combined and divorced as a pure industrial unit.

EVILS TO BE CURED.

Of the present evils of greatest moment is the unsystematic method of laying out new yard plants and the distribution of shop buildings among the various departments. The sites for the plants themselves are selected, usually, by people having an eye only to the depth of water, facilities for military protection, and the nature of the soil. The most important economic industrial consideration contained in the contour of the site and water frontage and in the economic arrangement of shops have seemingly had no part whatever in the establishment of our navy-yard plants.

Economy in arrangement, whereby labor and material travel by the shortest route between shop and ship, is an asset which means a goodly percentage in profit as long as the plant endures. A steel plate that will travel 300 yards from plate rack to its place on the ship's side in a poorly arranged plant may travel only a hundred yards in its course

from machine to machine in a well-arranged plant. The reduction in cost of handling is very appreciable; and if this be applied to all the multitude of articles that go to complete a modern ship, the difference in cost is considerable. The same condition obtains with labor, which is more important, because more expensive. The shipfitting and joiner shops belong nearest the building slips and fitting-out berths, so that the class of men that fit and refit from shop to ship will have to walk the shortest distance; for the similar reason that the engine and boiler shops would be at the rear, as near the fitting-out berths as possible, since the engines and boilers may be built complete in the shops, and when ready may be hauled any distance by rail to the fitting-out berths. Every shop has a logical location in a shipyard, yet no shop can have its proper place by our methods. Each department seeks the main business street as centrally located as possible. Sites and shops are let in a haphazard way, and even if determined by a board the most influential member gets the most central location. In the navy-yard of my most intimate acquaintance the distance of the farthest buildings from the power house of one department is so great that the cost of the electric-power wires is something extraordinary; one department is widely separated into two large halves by another department lying between, and the joiner shop is farthest away from slips and berths, while the engine and boiler shops are nearest the slips and docks, just the reverse of where they ought to be. Yet the losses on first cost and circuitousness must appear in the figures of cost as long as the plant exists.

Another great source of loss lies in the lack of harmony that usually exists between the heads of departments. There are two sorts of inter-department administration: one where controversy is rife, another where obliging tact prevails. It may be observed here, incidentally, that the one who willfully enters into a squabble is a downright enemy to economy, for when at their best, heads of departments are far enough apart by the very nature of things. One department finishes its work to where another begins, and then endeavors to get the other department to supply the connecting link. The second department may have its men on a more pressing job, or may not even have obtained funds for the work in hand. The delay in connecting may be anywhere from an hour to a month. Worse than that has happened. These misconnections are very frequent, due to the simple fact that the various heads of departments have different trains of thought, and one can not divine what the other intends to do until the time arrives. The great effort of working ahead of time in all the mass of details is not to be expected from men whose capital or income does not bind them to it, and whose salary depends on the limits of the single duties of their own department as laid down in the Navy Regulations. Unintentional misconnections between departments are the source of the greatest loss of time and money in the operation of the plants as they now stand. One department owns a crane, a second department is using it, while a third department waits for it. The time of making connections, getting permission, and waiting may keep a whole gang of men out of work for some time. One department builds a shop, the second department buys an elevator for it; the original plans made to fit are changed by one department without the knowledge of the other, and the elevator is found not to suit the shaft, so the floor just completed must be cut out again.

A load of steel plates arrives and must be immediately removed by one department from the receiving station. This causes one handling. Another department has the list of plates, what they are and who they are for, and retains it sometimes a week or two. When the list arrives the third department has to inspect them, one by one, to examine the inspector's mark on each. The first department does not find it convenient to handle them until the broken crane of the fourth department is mended, to avoid rehandling them twice again. At the end of some months the inspection is completed and the contractor has lost several months' interest on his money.

One department buys a lot of materials that it thinks the other department will need, and owing to a miscalculation of the other department's habits the goods lie in store for an indefinite time. Two departments disagree on a matter touching both. The first one begins the work and the other writes a letter to the commandant, who refers it to the first one for his arguments. If the work is important the commandant authorizes the one he thinks is right, and forwards the papers to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for a decision to guide in future cases. If unimportant, the work may await the decision. Sometimes friction arises between two departments; they begin to make caustic remarks and indorsements to each other. The clerks, foremen, and workmen soon catch it, and there is a regular blockade of the interlying work between the two. When this happens, lords of old in feudal castles were not in more impregnable fortresses than are the two belligerent heads. The warfare is waged silently by mutual understanding; each puts the other out as much as possible, and there is no power on earth to stop them except by mutual consent. The commandant seldom has evidence of its existence. If anything comes up in correspondence he settles the point at issue; if one reports the other, verbally or by letter, the other always has a plausible reason to offer. It is simply impossible for one to make the other come to time, and reports are liable to cut both ways, like a two-edged sword, and are out of fashion.

A dry dock belongs to one department, also its operating power plant. The operation of it belongs to the second department, and if the engines and boilers become old, dilapidated, and uneconomical, needing to be repaired or replaced, the first department must obtain the appropriations and make the repairs, if it approves the changes; its uninterested opinion governs, and in the meantime the second department bears on its books the unwilling losses from uneconomical operation, sometimes for a period of years.

The most unnatural scope of bureau cognizance is exemplified in the modern floating dry dock which falls under the bureau bearing a similar name, due undoubtedly to the circumstance of a name inherited from the graving dock. The design and building of a floating dock belongs purely to naval architecture (and not to civil engineering); yet the Government fails to utilize its own naval architects in such work, but pays the premiums, going to the naval architects of civil industry.

Another misfit is found in the building of a new shop by one department for another. The second department begins simultaneously to procure appropriations for the machinery. First there is a duplication of drafting work. The building plans originate in the second department, defining the internal arrangement within its cognizance. These plans are remade with changes by the first department. The one department's machinery requisition goes through without a hitch, while the other department's building may be held up for months after the machinery is delivered. The building may go a winter or two without heating or some other necessary facilities, while the other department's force must endure it. The building foundations may have been laid before the necessity of driving piles to support the other department's machinery becomes discovered, and when the piles are then driven the

foundations are ruptured and require extensive repairs. On no kind of work is misconception so rife, so radical, or so damaging as between the department that supplies the building, and the one that supplies the machinery and uses it. The building just completed must be mutilated with holes, underground wiring conduits, brackets, and machinery foundations to suit the need of No. 2, which No. 1 could not foresee to assemble himself or to have assembled in time to make all connections; and the worst of it is No. 1 lets the contract to a civilian contractor, No. 3. If the middleman, No. 1, built the house himself, there would be some logical excuse for his separate existence, but navy-yard shops and houses are built by private contract, as in other countries.

A contractor delivers a load of coal for department No. 1. A sample is inspected and passed by body No. 2. An order comes from department No. 3 forbidding the schooner to unload until a ship is moved from the vicinity. Department No. 4, owning the crane, must be consulted to have the crane heads sent at the proper time. Interdepartment correspondence ensues, until finally, after about four days, the schooner comes alongside and is unloaded with the ship, crane, and everything else standing in the same positions as when she first arrived. The loss to the contractor is four days' demurrage on the schooner, and he could not get damages from the Government if he tried, and the Government could not fix the responsibility if it tried.

One department confers with another by letter and gets a reply in a day or two; mails are sometimes delivered quicker in a city. Letters from business firms come to one department and are referred to the others, one at a time, for indorsement. In four to ten days the circuit is made and the original letter sometimes goes back to the business house plastered with six to ten indorsements in reply to its query. The amount of paper work is out of all proportion. The cost accounts of a manufacturing department are duplicated in the accounting department. The accounts of work done by one department for another are duplicated in both departments. Copies of contracts for one department made by the purchasing department are duplicated in both, together with many contingent inspection and other papers. A head of department executes a multiplicity of orders and then becomes a paper defendant to justify his actions brought into question always after the work is done. The amount of paper work inherent in the system leaves only too little time for carrying out the real work.

There is also the commercial-representative evil. Some commercial houses have representatives who visit navy-yards as constantly as any of their other customers. They convince foremen, leading men, clerks, chemists, officers, and their assistants of the quality of their goods, and offer specifications, suggestions, and objections. Any of the latter, in some way or other at some time, or both, may be able to influence the kind or quality of the goods bought. The evil and dangers are apparent. Business houses claim and they have a right to discuss business with the Government and to have representations at the rejection of goods. A single department would render practicable the concentration of all business inquiries in a single office and officer.

A board of inspection also complicates the situation. There are three members, two of whom seldom see the goods they sign away, but only delay the paper work in triplicate. The member representing the department for whom the goods are bought is the de facto inspection board, and is so known to contractors and Government alike. The presence of a board and all its paper machinery does not even conceal the fact, and the one member bears all the responsibility. There are six separate offices in which inspection papers and correspondence are eligible for consideration or indorsement, viz, general storekeeper, commandant, head of department concerned, inspection board, chemist, and the representative member. The shortest possible trip is via four of these, the return trip being the same. The time of a single trip depends on the uncertainties of messenger service, but is usually a day to a week, unless by urgent necessity a simple paper is escorted throughout the trip by a single messenger, which even then is long unless all heads happen to be in.

There is a shift of head of department and representative member for every department's inspections, which leads us into the problem of permutations and combinations to figure out what may happen to inspection matters that touch all departments, or more than one, at the same time, as naval supply fund materials, for instance.

The head of department most concerned has the final "say" in practice, and all departments being combined into one would place inspections under his direction and responsibility the same as the rest of the work. That would abridge all papers and place the work and the final "say" where they actually rest now. If there ever was an anomalous paper institution, it exists in an inspection board.

Another superfluity is the paint board, which loses time in the preparation of a lot of useless papers. Combination would replace it by a simple letter from the head of the department.

Each department is not complete in itself, but may require another department to do work it can not perform. One having no foundry may make requisition for the one with foundry to make its castings. The first department must furnish the materials, while the other department does the work and transfers back the charges so the labor may be paid from the appropriations of the department having cognizance of the work. Thus the cost appears against the first department, whereas it really had no hand in controlling the amount, which may be exorbitant. This occurs constantly, and it is evident the total expense account of a department includes a portion made outside of its control and for whose excess it can not be responsible. Another feature is illustrated in the effect of shifting cognizance from one department to another. Once the Government decided to economize by centralizing the lighting plants into a single department. The result was the department that needed light on ship work was supplied with inadequate lights, the ancient practice of using candles grew to an unnecessary extent, and hundreds of men have stood many hours in the dark, glad at the opportunity for a rest. The authority shifting the lighting from the department that controlled its cost and operation for its own work could not have understood how its details were going to work out. With all power plants shifted and consolidated under one department as the bureaus are now adjusted, the operation and cost of power would be beyond the control of the department using it, but the cost would be charged against that department, which would be held responsible for it notwithstanding, since this cost must have been included in the estimates and appears on the books against it. Such reform as that is truly "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel."

Another illustration of interdepartmental methods may be shown by the following example: An appropriation is made to build a ship and is apportioned at Washington between the three bureaus producing the hull, machinery, and equipment. The department building the hull must be responsible for its cost. Incidentally, the building slip and launching ways must be prepared. A fourth department, having no al-

lotment, must drive the piles by virtue of its cognizance as determined in the Navy regulations. The hull department must require the piles to be driven by the fourth department, and the latter determines all features included in the cost. The pile-driving department answers to nobody for expense, being the supreme judge of all matters touching its technical duties, while the cost is transferred back to the hull department, who must answer for it, though having no command over it. This requires the hull department to detail an inspector to watch the pile department to determine whether the men charged to the work have actually been present and properly engaged on the work as paid for. No regular inspectors having been provided for such work, this inspection is delegated to someone who is most handy; but only on large work of importance can inspection be employed, for there is so much small work going on of a similar character that it is impossible to anticipate it or to check it up after it is done; for in some cases where such charges have been transferred it has been found that men so charged for a whole day may have been engaged on the work only an hour, or perhaps a few of them may only have handled some of the material in the shops or may have done nothing at all on the work. This result may be quite unintentional and due to the methods of preparing accounts; but I shall not descend into those minutiae. A day never passes but what every department transfers accounts of work done for the other departments, and they are of such varied and irregular character that practically no one can be held responsible for their correctness, much less for the economy exercised in producing them. The same is true of work within the cognizance of one department which has not the shops to do it with and must request another department to do it, with the same transferring of accounts and uncertainty of costs.

Is this evidence enough, or shall other instances be cited? How should it be remedied?

Shall the commandant be vested with authority to violate the Navy regulations defining bureau cognizance, or shall he be permitted to violate the appropriation act and charge the work to the most convenient appropriations, to avoid the paper and other evils? If so, will someone venture to explain in what features will navy-yard administration be benefited thereby?

If not that, then how will a General Staff, composed of military administrators, line officers only, interposed between the present bureaus and the Secretary of the Navy, ameliorate the situation?

There is no possible solution other than consolidation. At the moment of this writing, out of a yard force of 1,426 workmen at the yard I have in mind, 761 of them belong to the construction and repair department and 665 to all other departments combined. At all navy-yards in full operation the construction and repair department force is usually greater than all the other combined, and always has been. The reason is because navy-yards exist principally for the construction and repair of ships. To consolidate the whole is not far to go.

Consolidation would cure also the spasmodic economy evil: One department has no money to do absolutely necessary work, while another department can not find enough work to expend all its funds; one can obtain all the material it needs, another has to take what it can get; one can supply motors for all its power on shipboard, another can not afford generators to give the crew electric lights; one can supply mahogany furniture for every need, another can not replace an article of furniture that falls to pieces from old age; one is worked to the limit of mental and bodily strain to reduce the costs, another rocks along easily, waiting for the quitting bell to ring. One wastes what the other saves.

One of the most expensive luxuries indulged in by the Government is a haphazard administrator—a merely accomplished officer, whose only necessity is to know enough to keep out of trouble, and perhaps, after some experience, to accumulate enough data to engage in a controversy. He is putty in the hands of his foremen. A ship arrives to be overhauled. The foremen make his estimates for him, and in so doing they determine the limits of the estimates. Shall this work be repaired or renewed? The foreman says it must be made new, with suitable gestures. The foreman's judgment usually governs the totals of the estimates. One who is not in a position to know better than his foremen must retreat when the latter present arguments which he knows not how to refute. Likewise the foremen determine the actual limits of the work undertaken, which may overrun the estimates. Foremen are from among the workmen, who are their friends and companions, and it is but natural to look out for new work and hold fast to that in hand. Otherwise it means discharges for the tradesmen, which is not a popular idea among them. Usually when an old ship gets safely moored alongside a navy-yard for a general overhauling she may bid farewell to the world until there is other work in sight.

One must know more than his foremen and have the will power of his convictions in order to be able to limit the work to its proper amount and cost, and he must be very energetic and diplomatic in exemplifying his superiority by a vigorous line of action. When several hundred expensive mechanics are engaged on a single ship, at a cost of several hundred dollars a day, more money can be sunk in shorter time than in any other way at a navy-yard, especially if the workmen are holding on to the job like grim death, with no other work in sight, with a figurehead in charge of the department. If the electric lights go out and the men stand idle for an hour, that is of little consequence where the work of repairs may be drawn out for several months without half trying.

Recently the captain of a ship forwarded to Washington a letter accompanied by a sample copy of each of the different bureaus' blank forms for survey, his contention being that all these forms should be reduced to a single one, applying to all bureaus alike. The stores belonging to one bureau must be included on a separate form supplied by that bureau, and the bureaus' forms differ on account of the differences of the methods and usages of the bureaus themselves. The consolidation of the bureaus handling material would reduce these forms to unity, and thus ameliorate a number of kindred inconveniences.

Another evil which combination would cure is to be found in the prevention of improvements to shipboard machinery where such improvement would transfer its cognizance to another bureau. Thus, steam auxiliaries have refused, at times, for such a reason to give way to motors, long after the auxiliary steam engine stands discredited everywhere else. The limit of bureau cognizance influences and injures the design of a ship in various details, and stands in the way of many improvements.

Likewise, no one may encompass, and be responsible for, the design of a ship as a whole. The art of shipbuilding is amply provided for in point of quality of workmanship, for where a poor job of work occurs the person who did it can always be definitely located; but the science of shipbuilding has no connecting link provided to unite the interdependent functions governing the mobility of a ship. The speed,

vibrations, coal consumption, radius of action, economy of power, water consumption, and horsepower of a ship depend upon three separate and interrelated things, viz, the model, the propeller, and the engines. On the model depend the speed, vibrations, wake coefficient, bow and stern waves, and horsepower. The functions of the propeller influence and depend upon the model, wake coefficient, speed, revolutions, slip, vibrations, depth of water, coal and water consumption, radius of action, indicated horsepower, and economy of operation. On the engines depend the speed, vibrations, horsepower, coal and water consumption, revolutions, radius of action, and economy of operation. The bureau that designs the hull has no "say" with respect to the propeller and engines, and the bureau that designs the latter has no say about the hull; so that no competent person is provided for, or permitted, by the Government to design these three component parts, or to adjust them to secure the best results, or to locate the errors in the completed vessel.

If a new ship fails to attain the desired speed, it may be due to the insufficient horsepower or inefficient propeller of one bureau, or to the lines of hull, foul bottom, displacement, trim, or lack of depth of water at trial of another bureau's consideration. If there are excessive vibrations it may be due to an unbalanced engine, an improperly designed propeller, or a wrong location of the engines with respect to the hull's nodes of vibration of one bureau's cognizance. If the vessel is uneconomical and has a large coal and water consumption and a small radius of action, it may be due to a foul bottom, wrong propeller, excessive steam consumption of engines, or inefficient boilers. There is no one in a position to locate the fault and denote whether it belongs to one bureau or the other, nor is anyone in a position to profit by the experience and correct future designs. There is greater reason to combine the design of the whole ship under one head than to combine the two departments building it. A ship is too small to separate its design or its building under any but one head. It may have been necessary forty-two years ago when the shipwright knew nothing of steam or electricity and the separate professions had to be employed to obtain the whole, but at this epoch when a war ship has merged into a machinery plant where hull, engines, boilers, dynamos, and all the other fittings are formed into shape by the same or similar machinery from iron, steel, brass, and copper by the same class of mechanics, there no longer remains an excuse for unnatural subdivisions descended from the olden times. The whole field of the shipbuilding profession today is not more than a specialized branch of mechanical engineering—steam engines, boilers, electricity, and naval architecture. Not even so diversified as the mechanical engineering of commerce, which encompasses the broad field covered by the great variety and differences in machinery, plants, and methods employed in the private industries of the country, but merely the comparatively narrow field of mechanical engineering applying to a shipyard plant only, and the architecture of naval vessels and machinery only; merely the same profession now covered by the curriculum of a single school and encompassed by a single diploma. There is no real barrier to the achievement of modern methods in our tape-ridden navy-yards.

PRACTICABILITY OF CONSOLIDATION.

Having examined the various conditions in detail we are now prepared to perceive the economic necessities of combination as may be classified under the following subheads:

1. The economical outlay, arrangement, and first cost of the plant.
2. The economical power operation of the plant.
3. The economical administration of industrial labor.
4. The economical purchase and handling of materials.

That is the sum total of the navy-yard needs, and there are no obstacles so far as the rearrangement of personnel is concerned. As with shops and workmen, a surplus of superintending officials may be dispensed with. The workmen may be combined with facility, as with clerks and draftsmen, creating a surplus all along the line. Also, every shop in the plant may be combined into a single one of each class or kind, excepting storehouses occupying several buildings.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Efficient navy-yard industry having been provided for in the foregoing, we are now prepared to consider the Navy Department itself. Whatever is best for navy-yard administration is best for the Navy Department, since the real battle ground on which the funds are expended is the navy-yard which determines the economy and efficiency of expenditures. The Navy Department is only a reflection on paper of what navy-yards and shipyards do; it only obtains the lump sums for expenditures, giving general plans and directions, and criticises results effected elsewhere.

The readjustment and consolidation of bureaus is necessary, aside from any features connected with the military administrative needs of the Navy Department which might seem to warrant such a body as a General Staff.

An executive board, of any composition, would be an unnecessary encumbrance in the Navy Department. But if the Secretary should see fit to create an advisory naval board, he could constitute it by a simple order. The best logic in the creation of the general board appears to have been in the purpose of supplying our then newly created Admiral with an office and duties commensurate with his distinguished services. That object might be attained even better by appointing him president of the Navy board as above outlined.

The only legislation needed is the following:

1. An act abolishing the Bureaus of Yards and Docks, Steam Engineering, and Equipment, and creating the Bureau of Personnel in the Navy Department.
2. An act creating the office of assistant chief of bureau in each of the bureaus.

With an assistant chief of bureau—already long needed, there being one already in fact, if not in name—the bureau chiefs would have more time to devote to the operations of the Navy board. This board would be merely advisory and dependent, as the present boards in the Navy Department are.

Let it be well understood, however, that a Navy board is not in any way essential to the industrial efficiency of the Navy Department. I merely suggest, not advise, its creation. It may be valuable, to avoid friction and duplication of work inside the Navy Department and to provide an advisory board covering the whole field of military and industrial operations, which neither of the two boards it replaces fully cover, but it can not in anywise influence industrial administration, excepting in so far as it may facilitate the preparation of the general plans and specifications of vessels. Even then it can influence only the time, but not materially the cost, of providing new ships.

Civil engineers may be attached to naval stations belonging to the Bureau of Navigation, or to the staffs of commandants, or to navy-yards on duty for the Bureau of Construction and Repairs, as their services may be required. Line officers performing engineering duty only may be utilized at inspection duty on shore in an independent capacity in keeping with their rank and eminent abilities. It is immaterial whether they serve a different bureau.

Line officers in general, during their periods of shore duty, may be assigned to inspection and other duties under the technical bureaus.

At private shipyards, line officers may be assigned as inspectors where needed, having separate specified duties.

When the necessary legislation shall have been passed, the Secretary of the Navy shall have the authority to distribute the work among the bureaus, by which the above arrangements may be realized. When that is done, navy-yards will be able to build and repair vessels as cheaply and as efficiently as private shipyards, steadily year after year. The industrial administration may hope for the same measure of success in the future as has ever attended the efforts of the military administrator in the past.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I now yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. LOUD].

Mr. LOUD. Mr. Chairman, men go to sea for pleasure, for health, for profit in commerce, or for glory in war. Of the last I would speak here to-day, and of battles on the ocean which have been decisive in the fate of nations, especially of our own America.

From far-off centuries, 3,000 years ago, came the rumors of naval strife. From Longfellow, writing of these far-off years, in rhyme, we hear:

And shapes more shadowy than these in the dim twilight half revealed
Phœnician galleys on the seas, and Roman camps like hives of bees;
The Goth uplifting from his knees Pelayo on his shield.

It was by means of these "galleys on the seas" that Phœnicia at that time maintained her supremacy among nations.

SALAMIS.

Five centuries later we hear of a great battle on the sea. It is no vague rumor now, for every trifling and interesting detail has been handed down to us by the Greek historians. It is the battle of Salamis, one of the most decisive in the world's history, civilization against barbarism; Greek against the Persian; Themistocles against Xerxes; 380 triremes of the Greeks against 700 triremes of the Persians.

It is told us that in the conference of Greek commanders the night before, when most of them advised against joining battle with the almost overwhelming force of the Persian fleet, Themistocles almost alone urged the attack. Themistocles was taunted by Adimantus with having no city to represent, alluding to the fall of Athens. Themistocles turned quickly upon him and informed him that 200 seagoing ships well equipped and well manned were a city in themselves. In the battle next day the victory was with the Greeks. The barbarian overwhelmed, Athens and Greece saved, Themistocles had in fact a city and a country, and a world's crisis was decided that day upon the sea.

ACTIUM.

Four hundred and fifty years later, 31 B. C., another decisive battle, the battle of Actium; not Greek meeting Greek, but Roman against Roman; the fleet of Octavius against that of Mark Antony and his ally, Cleopatra. All the world looked on and saw Mark Antony's defeat, the end of his high career, brought on by his illicit love for the Egyptian queen, and costing 300 ships and the lives of 5,000 men.

LEPANTO.

Sixteen centuries later, 1571, came Lepanto, another of the world's famous battles. The mighty fleet of Spain and Venice, representing Christian civilization of that age, against the fleets of the infidel Moors and Turks. Nearly even in strength, the 600 ships and the 200,000 men closed in death-grapple. Savagely they fought, the Christian against the infidel, until the Turkish fleet was almost annihilated, only 40 of their 300 ships escaping. The Christian world rejoiced, and Don Juan of Austria, the commander of the Christian fleet, was the idol of all Europe, and his victory was a glorious event in Spanish history.

ARMADA.

A few years later, 1588, came the defeat of the Great Armada, which marked the decline of Spain's glory, then the greatest world power. Intending to overwhelm England, it was itself overwhelmed by the English fleet under those famous leaders, Admirals Howard, Sir Francis Drake, and Sir John Hawkins. From this time forward England has been the great sea power, and up to 1812 nearly always victorious, seldom defeated.

NILE.

Their greatest battle, on which their fame rests, was the Nile, in 1798, a crushing defeat for Napoleon on the sea, such as was Waterloo on land. This battle made a hero of Lord Nelson—almost worshiped by every loyal Briton.

TRAFALGAR.

A few years later followed Trafalgar, 1805, when the English fleet, under Lord Nelson, again won a glorious victory. It was a costly victory, for even as they cheered in triumph all Eng-

land shed tears at the death of their idolized leader—Nelson. Nelson's signal as they closed in battle that day—"England expects every man to do his duty"—has ever since been a watchword in the English navy. This stanza comes down to us from an old song of Nelson and Trafalgar:

We beat them; how, you know, boys;
Yet many an eye was dim,
And when we talked of triumph
We only thought of him.
And still, though fifty years, boys,
Have gone, who, without pride,
Names his name, tells his fame,
Who at Trafalgar died?

Of Trafalgar Allison said:

At Waterloo England fought for victory; at Trafalgar for existence.

ENGLISH POWER SUPREME.

For two hundred years preceding 1812 England had been the mistress of the seas. Two hundred battles they claimed, with only five defeats. One of these five, however, was most humiliating to their pride. It was the battle of the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Serapis*, September 23, 1779. It came in the dark days of our American Revolution and cheered the hearts of our patriotic ancestors as it has the hearts of every generation of Americans up to to-day, when our hearts swell with pride in John Paul Jones, the father and hero of our American Navy. In his poor old ship, the *Bonhomme Richard*, a merchantman improvised as a ship of war, he was opposed to one of the finest ships of the English navy, the *Serapis*. He had no easy task, for he fought with one of the best captains of the English navy, with a full and perfectly disciplined crew. Captain Pearson, of the *Serapis*, was knighted for the gallant fight he made. Paul Jones, hearing of it, laughingly said:

He deserved it, and if I can but meet him again I will make him an earl.

Who of us that heard it will ever forget the beautiful tribute paid over the remains and to the fame of this naval hero by Gen. Horace Porter at Annapolis:

Untitled knight of the blue waters, "wrathful Achilles of the ocean," conqueror of the conquerors of the sea, the recollection of your deeds will never cease to thrill men with the splendor of events and inspire them with the majesty of achievement. You honored the generation in which you lived and future ages will be illumined by the brightness of your glory.

REVOLUTIONARY STATISTICS.

While this battle was the brightest of our naval achievements in the Revolutionary war, it was not all, by any means.

At the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence we had twenty-five vessels, only six of them built for war purposes, all the others being improvised from merchantmen. On them there were 422 guns.

Of the great English navy there were on our coast at that time seventy-eight men of war, carrying 2,078 guns.

Notwithstanding our greatly inferior force, the result was astonishing, for at the close of this war it was found that the enemy captured or destroyed 24 of our ships, carrying 477 guns, while we had captured or destroyed 102 English ships, carrying 2,622 guns, and, all told, we captured 800 of their merchantmen and ships of war, with 12,000 prisoners. Many of the merchantmen and transports captured were loaded with supplies and munitions of war for the British army, which were just what General Washington most needed, and gave strength and comfort to his Army.

An eminent authority tells us that out of the twenty most decisive naval battles in the world's history eight of them were victories for the United States Navy.

WAR OF 1812.

After magnificent naval service in the war with Tripoli and the Barbary States we come to the second of these important battles. It was in the war of 1812, when the United States was forced by England to fight for independence on the sea, just as they had forced us to fight for independence on land in the war of the Revolution. It was the first of many victories, for in that war of 1812, out of eighteen battles, our Navy triumphed in fifteen of them.

CONSTITUTION AND GUERRIERE, AUGUST 19, 1812.

The *Constitution*, by defeating the *Guerriere*, one of the finest ships in the English navy, taught them a lesson they were not soon to forget. Far from land, alone on the ocean, they fought it out, ship against ship, man to man, and all England, astonished, woke up to the fact that the despised Americans could fight, and could win as well.

CONSTITUTION'S GLORIOUS RECORD.

Three times in that war did the *Constitution*—or "Old Ironsides," as she was affectionately named by the American people—alone join battle with the enemy, and each time was victorious; first with the *Guerriere*; second, the *Java*, and,

third, two ships at once—the *Cyenne* and the *Levant*. No wonder that this grand old ship is still kept, and will be kept for years to come, as a treasured thing, and her memory revered.

LAKE ERIE.

The third victory counted decisive in our national history took place on Lake Erie. Commander Perry's modest message of victory to President Harrison will never be forgotten in American history:

We have met the enemy and they are ours—two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop.

At the beginning of this war of 1812, so glorious in our naval achievement, it seemed in the beginning a hopeless task. A leading newspaper in England, the *London Statesman*, under date of June 10, 1812, in an editorial said:

America certainly can not pretend to wage war with us; she has no navy to do it with.

There was reason for that statement, for we had then but 17 ships, carrying 442 guns, and 5,025 men, while our powerful adversary, England, then in the zenith of her naval power, swelled with pride over her recent victories of the Nile and Trafalgar, had 1,048 ships, carrying 27,800 guns, and 151,572 men. And what a result! We conquered them in fifteen out of eighteen battles, captured over 20,000 prisoners, and took or destroyed 1,500 ships, annihilating their commerce.

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC.

The fourth decisive battle came nearly fifty years later, in the war of the rebellion. The little *Monitor* against the formidable *Merrimac*—a David against a Goliath. By the genius of the inventor, Ericsson, the skill of the commander, Worden, and the efficiency of her crew, the *Monitor* defeated her huge antagonist, and the hope of the Confederacy was crushed.

As a boy of 10, I well remember the thrilling story that came to us in Massachusetts from that fight in Hampton Roads and the "cheese box on a raft," as the *Monitor* was admirably called, and the United States Navy were the pride of all loyal American hearts.

MOBILE BAY.

The fifth decisive battle was that of Mobile Bay, which gave Admiral Farragut the mark of fame, and his order, "Damn the torpedoes, go ahead!" is an example of his terse and vigorous use of the Queen's English. It was Farragut who said: Give me iron in the men and I shall not much mind the iron in the ships.

KEARSARGE AND ALABAMA.

The sixth decisive battle was that of the *Kearsarge* over the *Alabama* June 12, 1864. As a boy and an eye witness, I well remember the ovation given the *Kearsarge* as she entered Boston Harbor, the first home port made by the ship after the battle, and the next day a schoolboy of 12 in the gallery of Faneuil Hall, called the "Cradle of liberty," I witnessed the banqueting of the gallant crew. Every one of them was 10 feet tall at least in the admiring eyes of we boys.

MANILA AND SANTIAGO.

Seventh and eighth in the list of decisive battles are those of recent date, now ten years ago—Manila and Santiago. They have added new glory to our naval achievements. It thrills our hearts as we recall at Santiago the grand race of the *Oregon* along the Cuban coast, the white foam rolling high in billows from her bows, the black smoke rolling in dense volume back from her huge funnels—a giant bulldog of the sea. And then the last Spanish ship driven upon the beach, all fighting over, what tenderness did our victorious seamen show for the conquered Spaniards. In his report to the Admiral, Captain Evans said:

I can not express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen, but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.

[Applause.]

All the world admired as they read how, as the excited men on the good battle ship *Texas* began to cheer for victory, their captain, Phillip, said:

Do not cheer, boys; the poor fellows are dying over there.

How true the old line, "The bravest are the tenderest."

[Applause.]

By the thunder of Dewey's guns at Manila and of our fleet at Santiago a new glory has come to our country. With one bound from a nation of ordinary rank, we have leaped to the front rank of the world powers—no nation on earth more respected than our own. We have never known a decisive defeat on the ocean, but in every decisive battle have been victorious.

All honor to our American Navy and to the glorious record of the United States upon the seas. [Applause.]

I wish we might take a lesson from the history of the Navy of our country. We were not prepared for war at the time of the Revolution. We were not prepared for war upon the sea in the war of 1812, but with stout hearts we won our battles. The God of Battles was with us. But in those days a fleet could be built in months, and now it would be a matter of years.

In our last war with Spain we had a pitifully small navy—five battle ships, two armored cruisers, and thirteen protected cruisers. But what we did have was so well handled that it inured to the glory of our country. We can not always, if engaged in war, be engaged with a country like Spain. If we have a war—and I hope we may never have another one—it may be with some of the stronger nations of the earth, and it behooves us to be ready for anything that may come.

I can not subscribe to the remarks of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobson] when he says that he believes the nation is on the apex of a volcano, ready to be blown out of existence if we do not have 100 battle ships. Neither can I subscribe to the doctrine of peace advocated by the gentleman from Missouri, whereby we shall do away with all battle ships and all navies as a business proposition. Since this country came into existence we have been engaged in war six different times—on an average once in twenty-five years, and on the law of chances I can not predict otherwise than that by some decree of fate, we know not how or when, we will again be embroiled with some other nation of the earth, and it is living in a fool's paradise to say that because we have peace to-day there never again will be war.

If we need a navy, we need a strong navy. We need a strong navy, or else we need none. And if we are committed to a navy, as we are to-day, it is a question of how strong a navy we should have.

We men each have our own ideas upon that. My belief is that we should have a navy second in strength to any nation in the world. By that I do not mean that we should equal England, which is the strongest naval power, but that we should have a navy stronger than the next power. At present that nation is France. My figures show that England has to-day eighty-four battle ships and armored cruisers built and ten building, or a total of ninety-four, with a tonnage of 1,298,000 tons. France has fifty battle ships and armored cruisers built or building, with a total of 589,000 tons, considerably less than half the strength of England. The United States has built and building forty-one such ships, with a tonnage of 563,000 tons. It is my belief that we should have a navy 20 per cent, or thereabouts, stronger than any other nation except England.

Mr. GARRETT. Why except England?

Mr. LOUD. Because England has other considerations than we have. She has a great colonial organization to care for and has a great commerce to protect. I regret that we have not one also, but her merchant marine is a source of weakness in time of war.

And, again, it is argued by those who have studied the matter that England should always be prepared to meet any two nations on earth, it being considered there may be some coalition between two or more nations as against England. That is advanced as an argument for the size of her navy.

Mr. GARRETT. England has usually been equal to the expectation by making a coalition with one or two others herself, has she not?

Mr. LOUD. I think so.

Mr. KENNEDY of Ohio. Is it not true that, so far as England is concerned, in Canada we have a sort of hostage for her good behavior?

Mr. LOUD. I am not looking for any trouble with England, and I may say at this time that I am not looking for any trouble with Japan. I was in Japan a short time ago, and if I am a judge of any people I ever visited, there is no people that would be more glad to be friends with another nation than Japan would be to be friends with the United States, and only some act of ours can ever force war between the United States and Japan. Every interest of Japan is for peace with us.

At the present time their financial condition is not such as would warrant their embarking in any war. It would be the last subject they would contemplate, and then besides we are the greatest consumer of her exports. We would be the last nation that she would undertake to engage in war with if it were left to any volition of hers, and her people feel most friendly to us and have for fifty-five years, since Perry landed there in 1853 and made the first commercial treaty with Japan.

Next we come to the question of how many ships we ought to authorize this year. I would subscribe, if I could, to what I believe to be a consistent business programme, and that is that we should build two battle ships each year for the next

ten years or more. In this country, however, one Congress can not by its action bind a succeeding Congress to any such programme. In sentiment I am for a large and a strong Navy, and because we have no guaranty what other Congresses will do I shall vote at this time, if I have the opportunity, for four battle ships, although I would far rather, if I could see a systematic policy inaugurated, vote for two each year for ten years.

There is one subject which is of great interest to me, and that is the subject of colliers for our fleet. When I was at Hampton Roads on the 16th of December, watching that grand fleet of ours sail out of Chesapeake Bay—

Mr. GILL. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. LOUD. Yes.

Mr. GILL. The gentleman is speaking with some interest about colliers. I would like to ask the gentleman if he can explain or if he understands why it is that the Secretary put out of commission two colliers in San Francisco for the purpose of putting in commission one hospital ship, if the navy needs colliers?

Mr. LOUD. As I do not know that he has done so I will have to refer the gentleman to the Secretary of the Navy. I can not answer that question, but I will state that I would put out of commission, if I had my way, three-quarters of all the colliers now owned by the United States Navy, for the reason that they are so small in capacity that no business man in the United States who was carrying coal for profit would dare to use such small vessels for carrying coal as a business proposition. Still, because they are handed down to us from the Spanish-American war, and we have no others, we are using them.

Mr. GILL. I understand the Government bought those because of necessity. They bought the colliers that the gentleman refers to during the Spanish war?

Mr. LOUD. Certainly. As that fleet of ours steamed out into the Atlantic from Hampton Roads there was not with them a single collier. No provision had been made for the transportation of coal to go with the fleet. In order to have the fuel for making that long trip around to San Francisco they have been forced to send colliers ahead at the different ports along the route, and that coal, except what little was carried in Government colliers, was carried, with one exception, in foreign bottoms.

In case of war we could only wonder what condition we would be in, with a great fleet of battle ships without a single suitable collier to carry the coal for the fleet. When I say a "suitable collier" I mean a different collier from anything which we possess to-day. We are building now two colliers, one at the Mare Island Navy-Yard and one in the New York Navy-Yard. Each one of those colliers are to carry 6,000 tons of coal and are to have a speed of 16 knots per hour. Anyone who knows anything about boats realizes fully what it costs to get this great speed of 16 knots per hour. It doubles the cost of the ship, increases the size of it, the number of boilers required, more powerful machinery, and all that. I believe when we build colliers of that speed we should at least get a collier capable of carrying from ten to twelve thousand tons of coal each trip. Upon the Great Lakes, as a business proposition, that subject has been thrashed out again and again, and the five and six thousand ton collier has gone to the rear.

Now, the men who are prospering in business upon the Great Lakes in the carrying trade must build boats to carry ten to twelve thousand tons, and if you stand upon the banks of the Detroit River at Detroit you will see, hour after hour, a procession of great steel vessels passing up and down, and all the latest ones built to carry from ten to twelve thousand tons of coal or iron ore. They have been demonstrated to be the most profitable boats to carry cargoes for the least cost, and so it seems to me that if we are to build colliers we ought to build them of adequate size in which coal can be carried at a reasonable cost.

Mr. ADAIR. I would just like to ask the gentleman a question—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADAIR. How was the coal carried during the Spanish-American war? You say we did not have colliers sufficient.

Mr. LOUD. We hunted the world over, and bought every old thing we could buy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. FOSS. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TIRRELL].

Mr. TIRRELL. Mr. Chairman, yesterday afternoon the gentleman from New York [Mr. PERKINS] made a speech upon the paper and pulp industry of the United States, during which—

unwittingly, no doubt, because our relations are of the most intimate and friendly character—he made some aspersions upon myself. For this reason I desire to correct some misstatements in his speech, because I believe they ought not to stand upon the record uncontradicted by the facts. I make this statement not in the interest of any company, because I have no interest in them; nor because I desire to shield any company from any prosecution, because I believe that any company, no matter whether in the paper business or in any other industry in the United States which by combination of interests have violated the law and are endeavoring to control prices ought to be punished to the fullest extent that the law authorizes. The first misstatement which was made was in his opening remarks about the immense amount of wood which was consumed by the company which he was attacking, the International Paper Company, wherein he said:

Which certainly has been a large consumer of our diminishing stock of wood.

The fact is that this company consumed just 1.6 per cent of the wood which is cut in the United States. The next misstatement made is in regard to our tariff on pulp and paper. I am astonished that so intelligent and so well-read a gentleman should spread before the country the statement which he yesterday made. He said:

The first thing that was done prior to the organization of the International Paper Company was to raise the duty. The duty on print paper at that time was \$3, which was more than sufficient, but with a prudent regard for future development, the duty, which was already prohibitory, of \$3 was raised to \$6.

The gentleman did not seem to know the theory upon which our tariff was formulated and the tariffs before it. The Wilson tariff was formulated upon an ad valorem duty of 15 per cent, and our friend from New York has arrived at this duty by figuring 15 per cent on 2-cent paper, which would amount to three-tenths of a cent per pound, and he has arrived at \$3 a ton by multiplying 15 per cent by two, whereas this being three-tenths of a cent per pound multiplied by the ton would amount to \$6, which is the correct statement in regard to the case. Now, the Dingley tariff was formulated on a specific-duty basis, and that specific duty in regard to the tariff upon paper was just the same as the Wilson tariff, so that if you multiply in the same way you did before, you have the same duty which you had previous to its enactment, the same duty, substantially, a Democratic Congress placed upon that product.

That shows the fallacy of that statement in regard to the tariff duty.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. That is, you get the same result under each bill?

Mr. TIRRELL. You get the same result under each bill, and therefore neither the International Paper Company nor any other paper company in this country can be shown as coming before Congress in order to raise the duty in order to carry on their business or organize their company.

The next misstatement is in regard to the value of paper plants. He says in his remarks that there were some of the companies taken in by the International Paper Company that were worth a good deal and that a good many were worth nothing, and the capitalization was produced by erroneous valuation of the plants, which should have been estimated at their capital value only. He cites one paper-mill company with a capital of \$500,000 where securities were issued by the International Paper Company to the amount of \$2,250,000. Now, the fact in regard to the building of paper mills is that there is no paper mill in this country that can be built to-day, according to the estimates of experts, at less than \$30,000 a ton of paper produced, and as the International Paper Company produces 1,700 tons of paper a day, if you multiply it by what experts say you have a valuation of \$51,000,000, which is about the total valuation of this company to which I have referred, common stock and all.

You might just as well say that these companies which were capitalized thirty, or forty, or fifty years ago, many of them, and which have been adding to their plants, increasing them, doubling them, tripling them, buying wood lots, and so forth, with the same capitalization, are worth no more than they were when the capitalization was first formed. Take the Chemical National Bank of New York, the par value of whose stock is \$100, and that same stock is sold for about \$1,500, and there would be just as much consistency in the gentleman saying the Chemical National Bank stock was worth only \$100 as to say that these paper companies, which have been multiplying their resources all these years, are only worth what they were originally capitalized at forty or fifty years ago. Now, there is one asset alone which this company possesses which is worth as much as the gentleman from New York [Mr. PERKINS] said the entire plant was worth. The horsepower which

has been developed by this company is 150,000, and there is no engineer of experience in this country who will tell you that you can on the average develop horsepower upon rivers or anywhere else at less than \$100 for each horsepower, and if you will multiply by the entire horsepower you will find that the capitalization value of these companies, the value of this company in its horsepower alone, is worth as much as he says the entire plant of the twenty-four companies which they absorbed.

The next misrepresentation which the gentleman made was in regard to the dividends which this company had paid upon its common stock. He said in his speech that it was perfectly possible to sell stock to an eager public if it paid dividends on its common stock at the rate of 4 per cent covering a period of two years. As a matter of fact, it paid 1 per cent in July, 1898, and 1 per cent in October, 1898, and that is all it has ever paid upon that common stock.

The next misstatement the gentleman makes is in regard to the salary which is paid to its president. He says that they were exercising economy, and then sarcastically added:

It is stated that the salary of the president of the new corporation was fixed at \$50,000—a very favorite form of economy.

As a matter of fact, the salary of the president of this company is, and has been, \$25,000 a year, not an excessive sum in view of the enormous business and great responsibilities which devolve upon him. I wish also to add in this connection, in order to cover this subject, what is said in an article which I will read in regard to the organization of other paper companies throughout this country. Now, the Great Northern Company of Maine is the largest paper manufacturing concern in the United States outside of the International, and probably in the—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. TIRRELL. I would like just one minute.

Mr. FOSS. I yield one minute more to the gentleman.

Mr. TIRRELL. Now, this company produces 300 tons, or did produce at the time this statement was made, 300 tons of paper a day. It had cost that company, with the benefit of all experience in constructing paper mills in past years, \$9,000,000, and they built it cheap. Now, then, if they produced with a capital of \$9,000,000—or, rather, with an expenditure of \$9,000,000 on their plant—300 tons a day, and the International Paper Company produces 1,700 tons a day, or more than five times as much, if you will multiply the figures, you will find that five times \$9,000,000 would be \$45,000,000; and then you have got a surplus to work on which would bring up the cost of the plant of the International Paper Company to duplicate to-day to \$50,000,000. I wish these remarks, Mr. Chairman, to be placed upon the Record in order that the paper manufacturers of the country may have the facts just as they are and receive a square deal, if it comes to action, that I believe they will receive from the Congress of the United States.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, a short time ago the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND] arose in his place and delivered a speech in this House because, to use his own language, he could no longer possess his soul in patience while gentlemen lost sight of the qualities of exalted American statesmanship and descended to the plane of the politician to claim a credit they did not deserve.

The direct and immediate cause of his great anguish of soul, as disclosed by his speech, was the fact that Democrats refused to accord unstinted praise to Republican administration, and were wicked enough to try to deprive the Republican party of the credit the gentleman seems to think that party is entitled to with reference to railroad rate and antitrust legislation and the enforcement thereof.

In the brief time now allotted to me I desire to call attention to a few well-authenticated facts, so that the Members of this House and the country may judge therefrom for themselves whether the past record of the party to which the gentleman belongs is altogether worthy of the encomiums he has pronounced upon it, and who it is, if any one, that "has lost sight of the qualities of exalted American statesmanship and descended to the plane of the politician."

The gentleman claims that the regulation of railroads by Congress is of Republican origin and of Republican legislation, and to prove this contention he refers to bills and resolutions by various individual Republicans introduced from time to time, beginning in 1865 and running up to 1887, when the Cullom bill was passed. Mr. Chairman, I shall not take time at present, as I do not deem it necessary, to inquire just what these bills and resolutions were, or whether or not any individual Democrats, during this period, were concerned with railroad regulation. But I do want to say that although such bills

and resolutions as mentioned by the gentleman from Michigan may have been introduced by Republican Congressmen the fact remains that the Republican party refused to enact any of them into law, although it was in full and complete control of the Government nearly all of that time.

Let us examine the record. At two different times during that period Congressional committees made investigation of railroad abuses and reported their findings to Congress. The Windom report, in 1873, was very exhaustive and evinced a very thorough investigation. It declared that there existed very gross defects and abuses in the then existing system of transportation, which consisted of insufficient facilities, unfair discrimination, and extortionate charges, and as the principal causes of such extortionate rates this report assigned stock watering, capitalization of surplus earnings, construction rings, general extravagance and corruption in railway management, and combinations and consolidations of railway companies. This committee, after reaching these conclusions, went further and expressed the opinion that the promotion of competition would not permanently remedy the evil for the reason that, as a general rule, competition among railroads ends in combination and in enhanced rates; and therefore the committee recommended Congressional regulation under the power to regulate commerce among the several States as the only effective remedy.

According to the gentleman from Michigan himself, petitions from the people poured into Congress from every direction praying for relief. So that the gentleman is very unfortunate in the evidence which he brings forward in favor of his party. He proves too much. He proves that individual Members of Congress during the period mentioned introduced bills repeatedly for the regulation of railroads; that committees appointed for that purpose thoroughly investigated and reported upon the evils, abuses, and extortion of railway practices and suggested remedies, and that the people sent up petitions from every direction. But he also shows that his party, which was in power, utterly disregarded all these things and took no steps to give the people relief.

Mr. Chairman, the truth is the first real move toward the regulation of interstate commerce was the introduction of a bill in the House of Representatives in 1878 by a Democrat, the Hon. John H. Reagan, the grand old Commoner from Texas. [Applause on the Democratic side.] This statement, I believe, is confirmed by all the authorities except the gentleman from Michigan. The Reagan bill was a comprehensive and well-planned measure, and the Record will show that he pressed it vigorously upon the attention of Congress until he secured its passage in 1887 by a Democratic House of Representatives during the first Democratic Administration since the war. [Renewed applause on the Democratic side.]

But the gentleman from Michigan belittles the Reagan bill, because it did not create a Commission, notwithstanding it provided that its provisions should be enforceable in both the State and Federal courts. He contends that the omission of the Commission feature takes Judge Reagan entirely from the list of those who can claim to be pioneers in the movement for railway regulation, although he mentions with praise the most trivial bills on the subject introduced by Republicans. In doing this, of course, he keeps constantly in sight "the qualities of exalted American statesmanship."

The reason the Reagan bill did not become a law was because the Senate was Republican. That body passed the Cullom bill instead, which, as a compromise, was accepted by the House and became a law. The Cullom bill provided for a Commission, and this fact is mentioned by the gentleman from Michigan with evident pride.

Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt every Democrat upon this floor is willing to accord to the Republican party all the glory it claims for having put the Commission feature into the Cullom law, because it must also claim the glory (?) of omitting to confer upon that Commission any power. You were so afraid of interfering with the business of the railroads that you merely set up a dummy, with practically no power except to receive its salary. This the Supreme Court made plain to the people by a decision which it rendered in 1897, and from that time until this the Republican party has had full and complete control of every department of the Government, and could at any time have passed an effective law.

But what have been the facts? Immediately after the decision was rendered to which I have referred by which the people were advised that they were still at the mercy of the railroads, organizations of farmers, of merchants, of manufacturers, and of other shippers began to pass resolutions and to send up to Congress petitions asking that the Cullom law be amended. They wanted to have some substantial power conferred upon the

Commission. The Commission itself from year to year in its reports called attention of Congress to its absolute want of power and its helplessness to afford any protection to the people. In addition to this, the Democratic party, in national convention in 1896, 1900, and 1904, in specific and emphatic terms demanded such legislation. The press of the country advocated it. Bill after bill was introduced in Congress by both Democratic and Republican Members favoring it.

Notwithstanding all this, what did your party do? Absolutely nothing. For nearly ten years it completely ignored the question. Its platforms, the party creed, made no reference to it, and as a party you remained absolutely indifferent, during all of which time the people suffered the grossest abuses, extortions, and oppressions at the hands of unbridled railroad monopoly. You folded your hands complacently and, with a criminal disregard of your duty and obligation to the public and without sympathy or compassion, you witnessed the robbery and oppression of those to whom it was your duty to afford protection.

Did I say you did nothing? I think I should modify that. There was one feature of the Cullom law which was good, and that was the provision for a penalty of imprisonment against rebates and discriminations. This penalty you concluded was too severe upon the poor railroads, so in 1903 you repealed the imprisonment part of the penalty and fixed it so that whenever the courts should find a railroad guilty of rebating, they could impose only a pecuniary fine, which the railroads could collect back from the people.

Mr. Chairman, this favorable attitude of the Republican party toward railway abuses continued without interruption until 1906, when the so-called "Hepburn bill" was passed, and, as I shall presently show, did not wholly disappear then. However, before I undertake to point out the inadequacy of the Hepburn law, I want to call attention to the fact which every observer of the legislative history of the times already knows, and that is, the Republicans in Congress continually refused to take up the railroad question with any serious intention of further legislation until they had lost the support of the President in their do-nothing policy and could no longer resist the just demands of an outraged people. As long as your party platform was silent upon the question and your President ignored it, you had the courage to withstand the entreaties and importunities of the people; but when Mr. Roosevelt broke away from you and said the Democrats were right, that the powers of the Commission ought to be enlarged, it was such an admission against interest you were forced to a realization of the fact that you had to heed or go out of power, and the Hepburn law was the result.

Mr. GAINES of West Virginia. Will the gentleman permit an interruption?

Mr. SMITH of Texas. I am sorry I can not yield; I have only a limited time. If any gentleman on the other side wants to deny what I have said, let him explain to the country why the Republican party for nearly ten years viewed with such complacency every abuse in the management and operation of the railroads of the country that cunning, greed, and avarice could devise and never raised its hand nor uttered a protest.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Republican party having been forced, in the manner I have stated, to take some action, let us see to what extent it has gone toward meeting the needs of the people. The Hepburn law was passed. For the want of a better bill it received the support of the Democrats. This law has a number of good features, but very serious defects. The Republicans were still so afraid they would do the railroads an injustice that they again left them free to fix their own rates and conferred upon the Commission the very smallest power of supervision over rates they could possibly find words to express. They do not permit the Commission to investigate and adjust a single rate upon its own initiative. Every person who is made the victim of railway extortion is required to go before the Commission with formal complaint, and at his own expense contest with these giant corporations backed by their able and expert counsel and millions of money. Such a contest is so unequal and expensive that the citizen, as a general rule, will prefer to suffer the abuses to which he may be subjected rather than to undertake it.

Mr. Chairman, no one will contend for a moment that there is any competition in rates among the railroads. We all know that the rates charged for transportation are never the subject of negotiation and contract, but are determined by the will of the carrier and enforced upon the shippers. And who ultimately pays transportation charges? The great mass of consumers of the country. Those by whom such charges are primarily paid are, of course, the shippers or middlemen, who

ordinarily do not concern themselves as to the amount so long as they are not discriminated against in favor of a competitor in business. No matter how extortionate and unjust rates may be they shift them to the backs of the consumers, who have no right of complaint and no mode of redress.

And, sirs, there is no expense so pervasive and universal as the cost of transportation. It constitutes an important part of the cost of every article employed for the sustenance, comfort, and gratification of man. It is a tax upon every article we use in our daily living, and the amount of it is fixed and forced from us by irresponsible railway officials with no restraint except such as is imposed by that natural law which determines "what the traffic will bear."

To illustrate the importance to the people of every change in rates I call attention to the fact that the gross earnings of the railroads of this country for the year 1907 was the enormous sum of \$2,585,913,000. An advance in rates of 1 per cent would have taken from the pockets of the people an additional amount of \$25,859,130; an advance of 5 per cent would have taken from them \$129,295,650 additional, and a 10 per cent advance would have increased their burden \$258,591,300.

Such power for extorting money from the people, in my humble judgment, should never be, by a free and liberty-loving people, allowed to remain in the hands of private corporations or individuals, however fair-minded they may be.

Do you contend that the railroads do not abuse this extraordinary power? I only have to call your attention to the fact that since the Hepburn law went into effect there has been a material advance in rates, and the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1907 shows that millions have been taken from the people by the railroads in excess of what I believe they were entitled to. That report shows that the railroads of the United States that year, after paying from their net income interest, rents, betterments, taxes, and miscellaneous items and dividends, had left a surplus of \$132,200,140. The Commission advises me that the term "betterments," as used in this report, means permanent improvements to existing structures which increases their value, but I have been unable to obtain a statement as to the amount which was put into betterments out of the income account of the railroads for the year 1907. For the year 1906 the amount was about \$50,000,000. Assuming that the amount for 1907 was no more, it is shown that the railroads took from the people that year over \$182,000,000 more than was necessary to pay all legitimate items.

Mr. Chairman, I deny the right of the railroad corporations of this country to levy a tax upon the people for money with which to make permanent improvements, which add to the value of their property, and in addition thereto produce a surplus to further enhance the value of their stocks.

I contend that railroads are entitled to a fair and reasonable return upon the value of their property and no more. This much is guaranteed to them by the Constitution and can not be taken from them by any legislative or administrative power of this Government. Subject to this constitutional restriction the power of Congress to regulate interstate rates is supreme, and I submit that it ought to be exercised for the protection of the helpless millions in this country against extortion. If the gentlemen on the other side insist upon claiming credit for all our railway legislation, they must also assume responsibility for its defects and shortcomings. Neither the present law nor any former law gives the people any protection against extortion in railway rates. It seems to have always been the policy of the Republican party to give to the question of rebates and discriminations what little attention they give the railroad problem at all. Extortion has been completely overlooked. It has been all right for the railroads to rob the people provided one railroad did not rob more than another.

Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, there is but one remedy, and that is to give the Commission the power to fix rates. Clothe that body with the authority and cast upon it the duty to act upon its own initiative. The Supreme Court has declared that a railroad corporation is created for public purposes and that it performs a function of the State. If this be true then the State has the right to regulate and control the functions which railroad corporations exercise. Many of the States have already conferred this broad power upon their commissions, and such power is now being constantly exercised in fairness and justice to the railroads and for the protection of the people. The same power ought to be conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to be exercised over interstate commerce. You have the power. Will you do it? I proposed it in an amendment to the Hepburn bill, but it was voted down. I propose it in a bill now pending before this Congress. President Roosevelt recommends it substantially in his recent message.

Now, it is for you to answer whether or not you will grant such power to the Commission. I presume it is vain for me to hope that you will, for it has never been the policy of your party to place any obstacle in the way of private monopoly or to protect the people from insatiate greed and avarice.

CAR SERVICE.

Mr. Chairman, there is another phase of the railroad question that has been neglected. Certain business interests of this country are suffering great injury, some of them almost complete destruction, because the railroads neglect to furnish cars and to move freight with proper diligence and dispatch.

It is the duty of the railroads to furnish cars to shippers and transport freight without unreasonable delay, but in some parts of the country they are not doing so. They not only charge what they please for the service, but they perform the service in the manner best suited to their own convenience and mainly in the interest of stockholders. They ought to be compelled to recognize their obligation to the public, and to this end adequate penalties ought to be provided. In the last Congress and in this I introduced a bill to cure this evil. Witnesses have been brought here who are engaged in the live-stock business in the West, and they have appeared before both the Senate and House Committees on Interstate Commerce. These witnesses have detailed before these committees a state of affairs resulting from this willful neglect of duty on the part of the railroads sufficient not only to shock our sense of justice, but to excite our deepest sympathy and commiseration.

We seek to impose no new or impossible or unreasonable duty upon the railroads. We only demand that they perform the duties with which they have always been charged. We want to require of them only reasonable service. We demand that they shall be required to have some regard for the rights and welfare of the public as well as for the pockets of stockholders.

Upon this question your President has again shown his courage by breaking away from you. In his special message to Congress on January 30 last he urges this legislation. What are you going to do about it? We shall await with anxiety and with as much patience as we may the action of the committees on this measure and the pleasure of those on whom rest the responsibility for the legislation of this country. You may be able to resist the influence of the President and refuse to pass this measure, but if you do I warn you now that there are hundreds of thousands of sovereign American citizens in this country whose business is being ruined by the neglect of the railroads who will hold you responsible.

Mr. Chairman, I want it understood that I have no animosity toward the railroads. I would not do them an injustice, but they should not do injustice to the people.

TRUSTS.

Mr. Chairman, I now come to the trust question. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND] correctly admits that Democrats have always been opposed to the trusts; that they have in the press, on the stump, and in convention fought and condemned the trusts, yet he argues that our antitrust legislation is of Republican origin and has been the subject of Republican enforcement almost exclusively.

If the gentleman had desired to remain upon the high plane of "exalted American statesmanship"—and my respect for him is such that I have no doubt that he did—it seems to me that it would have been only fair for him to have gone further and admitted that it was through the counsel of such able constitutional lawyers as Vest in the Senate and CULLESON in the House, both Democrats, that the Sherman antitrust bill was put into constitutional form, and that in accordance with the unvarying sentiment of the Democratic party it received the support, practically, of every Democrat in Congress. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

And, Mr. Chairman, there is another important fact which the gentleman saw fit not to mention, but which I think he ought to have mentioned, just to keep his history straight if for no other reason, and that is, that the trusts themselves are of Republican origin. [Renewed applause.] They are the outgrowth of a vicious system of government for which the Republican party alone is responsible, and which it can no longer defend.

The people of this country can not be further misled into the belief that your tariff policy has been for the just and reasonable protection of American industry and labor, for they are convinced that that policy has gone far beyond the point of such protection. They are convinced that it is what the dominant forces in the Republican party intended it should be—a veritable Chinese wall around our borders to prevent competition from

abroad. They are convinced that its object and purpose was and is to aid an unscrupulous and greedy band of commercial and industrial pirates in holding up the people of this country for the purpose of extortion and plunder. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

I am speaking more particularly of the Dingley law, which I understand is the highest tariff law that was ever enacted by any nation in any age of the world. The conditions brought about by that law have become intolerable. Being protected from competition from abroad by the barriers which that law erects, the beneficiaries thereof have, by every scheme, device, conspiracy, and combination that greed and cunning could invent, eliminated competition at home. More trusts have been formed in this country in the last ten years under the operation of the Dingley law than in all the previous history of our Government. They have multiplied in number and grown in power until their imperious sway has been extended over almost every field of human industry, and they hold in their heartless and monopolistic grasp almost every article of necessity in daily use among the people. [Renewed applause.] They dictate prices to the producer and extort tribute from the consumer, while they dictate to labor the terms and conditions of employment. The citizen can not escape their power. As tax gatherers they stalk in multitudes by his side by day and by night, and without sympathy or compassion demand and collect a tax upon almost every purchase or sale his necessities require him to make.

Mr. Chairman, this is no fairy tale, but a hard and cruel fact, which casts its hideous and sickening shadow over millions of helpless homes in this country. And this is not all. These monopolies which you have fostered have flooded this country with their securities, which have for their basis no real property value, but have for their support only their monopolistic power to extort from the people. The returns from these securities usually being so attractive by reason of being so remunerative, many of the bankers of the country invest heavily in them the money of their depositors, and what is the result? Even a threat of prosecution against these monopolies for violation of the antitrust laws creates fear and distrust and precipitates a panic. The very system is rotten, and there seems to be no protection or relief to the people except at the cost of widespread business disaster.

You can not deny that this is the situation in this country to-day, and who is responsible for it? You may go on trying to deceive the people by discussing what was or was not done during the Cleveland Administration, but you will not succeed. They know that the Democratic party has had full control of the executive and legislative branches of this Government only two short years out of the forty-three since the war. It matters not how much you may protest, deny, or argue, they know that the trust evil has become so very acute only since the passage of the Dingley law; that hundreds of them exist to-day in aggravated form as a consequence of that law, whereas comparatively few existed before; and yet, whenever it is suggested that the Republican party has not been as active and diligent in the enforcement of the antitrust law as it should have been, some gentleman on the other side, from his high plane of "exalted American statesmanship" rises in his place and in solemn tones reminds the country that there have been a larger number of trust prosecutions during the Administration of Mr. Roosevelt than during the Administration of Mr. Cleveland. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND] himself unloaded this bit of argument upon the House in the speech to which I have already referred.

Mr. Chairman, I am not here to defend the Administration of Mr. Cleveland. I shall not criticize it further than to say that because there arose in the minds of the Democratic masses a conviction that the sympathies of Mr. Cleveland, like those of the leaders of the Republican party, were with the devotees of predatory wealth, the Democratic party long ago repudiated many of his policies as the only means of deserving Democratic support and of preserving the existence of the Democratic party.

But whatever may be said in criticism of Mr. Cleveland's Administration, it is a fact that there were more trust prosecutions during his term than there were during the term of Mr. Harrison immediately preceding and more than there were during the Administration of Mr. McKinley immediately succeeding, and as many, lacking only two, as there were during both the terms of Harrison and McKinley. [Applause on the Democratic side.] The gentleman possessing the "qualities of exalted American statesmanship" to such a high degree forgot to call attention to these facts, although they were clearly embodied in a printed statement issued by the Attorney-General on December 2, 1907.

The truth is, as is shown by that statement, the Sherman antitrust law ever since its enactment has virtually been a dead letter. Harrison did not enforce it, Cleveland did not enforce it, McKinley did not enforce it, and Roosevelt has not enforced it. During Harrison's Administration there were only seven cases, four civil and three criminal. During Cleveland's Administration there were only eight cases, four civil and four criminal. During McKinley's Administration there were only three cases, all civil. And during Roosevelt's Administration, extending over a period of more than seven years, during which time hundreds of trusts existing in violation of law have daily plundered the American people, there have been only thirty-five cases, seventeen civil and eighteen criminal.

The Sherman antitrust law became effective on July 2, 1890, nearly eighteen years ago. Since that time trusts have multiplied from year to year, have driven competition from business, plundered the people, forced individual proprietors into bankruptcy, oppressed labor, debauched and corrupted our political life, and defied Congress and the courts. All this in violation of the law, for which in the eighteen years there have been instituted in the courts by our Government only fifty-three cases in all, including both civil and criminal. And the results from these cases, as shown by the Attorney-General's report, have been extremely meager. Outside of a few injunctions granted there have been only eight convictions in criminal cases, in which merely fines were imposed aggregating the sum of only \$96,000, far less, I dare say, than the amount wrongfully extorted from the people by these unlawful combinations every day in the year. What would you think of only twenty or twenty-five prosecutions for theft out of thousands of violations of the law against theft. Such a thing would be absolutely ridiculous, and yet it would be no more ridiculous than the record that has been made in the matter of trust prosecutions.

Mr. Chairman, in order that the people of this country may no longer be deceived by the false claim so often made by Republicans, I shall, by permission, insert in the RECORD, as an appendix to my remarks, the statement of the Attorney-General to which I have already referred. I want the people of this country to read it, and then in connection with it I want them to read the list prepared a few years ago by the gentleman from Maine [Mr. LITTLEFIELD] and which was inserted in the RECORD on December 12 last by one of the Senators, containing the names of more than 400 big trusts existing in violation of law. The number, no doubt, has greatly increased since the list was prepared. Let the two documents be read together and I dare say they exhibit an example of official dereliction and political hypocrisy never surpassed in any age of the world.

Mr. Chairman, not a single individual has ever been sent to jail, and what excuse does the President give? In his message to this Congress he says jurors are quite willing to fine the corporations, but will not imprison individuals. With all due respect to the President, I must deny that such is the case, and in support of my denial I appeal to the President's own experience. I do not find any case in the Attorney-General's statement in which an individual was tried before a jury and acquitted, and I find only one criminal case against an individual submitted to a jury at all. I think I know something of the temper of the jurors of this country. The average juror will convict in any sort of a case if proven, but especially would he convict those who employ an unlawful combination of capital to plunder the public. I suppose it was because of the peculiar views which the President holds on this question that he did not prosecute the individuals who organized the Northern Securities Company, and who went ahead after the company was dissolved and, by individual combination, did, without a corporation, the identical same thing they were prevented from doing with one.

Mr. Chairman, the attitude of the Republican party with regard to the enforcement of the antitrust law is well illustrated by the President's appointment of the present Attorney-General, whose antipathy to antitrust legislation is well known. In the proceedings of the antitrust conference held at Chicago a few years ago, there appears a speech by Mr. Bonaparte, in which he made the following remarkable statement:

Emphatically no legislative action or restraint of combinations, whether by Congress or State legislature, is desirable. Our public men (with, I need say, some honorable exceptions) are wholly unfit to deal with any such matters. The attempt will be highly demoralizing to all concerned, the practical results (except in the levy of blackmail) altogether nugatory.

And in discussing the tendency toward combination, he said:

Whatever we may think, we can not prevent it, except at the price of liberty and civilization.

As the Attorney-General did not favor any legislation in regulation or restraint of trusts at all, and as he considered that any such legislation would be without practical results, except in the levy of blackmail, it was no doubt his opinion that no one was competent to legislate upon the subject except those who favored the trusts; and as he believed trusts could not be prevented except at the price of liberty and civilization, of course he did not believe in trying to prevent them, and therefore could not believe in the enforcement of the antitrust law. And yet this is the man the President has put at the head of the Department of Justice, which is charged with the duty of enforcing this law. Has Mr. Bonaparte changed his views upon this question? He has never said so, and you would never suspect he had from the record he has made in the office. The statement which he has furnished to the country fully sustains his patriotic sentiments, for it shows he has done practically nothing which, according to his own peculiar notions, would have been done "at the cost of liberty and civilization."

Mr. Chairman, the history of the Republican party upon the trust question has been a most remarkable one. Until within the last few years Republican leaders have persistently denied the existence of trusts, and contended that if any did exist they were largely private affairs with which the public had nothing to do. When forced to admit that many trusts had grown up in the country they then contended that the trust was a necessary evolution of our civilization and was beneficial to the people. When further publicity disclosed some of the evils of the trusts they began to contend that while there were some bad trusts there were many good ones, and that it was better to endure the evils of the bad ones than to deprive ourselves of the blessings of the good ones. But when they can no longer deceive the people, when they can not further resist the overwhelming tide of public sentiment which comes up from an outraged people, the Republican party suddenly becomes a reform party and asks that we continue to intrust it with the duty of giving the people relief.

It pretends a warfare upon its own offspring which it has in every way nurtured and protected. But at the same time it shows its want of good faith by advocating a modification of the Sherman antitrust law in order to destroy its efficacy. The people are demanding an enforcement of the law as it is now written. You can no longer evade this demand, so you are now asking that the power to determine when a trust is good or bad be conferred upon a subordinate officer in the Department of Commerce and Labor—a power which the President himself has been freely exercising up to this time without authority of law. You are just simply trying to provide an easier way of granting immunity.

Because organized labor is now prostrate, bound hand and foot by the Sherman antitrust law, as recently construed by the Supreme Court, you no doubt think this an opportune time to enter upon a move to emasculate that law. But you are mistaken. The people very well understand your proposition, which is to exempt organized labor from the terms of that law provided organized capital is given an opening to evade it. But it appears from the press reports that for some reason you failed to drive the bargain with the leaders of organized labor. I am here to tell you that there is another class of people who will never agree to your programme, to wit, the millions in this country who do not belong either to organized capital or to organized labor, but who are the constant victims of the trust system.

I think the labor leaders are right. They ought not to consent to impair the law as it applies to combinations of capital, as a penalty for securing the rights of labor. Let the cause of labor stand for its rights upon its own merits, and let labor lock shields with those who stand for justice against special privilege, and the ultimate outcome will be a glorious victory. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. Chairman, such is the record of the Republican party upon the question of private monopoly. Why has that party stood so determinedly for organized wealth against the welfare of the people? In answering this question we come to the most disconcerting feature of the situation. The Republican party is in league with this aristocracy of wealth which infamously plunders the people. This affiliation began many years ago when the party in return for political and financial support entered upon a policy of legislation and administration favorable to the nurture and growth of private monopoly, and this affiliation has been kept up and carried out as faithfully and effectually as the usual contracts of trade and commerce. The Republican party supports the trusts and the trusts support the Republican party. [Applause on the Democratic side.] Do you deny it? I only have reference to the campaigns of 1896 and 1900, and I refer to the last campaign. Has the partner-

ship been dissolved? If so, that fact has not been formally announced to the country, and your present conduct gives no evidence of it. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not despair. The unholy conspiracy against the people of this country has been found out, the people are awakening, and with confidence I look forward to the early coming of reform. Some of the Republican leaders have already seen the handwriting on the wall. [Renewed applause.] Mr. Roosevelt was the first to see it, and he began immediately to hunt cover. Elected as a stand-patter, he suddenly becomes an advocate of reform, although he does not always practice what he preaches. Many others have attached themselves to his coat tails, with the hope of being saved from the wrath to come.

And, Mr. Chairman, another great Republican leader has at last seen the gathering of the storm. He who presides with so much grace and dignity over this august body could no longer defy the thunderbolts hurled from the press of this country in denunciation of the iniquitous paper trust [renewed applause], so he leaves his high position and comes down upon the floor of the House to become a reformer himself. [Renewed applause.] I want to congratulate him upon his beginning, but at the same time I want to modestly suggest to him that something more is needed than to appease the wrath of the newspapers and hush their complaints. The great mass of people in this country who are constantly paying tribute to the lumber trust, to the beef trust, to the oil trust, to the steel trust, to the sugar trust, and to the hundreds of other trusts that you have encouraged and are now protecting may be unable to make themselves heard as the newspapers are, but if I mistake not, they have begun to understand the wrongs which they are compelled to suffer, and, mark my words, they will find some way to make you hear their complaints also.

They are already driving you step by step. You do not want to revise the tariff, but you are yielding, not willingly and honestly, however, but merely to meet the exigencies of the political situation. An honest revision before the election would offend the trusts and a dishonest revision would disappoint the people, so you defer action and promise to revise the tariff after the election, hoping in this way to get the support of both. If the tariff needs revision, if as charged its schedules are such as to shelter the trusts which are robbing the people of this country, it ought to be revised now. It ought to have been revised long ago, and if you are sincere about it and wanted to serve the people in good faith, you would not defer revision till after the election.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the people are tired of this game of hide and seek. There is every evidence that they have made up their minds not to be further trifled with, to no longer tolerate a corrupt alliance between their Government and the money power. And in the coming campaign, it is needless for me to say, the Democratic party will again champion their cause. It will take the position not only that the tariff should be revised, but that it should be revised by the friends of the people instead of by the friends of the trusts.

It is again going before the country with the declaration that the railroads shall be controlled and regulated and compelled to do justice to the people. It will again declare that private monopoly is intolerable and indefensible, and that those who enter into conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade for the purpose of plundering the people shall not escape prosecution, and that they shall not only be enjoined and fined, but put in stripes and sent to the penitentiary.

Mr. Chairman, it is going to be a great moral contest, in which an appeal will be made to the hearts and consciences of the people of this great nation. Fortunately God has raised up among us a man superbly equipped and in every way worthy to lead in such a cause. And in spite of the jeers and opposition of the servient tools of predatory wealth, whether they call themselves Democrats or Republicans, we are going to nominate Mr. Bryan and elect him. In moral grandeur, in purity of character, in intellect, in profound statesmanship, in steadfast and unswerving fidelity to the cause of the common people, and in devotion to the principles of free government history does not record his equal. The shafts which are hurled against him daily from the strongholds wherein are ensconced the conspirators against the welfare of the people fall harmless at his feet. These malefactors have had their day. This plain, honest American citizen, in whose superb character is illustrated the true ideals and aspirations of the American people, has by the simple statement of truth enlightened their intellect and quickened their consciences, and they are now moving, and under the guidance and overruling providence of God they will again soon come into their own. [Loud applause on the Democratic side.]

APPENDIX A.

STATEMENT PREPARED BY ATTORNEY-GENERAL BONAPARTE ON DECEMBER 2, 1907, SHOWING ALL SUITS AND PROSECUTIONS INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST LAW OF JULY 2, 1890.

President Harrison's Administration, March 4, 1889, to March 4, 1893.

[William H. Miller, Attorney-General, March 5, 1889, to March 6, 1893.]

1. *United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal Company* (43 Fed. Rep. 898; 46 Fed. Rep. 432).—(Circuit court, middle district, Tennessee; decided October 13, 1890; June 4, 1891).—Bill filed September 25, 1890, against the members of the "Nashville Coal Exchange," composed of various coal mining companies operating mines in Kentucky and Tennessee, and of persons and firms dealing in coal in Nashville, formed for the purpose of fixing prices and regulating the output of coal.

A preliminary injunction was denied, but upon full hearing the court held the combination to be in violation of the antitrust law and enjoined the further carrying out of the agreement.

2. *United States v. Greenhut et al.* (50 Fed. Rep. 469).—(District court, Massachusetts; decided May 16, 1892).—Indictment returned about May 1, 1892, against the officers of the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company (whisky trust), an Illinois corporation. The indictment alleged that the defendants had purchased or leased seventy-eight competing distilleries in the United States, producing 75 per cent of all the distilled spirits manufactured and sold, with the intent to monopolize the manufacture and sale of such spirits in Massachusetts and among the several States, increase the price, and prevent competition. The indictment was quashed, because it failed to allege that defendants monopolized or conspired to monopolize trade and commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, the allegations being held insufficient to constitute an offense under the statute.

3. *United States v. Nelson* (52 Fed. Rep. 646).—(District court, Minnesota; decided October 10, 1892).—Indictment returned in 1902 against a number of lumber dealers for conspiring together to raise the price of lumber in violation of the antitrust law. Demurrer to indictment sustained, the court holding that an agreement between a number of dealers and manufacturers to raise prices, unless they practically controlled the entire commodity, could not operate as a restraint of trade within the meaning of the act.

4. *United States v. Trans-Mississippi Freight Association* (53 Fed. Rep. 440; 58 Fed. Rep. 58; U. S. 290).—(Circuit court, Kansas; decided November 28, 1892. Circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit; decided October 2, 1893. United States Supreme Court; argued December 8, 9, 1896, by Attorney-General Harmon; decided March 22, 1897).—Bill filed January 6, 1892, to enjoin the operations of a combination of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, alleged to have been formed for the purpose of maintaining "just and reasonable rates" and preventing unjust discriminations. The bill was dismissed by the circuit court, whose decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the case, holding that the antitrust act applied to railroad carriers and embraced all contracts in restraint of trade and commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, and was not confined to those in which the restraint was unreasonable.

5. *United States v. Workmen of the Amalgamated Council of New Orleans et al.* (54 Fed. Rep. 994; 57 Fed. Rep. 85).—(Circuit court, eastern district Louisiana; decided March 25, 1893. Circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit; decided June 13, 1893).—Bill filed November 10, 1892, to restrain defendants, a combination of workmen, from interfering with interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of the antitrust law. The injunction was granted, and the law held to apply to combinations of laborers as well as capitalists. The circuit court of appeals affirmed this decree.

6. *United States v. Patterson et al.* (55 Fed. Rep. 605; 59 Fed. Rep. 280).—(Circuit court, Massachusetts; decided February 28 and June 7, 1893).—Cash register case. Indictment returned about January, 1893, against the members of a combination formed for the purpose of controlling the price of cash registers. A demurrer was sustained as to certain counts of the indictment and overruled as to others, and leave granted to file special demurrers to the counts which were sustained. The special demurrers were overruled and leave granted the defendants to answer. Letter of Attorney-General dated October 16, 1893, shows that the case was allowed to lapse because of the consolidation of the complaining witness with defendants, said witness being in possession of the evidence relied on.

7. *United States v. E. C. Knight Company* (sugar trust) (60 Fed. Rep. 306; 60 Fed. Rep. 934; 156 U. S. 1).—(Circuit court, eastern district, Pennsylvania; decided January 30, 1894. Circuit court of appeals, third circuit; decided March 26, 1894. United States Supreme Court; argued by Solicitor-General Lawrence Maxwell, jr., October 24, 1894. Mr. Attorney-General Olney on brief; decided January 21, 1895).—Bill filed May 2, 1892, to enjoin the acquisition by the American Sugar Refining Company, a New Jersey corporation, of the stock of the E. C. Knight Company, the Franklin Sugar Company, the Spreckels Sugar Refining Company, and the Delaware Sugar House, Pennsylvania corporations. The circuit court dismissed the bill, and the decree of dismissal was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court, the latter court holding that the antitrust act did not apply to combinations of manufacturers.

President Cleveland's second Administration, March 4, 1893, to March 4, 1897.

[Richard Olney, Attorney-General, March 6, 1893, to June 7, 1895; Judson Harmon, Attorney-General, June 8, 1895, to March 5, 1897.]

1. *United States v. Elliott* (62 Fed. Rep. 801; 64 Fed. Rep. 27).—(Circuit court, eastern district, Missouri; decided July 6 and October 24, 1894).—Suit instituted about July 1, 1894, to restrain Elliott, Debs, and others, members of the American Railway Union, from carrying out their unlawful conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce and to obstruct the carrying of the mails, in violation of the antitrust law. Preliminary injunction granted and a demurrer to the bill overruled.

2. *United States v. Agler* (62 Fed. Rep. 824).—(Circuit court, Indiana; decided July 12, 1894).—Information filed July, 1894, charging contempt of court in disobeying an injunction restraining Agler and others from interfering with interstate commerce and obstructing the mails. This was one of the Debs cases. It was alleged that Agler was a member of the American Railway Union, the members of which were on a strike, and had been enjoined under the antitrust law from interfering with the carrying of the mails and from obstructing interstate commerce. Information quashed for lack of certainty in describing defendant and his actions.

3. *United States v. Debs et al.* (64 Fed. Rep. 724).—(Circuit court, northern district, Illinois; decided December 14, 1894).—Information

filed July 17, 1894. Proceedings in contempt to punish Debs and others for disobeying an injunction restraining them from interfering with interstate commerce and with obstructing the mails, by means of a conspiracy, in violation of the antitrust law. Defendants found guilty and punished.

4. *In re Debs*, petitioner (158 U. S. 564).—(United States Supreme Court; decided May 27, 1895).—Proceedings instituted July 2, 1894. Application for a writ of habeas corpus to secure discharge from imprisonment for disobeying an injunction of the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois, restraining Debs and others from conspiring to interfere with interstate commerce, in violation of the antitrust law.

Petition for the writ denied.

5. *United States v. Cassidy* (67 Fed. Rep. 698).—(District court, northern district, California; charge to jury delivered April 1 and 2, 1895).—Cassidy and others were indicted under section 5440, United States Revised Statutes, for conspiring to commit offenses against the United States, which acts consisted in combining and conspiring to restrain trade and commerce between the States in violation of the antitrust law, the prosecutions growing out of the Pullman car strike, which occurred June-July, 1894. The trial lasted five months, resulting in a disagreement of the jury.

6. *Moore v. United States* (85 Fed. Rep. 465).—(Circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit; decided February 14, 1898).—Indictment of the members of an association of dealers in coal at Salt Lake City for entering into a conspiracy to regulate the price of coal. Indictment returned November 4, 1895. Moore was tried and convicted in the district court of Utah upon this indictment. The circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction for the reason that upon the admission of Utah as a State it was no longer a "Territory" within the meaning of the antitrust act, and the combination was not in restraint of interstate commerce.

7. *United States v. Joint Traffic Association* (76 Fed. Rep. 895; 89 Fed. Rep. 1020; 171 U. S. 505).—(Circuit court, southern district of New York; decided May 28, 1896. Circuit court of appeals, second circuit; decided March 19, 1897. United States Supreme Court; argued by Solicitor-General John W. Richards, February 24, 25, 1898; decided October 28, 1898).—Suit instituted January 8, 1896. Bill in equity to enjoin the alleged violation of the antitrust law by a combination of railroads. Thirty-one railroad companies engaged in transportation between Chicago and the Atlantic coast formed themselves into an association known as the Joint Traffic Association, to control competitive traffic, fix rates, etc. The circuit court dismissed the bill and the court of appeals affirmed the action of the circuit court. These judgments were reversed by the United States Supreme Court upon the authority of *United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association* (163 U. S. 290), and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with its opinion, by which the combination was adjudged illegal.

8. *United States v. Hopkins et al.* (82 Fed. Rep. 529; 88 Fed. Rep. 1018; 171 U. S. 578).—(Circuit court, Kansas; September 20, 1897. Circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit; December 27, 1897. United States Supreme Court; October 24, 1898).—Suit instituted December 31, 1896. Bill to restrain the operations of the "Kansas City Live Stock Exchange." The injunction was granted, but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the case, with instructions to dismiss the bill, the business of the exchange being held not to constitute interstate commerce, nor covered by the antitrust act.

9. *United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Company* (78 Fed. Rep. 712; 85 Fed. Rep. 271; 175 U. S. 211).—(Circuit court, eastern district, Tennessee; decided February 5, 1897. Circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit; decided February 8, 1898. United States Supreme Court; argued by Solicitor-General Richards, April 26, 27, 1899; decided December 4, 1899).—Suit instituted December 10, 1896. Bill in equity to enjoin the operations of the cast-iron pipe trust, which attempted to enhance the price of cast-iron pipe by controlling and parceling out the manufacture and sale thereof throughout the several States and Territories to the several corporations forming the combination. The bill was dismissed by the circuit court. The circuit court of appeals reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the case, with instructions to enter a decree for the Government. On appeal to the Supreme Court the action of the circuit court of appeals was affirmed, the court distinguishing the case from that of *United States v. E. C. Knight Company* (156 U. S. 1).

President McKinley's Administration, March 4, 1897, to September 14, 1901.

[Joseph McKenna, Attorney-General, March 5, 1897, to June 25, 1898; John W. Griggs, Attorney-General, June 25, 1898, to March 29, 1901; Philander C. Knox, Attorney-General, April 5, 1901, to June 30, 1904.]

1. *Anderson v. United States* (82 Fed. Rep. 998; 171 U. S. 604).—(United States Supreme Court; decided October 24, 1898).—Suit instituted June 7, 1897, in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Missouri, to restrain the operations of The Traders' Live Stock Exchange, of Kansas City, an association formed for the purpose of buying cattle on the market. A temporary injunction was granted and the case appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. From there it was certified to the Supreme Court of the United States for instructions upon certain questions. The Supreme Court reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the bill, holding that the rules of the association were not in violation of the antitrust law.

2. *United States v. Coal Dealers' Association* (85 Fed. Rep. 242).—(Circuit court, northern district, California; decided January 28, 1898).—Suit brought December 16, 1897. Bill for injunction to restrain the operations of a combination of coal dealers known as the "Coal Dealers' Association of California."

A temporary injunction was granted.

3. *United States v. Chesapeake and Ohio Fuel Company et al.* (105 Fed. Rep. 93; 115 Fed. Rep. 610).—(Circuit court, southern district, Ohio; decided August 31, 1900. Circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit; decided April 8, 1902).—Bill filed May 8, 1899, to annul a contract and dissolve a combination of producers and shippers of coal in Ohio and West Virginia, engaged in mining coal and making coke intended for "western shipment," under agreement to sell the same at not less than a memorandum price, to be fixed by an executive committee appointed by the producers. Defendants enjoined, contract declared void and illegal, and the combination dissolved.

Affirmed by circuit court of appeals. No appeal to Supreme Court taken.

President Roosevelt's Administration, September 14, 1901, to —.

[Phillander C. Knox, Attorney-General, April 5, 1901, to June 30, 1904; William H. Moody, Attorney-General, July 1, 1904, to December 16, 1906; Charles J. Bonaparte, Attorney-General, December 17, 1906.]

CIVIL CASES.

1. *United States v. Northern Securities Company, Great Northern Railway Company, Northern Pacific Railway Company et al.* (120 Fed. Rep., 721; 193 U. S., 197).—(Circuit court, Minnesota; decided April 9, 1903. United States Supreme Court; decided March 14, 1904).—This suit was brought on March 10, 1902, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, to enjoin the defendant, the Northern Securities Company, from purchasing, acquiring, receiving, holding, voting, or in any manner acting as the owner of any of the shares of the capital stock of the two defendant railway companies and to restrain the defendant railway companies from permitting the Securities Company to vote any of the stock of said railways, or from exercising any control whatsoever over the corporate acts of either of said railway companies, it being charged that the Securities Company was formed for the purpose of acquiring a majority of the capital stock of the two railway companies in order that it might in that way effect practically a consolidation of the two companies by controlling rates and restricting and destroying competition, in violation of the Sherman antitrust law.

The circuit court entered a decree in favor of the Government, as prayed in the petition, and this decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

2. *United States v. Swift & Co. et al.* (122 Fed. Rep., 529; 196 U. S., 375).—Suit brought May 10, 1902, in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois to restrain the defendants (commonly known as the "Beef Trust") from carrying out an unlawful conspiracy entered into between themselves and with various railway companies to suppress competition and to obtain a monopoly in the purchase of live stock and selling dressed meats. A preliminary restraining order was granted on May 20, 1902.

The defendants having demurred to the bill, the court, after hearing, on April 18, 1903, overruled the demurrers and granted a preliminary injunction. The defendants having failed to answer, the court, on May 26, 1903, entered an order making the decree final and perpetually enjoining the further operations of the trust.

The defendants, on August 14, 1903, appealed from the final decree of the circuit court to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Decree affirmed by the Supreme Court, January 30, 1905.

3. *United States v. The Federal Salt Company et al.*—Suit brought October 15, 1902, in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California, to restrain the defendants (known as the "Salt Trust") from unlawfully combining and conspiring to suppress competition in the manufacture and sale of salt in the States west of the Rocky Mountains, in violation of the Sherman antitrust law. A temporary restraining order was issued on that date, and, the cause coming on for hearing, the court on November 10, 1902, granted an injunction pendente lite, thus, in effect, making the restraining order perpetual.

No appeal taken.

4. *United States v. Jacksonville Wholesale Grocers' Association.*—A suit in equity, instituted on September 12, 1903, in the United States circuit court for the southern district of Florida, for the purpose of dissolving a combination of wholesale grocers operating in violation of the antitrust law. The members of the association have filed answers, and the cause has been continued from time to time and will be heard at the next term of court.

5. *United States v. General Paper Company et al.*—December 27, 1904, a bill in equity was filed in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota against the General Paper Company and twenty-three other corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of paper, alleging that said defendants had entered into a combination and conspiracy to control, regulate, monopolize, and restrain trade and commerce in the manufacture of news print, manila, fiber, and other papers and products of paper in violation of the Sherman antitrust law, by making the General Paper Company their common sales agent.

After issue was joined, the defendants and their officers declined to obey orders of the circuit court for the district of Minnesota and the circuit court for the eastern district of Wisconsin, in which district testimony was also being taken, requiring them to answer certain questions and to produce certain books and papers, and appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. On March 12, 1906, the court dismissed the appeals in the Wisconsin cases and affirmed the judgment in the Minnesota cases. (Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S., 92; Alexander v. United States, id., 117.)

On May 11, 1906, judgment was ordered in favor of the Government by the circuit court for the district of Minnesota, dissolving the combination and affording the Government all the relief prayed for in its bill.

6. *United States v. Metropolitan Meat Company et al.*—Bill in equity filed in October, 1905, in the United States circuit court for the district of Hawaii, to restrain the alleged unlawful operations of certain combinations in the matter of the restraint of trade in beef and beef products. Demurrer to bill overruled October 2, 1906. Pending.

7. *United States v. Allen and Robinson et al.*—Bill in equity filed in October, 1905, in the United States circuit court for the district of Hawaii, to restrain the operation of an alleged unlawful combination to control the trade in lumber in that Territory. Answers of three defendants filed January 2, 1906. March 4, 1907, cases on trial—continued, on application of defendants, until September. Pending.

8. *United States v. Nome Retail Grocers' Association.*—November 4, 1905, the Department directed the United States attorney for the second division of Alaska to file a bill in equity against the Nome Retail Grocers' Association, alleging a combination to fix prices and to suppress competition in violation of the Sherman antitrust law.

Suit was promptly instituted, whereupon the defendants agreed to the entry of a decree which would subvert all the interests of the Government and the general public set forth in the bill. A decree dissolving the combination was entered accordingly.

9. *United States v. The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis et al.*—Petition filed in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri on December 1, 1905, to enjoin the defendants (The Terminal Association, the bridge companies, and the railroad and ferries crossing the Mississippi River at St. Louis) from carrying out an unlawful combination entered into between them to operate the Eads Bridge and the Merchants' Bridge as a common agency of interstate commerce, and to suppress competition between said bridges and between the bridges and ferries, and to monopolize interstate transportation at this point. This case is pending.

10. *United States v. Otis Elevator Company et al.*—Bill in equity filed March 7, 1906, in the United States circuit court for the northern district of California against the Otis Elevator Company and a number of other corporations and individuals, in which it was alleged that they were maintaining a combination in restraint of trade in the matter of the manufacture and sale of elevators. June 1, 1906, a decree was entered by consent dissolving the combination and granting the relief prayed.

11. *United States v. National Association of Retail Druggists et al.*—Bill in equity filed May 9, 1906, in the United States circuit court for the district of Indiana against the National Association of Retail Druggists and others, alleging a combination in restraint of interstate trade and commerce in the matter of the sale of drugs and proprietary medicines to consumers through retail druggists. May 9, 1907, final decree entered by agreement giving the Government all the relief prayed for in the petition.

12. *United States v. Standard Oil Company et al.*—November 15, 1906, bill in equity filed in the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Missouri against the Standard Oil Company and others, in which it is alleged that they are maintaining a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of petroleum. Motions were filed by the defendants to vacate an order of the court directing service of subpoenas upon nonresident defendants. These motions were argued on January 30, 1907, and on March 7, 1907, the court rendered an opinion in favor of the Government. Exceptions filed by defendants to Government's petition. May 24, 1907, hearing at St. Paul, Minn., on bill of exceptions, which resulted in a decision in favor of the Government. Testimony now being taken.

13. *United States v. American Seating Company et al.*—March 12, 1907, bill in equity filed in the United States circuit court for the northern district of Illinois against the American Seating Company and others, in which it is alleged that they are maintaining a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of school and church furniture. August 15, 1907, decree entered granting perpetual injunction against all defendants, except E. H. Stafford Manufacturing Company, E. H. Stafford, E. M. Stafford, and E. G. Bentley.

14. *United States v. The Reading Company et al.*—June 12, 1907, bill in equity filed in the circuit court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania to dissolve a combination among the anthracite coal-carrying roads and others, which are operating in violation of the Sherman antitrust law. Case pending.

15. *United States v. American Tobacco Company et al.*—July 10, 1907, bill in equity filed in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York against the American Tobacco Company and others, in which it is alleged that they are maintaining a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of tobacco. Pending.

16. *United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. et al.*—July 30, 1907, bill in equity filed in the circuit court for the district of Delaware against E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. and others, in which it is alleged that they are maintaining a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of gunpowder and other high explosives. Pending.

17. *United States v. One Hundred and Seventy-five Cases of Cigarettes.*—October 28, 1907, information filed in the district court for the eastern district of Virginia covering the seizure of 175 cases of cigarettes under section 6 of the Sherman antitrust act. Case pending.

CRIMINAL CASES.

1. *United States v. The Federal Salt Company.*—On February 28, 1903, the grand jury for the United States district court for the northern district of California returned an indictment against The Federal Salt Company for having violated the antitrust law.

On May 12, 1903, the company pleaded guilty and the court sentenced it to pay a fine of \$1,000, which was paid.

2. *United States v. Armour & Co. et al.*—After the affirmation by the Supreme Court of the decree of the circuit court in *United States v. Swift & Co.* (above referred to) complaints from various quarters were made to the Department that the combination still continued. The Department thereupon undertook by every means at its command to investigate the truth of these complaints. Exhaustive inquiry was made before the grand jury for the northern district of Illinois, which resulted in the return of an indictment on July 1, 1903, against Armour & Co., and J. Ogden Armour, president; Patrick A. Valentine, treasurer; Arthur Neekle, general manager; Thomas J. Connors, superintendent; and Samuel A. McRoberts, assistant treasurer, of Armour & Co.; the Armour Packing Company, and Charles W. Armour, president; Swift & Co., and Louis F. Swift, president; Lawrence A. Carton, treasurer; D. Edwin Hartwell, secretary; and Albert H. Veeder and Robert C. McManus and Arthur F. Evans, agents of Swift & Co.; the Fairbank Canning Company, and Edward Morris, vice-president; Ira N. Morris, secretary of the Fairbank Canning Company; the Cudahy Packing Company, and Edward A. Cudahy, vice-president and general manager of the Cudahy Packing Company.

Again this indictment many preliminary objections were urged. All were disposed of in favor of the Government, except certain special pleas of immunity in bar, based upon information concerning the matters for which they were indicted, which they had given to the Department of Commerce and Labor. The court sustained the pleas so far as the individual defendants were concerned and overruled them with respect to the corporations.

3. The tobacco trust cases (*Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U. S. 43; *McAllister v. Henkel*, id., 90).—These cases grew out of an investigation by a Federal grand jury in the southern district of New York of the American Tobacco Company and the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, believed to be violating the antitrust laws, the matter having been brought to the attention of the grand jury by the officers of the Department of Justice, special counsel having been appointed for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. Subpoenas duces tecum were served upon the officers of the companies directing them to produce papers and other documentary evidence belonging to the corporations. They refused to obey the subpoena or to answer questions propounded to them. The circuit court adjudged them in contempt and committed them until they should produce the books and answer the questions. They applied to another judge of the same court for writs of habeas corpus, which upon hearing were discharged. Upon appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the orders denying the writs.

June —, 1906, the grand jury returned an indictment against the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, the J. S. Young Company, a corporation of Maine, and Karl Jungbluth and Howard E. Young, their respective presidents, for illegally combining and conspiring to regulate the interstate trade and sale in licorice paste, an article used

in the manufacture of plug and smoking tobacco, snuff, and cigars. Defendants entered pleas of not guilty, with leave to withdraw or demur on or before July 9, 1906. July 9, 1906, demurrers filed by all of the defendants. December 4, 1906, demurrers overruled. December 19, 1906, trial commenced. January 10, 1907, MacAndrews & Forbes Company found guilty on first and third counts of indictment, the J. S. Young Company found guilty on first and third counts; verdict of acquittal as to individual defendants. MacAndrews & Forbes Company fined \$10,000. J. S. Young Company fined \$8,000. Stay of sixty days to perfect appeal.

4. United States v. F. A. Amsden Lumber Company et al.—Indictment returned in the district court of Oklahoma, May 4, 1906, for violation of the Sherman Act in restricting competition and maintaining prices in the sale of lumber. May 13, 1907, change of venue granted to Grant County. September 25, 1907, pleas of guilty and fines imposed aggregating \$2,000, which were paid.

5. United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company et al.—May 25, 1906, the Federal grand jury for the middle district of Tennessee, upon information furnished by the Department of Justice, returned an indictment against thirty-one corporations and twenty-five individuals engaged in the fertilizer business in the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee, charging them with engaging in a conspiracy in violation of the Federal antitrust act, and with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, viz, the aforesaid conspiracy, in violation of section 5440 of the Revised Statutes. The fertilizer manufacturers combined to fix the price of fertilizers in the territory mentioned and to apportion the trade among themselves according to an agreed percentage. July 11, 1906, all the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States from an order of the circuit court of the eastern district of Virginia denying the right of habeas corpus and remanding them to the custody of the marshal for removal to the middle district of Tennessee for trial. The case before the Supreme Court was argued on December 3, 1906, and on March 4, 1907, the judgment of the circuit court for the eastern district of Virginia was reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court.

6. United States v. American Ice Company et al.—July 12, 1906, indictment returned in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, charging an unlawful agreement to control prices and restrict competition in the sale of ice. Case pending.

7. United States v. Chandler Ice and Cold Storage Plant et al.—September 19, 1906, indictment returned in the district court for the Territory of Oklahoma against the Chandler Ice and Cold Storage Plant and others, charging a combination to apportion territory in the matter of the sale of ice. May 5, 1907, demurrer filed by defendant Groves and overruled. May 20, 1907, demurrer filed by Chandler Ice and Cold Storage Plant. Pending.

8. United States v. Alfred M. Gloyd et al.—September 21, 1906, indictment returned against Alfred M. Gloyd and others in the district court for the Territory of Oklahoma, charging a combination to maintain prices and restrict competition in the sale of lumber. The case is pending.

9. United States v. People's Ice and Fuel Company, a corporation, and W. B. Lount.—October 23, 1906, indictment returned in the district court for the Territory of Arizona, charging a combination to control prices and restrict competition in the sale of ice. January 5, 1907, trial commenced. Verdict not guilty as to People's Ice and Fuel Company and company held to next grand jury. Trial of W. B. Lount continued over term.

10. United States v. Demund Lumber Company et al.—October 23, 1906, indictment returned in the district court for the Territory of Arizona, charging a combination to control prices and restrict competition in the sale of lumber. January 2, 1907, trial commenced. Verdict of not guilty as to Demund Lumber Company. January 7, 1907, cases against Chamberlain Lumber Company and Valley Lumber Company continued over term.

11. United States v. Phoenix Wholesale Meat and Produce Company, a corporation, P. T. Hurley, and S. J. Tribolet.—October 23, 1906, indictment returned in the district court for the Territory of Arizona, charging a combination to control prices and restrict competition in the sale of meats. January 7, 1907, trial commenced. Verdict of not guilty as to Phoenix Wholesale Meat and Produce Company. January 8, 1907, indictment against Hurley dismissed. Verdict of guilty as to defendant S. J. Tribolet. January 12, 1907, Tribolet sentenced to pay fine of \$1,000.

12. United States v. T. B. Hogg et al.—December 8, 1906, indictment returned in the district court for the Territory of Oklahoma, charging a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in the sale of lumber. March 25, 1907, plea of not guilty. Change of judge granted on application of defendants. Case pending.

13. United States v. Atlantic Investment Company et al.—February 11, 1907, indictment returned in the United States district court for the southern district of Georgia against the Atlantic Investment Company and others, charging a combination in restraint of trade and commerce in the matter of the manufacture and sale of turpentine. February 18, 1907, four corporations and two individuals, defendants to this indictment, entered pleas of guilty, and the court imposed a fine of \$5,000 upon each of the six defendants, making a total of \$30,000.

14. United States v. American Seating Company et al.—March 12, 1907, indictment returned in the district court of the northern district of Illinois charging a violation of the Sherman antitrust law by engaging in a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of school and church furniture. April 1, 1907, defendant corporations entered pleas of guilty, with one exception. May 20, 1907, fines imposed aggregating \$43,000. Defendant E. H. Stafford Manufacturing Company filed demurrer April 3, 1907. May 31, 1907, demurrer overruled and plea of not guilty entered.

15. United States v. Santa Rita Mining Company and Santa Rita Store Company.—April 4, 1907, indictment returned in the district of New Mexico charging a violation of section 3 of the Sherman antitrust law for engaging in a combination in restraint of trade. Demurrer filed and overruled. Fine of \$1,000 imposed.

16. United States v. National Umbrella Frame Company et al.—July 1, 1907, indictment returned in the district court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania charging a conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce in the manufacture and sale of umbrella material, in violation of the Sherman antitrust law and section 5440 R. S. Case pending.

17. United States v. E. H. Stafford Manufacturing Company et al.—July 10, 1907, indictment returned in the district court for the northern district of Illinois charging a violation of the Sherman antitrust law by engaging in a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale of school and church furniture. Case pending.

18. United States v. H. D. Corbett Stationery Company et al.—November 1, 1907, indictment returned in the district court for the district of Arizona charging a combination in restraint of trade. November 4, 1907, demurrer filed. November 14, 1907, demurrers sustained and defendants referred to next grand jury.

SUMMARY OF CASES UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS. President Harrison's Administration, 1889-1893.

4 bills in equity:
3 injunctions granted.
1 dismissed.
3 indictments:
1 quashed.
1 demurrer sustained.
1 discontinued.

President Cleveland's second Administration, 1893-1897.

4 bills in equity:
3 injunctions granted.
1 dismissed.
2 informations (for contempt in violating injunctions):
1 quashed.
1 conviction.
2 indictments:
1 quashed.
1 dismissed.

President McKinley's Administration, 1897-1901 (September 14).

3 bills in equity:
2 injunctions granted.
1 dismissed.

SUMMARY OF CIVIL CASES.

President Roosevelt's Administration, September 14, 1901, to —.

16 bills in equity:
8 injunctions granted.
8 pending.
1 forfeiture proceeding:
Pending.

SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL CASES.

18 indictments:
7 convictions.
1 plea in bar sustained.
1 demurrer sustained.
9 pending.
2 proceedings for contempt in refusing to testify before grand jury:
Convictions.
Total fines imposed, \$96,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee and the gentleman from Illinois each have the same length of time remaining to their credit.

Mr. PADGETT. There must be some mistake about that. I had forty-seven minutes remaining when I yielded thirty, which leaves me seventeen minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee must remember that the time is not absolutely all taken during the course of the day.

Mr. PADGETT. I was only basing my remark on the statement of the Speaker's clerk, who informed me I had forty-seven minutes before yielding thirty minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. According to the calculation of the clerk, the same amount of time has been consumed on both sides.

Mr. PADGETT. How much time have I remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has one-half of the time between now and 5 o'clock.

Mr. PADGETT. Then I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. O'CONNELL].

Mr. O'CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. LAMAR], in a beautifully worded prose poem, told of his happy people in Missouri, and described with picturesque glow the beauty of the sunset in the Ozark Hills. We were delighted to listen to his charming description, as we were all willing to rejoice at the happiness of his people.

Now, I come from a great metropolitan district, which takes pride in the possession of hills—Dorchester Heights, memorable for the expulsion of the British troops by George Washington on St. Patrick's Day, 1777. Meeting-House Hill in Dorchester and its surrounding hills, on the slopes of which was erected the first free public school in this country that was supported by taxation of the people. That school was the forerunner of the great public school system of this country that has been its strength and bulwark. The Granite Hills of Quincy, on whose sides were born two Presidents of this Republic, and at the base of which sleeps the mortal remains of those two great men—Adams, and his son, John Quincy Adams. The magnificent Blue Hills of Milton, the highest on the Atlantic seaboard, to-day used as part of the great park system of the city of Boston, and upon whose heights the setting sun rests—

Not * * * obscurely bright,
But one unclouded blaze of living light.

[Applause.]

But we do not bother ourselves much with the sunset on those hills. We are a wakeful, watchful, alert people, and we are more concerned with the rising of the sun. For this reason we have probably the happiest Congressional district in this great country. Take us, big or little, and you will find less poverty and more general comfort than any other Congressional

district can show. We are rich in history and tradition, and take great pride in the part we have played in the history making of this country. [Applause.]

As the sun emerges from the waters of Massachusetts Bay and sends its beams over the glistening waves, we are mindful that those same waters may to-morrow or at another time bring forth our ancient enemy of three great wars. We receive the hope and cheer of each day, but we recall the great past, and we are thoughtful as to the future. So it is, Mr. Chairman, that my people have sent me various petitions and resolutions protesting against any treaty of arbitration with Great Britain, and urge the building of an adequate navy for the national defense. It is with pleasure, therefore, that I rise to urge the building of four battle ships or more during the coming year. [Applause.] I believe, with a due regard for the past and for the dangers of the future, we should hasten the upbuilding of that arm of the defense, the Navy, which is so important to our well-being. We have built a great navy in the past, and it is agreed that that navy was built for the protection of the Atlantic seaboard. If it was not built for that purpose, then there can not be a reason given for its existence; and if it was built for that purpose and has now left these shores, then the same reasons that brought that fleet into existence should quickly build another fleet to take the place of this absent one. [Applause.] No one knows when our fleet will return; no one can tell how many of those ships will be greeted again in the Atlantic Ocean. No man knows what the future may have in store for us. I believe the policy of this Government should be to keep apace with all its possible enemies.

We have two possible enemies to-day, two likely opponents—Great Britain and Japan. My colleague from Alabama, Captain HOBSON, has told us to-day of the dangers and imminence of war with Japan. Let me call your attention to the danger on the Atlantic seaboard.

I have received various petitions from my district, one of which was from the John Boyle O'Reilly Club, of West Quincy, which I will read:

We, citizens of Quincy, Mass., in meeting assembled, taking account of the announcement made in the British House of Commons recently by Sir Edward Grey, the secretary for foreign affairs, and confirmed by news dispatches from Washington, that a treaty of arbitration is now being negotiated between the United States and Great Britain, protest against the ratification of such treaty, and call upon the Senate to reject it for the following reasons, which we respectfully commend to the earnest consideration of the Senators:

I. Such treaties are notoriously sought by England, not for the maintenance or promotion of the world's peace, but for the purpose of leaving herself free to carry on her policy of aggression and spoliation against weaker peoples and maintaining her robber grip on and continuing to oppress countries to which her rule has been a curse and a blight.

II. These treaties are intended by England to limit or destroy the freedom of action of the powers with which they are concluded, while she herself pursues untrammelled her policy of aggression elsewhere; or they are the first steps to a closer alliance for the purpose of waging war, as is clearly demonstrated by her present entente with France, which is aimed directly against Germany, and has encouraged and stimulated France in the savage and predatory war she is now carrying on in Morocco, which is a disgrace to civilization and humanity.

III. England's professions of peaceful intent are belied by her colossal naval preparations for war and her alliance with Japan, which involves not the mere possibility, but the certainty of war with the United States, as is conclusively proved by the speech delivered in the Dominion House of Commons on January 28 last by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian premier, in which he said:

"It is to the credit of Lord Lansdowne that, of all the diplomatists of Europe, he was the first to recognize the possibilities of this change in the condition of Japan. Such was the importance that he attached, and rightly attached, to this changed condition that he, all of a sudden, broke loose from all the traditions of British policy. Hitherto it had been the rule and tradition of British diplomacy that Britain would not become entangled in any foreign alliance, that she would stand alone in her insular position, and be ready in all circumstances to take advantage of her opportunities without being shackled by weighty alliances. But Lord Lansdowne attached so much importance to the new condition Japan had attained that in 1902 he did what had not yet been done for us by any British statesman, and concluded a treaty, defensive and offensive, between Britain and Japan."

"What is the condition, therefore, which has existed since 1902? It is that, under the treaty negotiated by Lord Lansdowne, it is possible, if unfortunately the interests of Great Britain were to be jeopardized in the northern Pacific Ocean, we might see, should unfortunately war break out, the fleet of Japan and the fleet of England riding the waves together for a common purpose and against a common enemy. It is possible that, under the treaty, we may see the fleet of Japan weighing anchor in the harbor of Vancouver for the protection of those British interests to which Canada attaches such vital importance."

The importance and significance of this declaration of the Canadian premier can not be ignored. For these reasons we urge most earnestly on the Senate the rejection of the proposed arbitration treaty with England, and we commend to the American people the adoption of a continental policy based on a good understanding with all American Republics, sustained by an army and a navy adequate to the national defense and free from all entangling alliances with European powers.

Resolved, That copies of this protest be sent to the President of the United States, to the Secretary of State, to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and to the Senators and Representatives from this State and district.

JOHN BOYLE O'REILLY CLUB,
West Quincy, Mass.

I received several others—from the Irish-American Club, Wolfetone Club, Grattan Club, Hugh O'Neil Club, and numerous other civic bodies against the ratification of a treaty of arbitration with Great Britain. Is there justification in their fears? I rather think so. An inspection of history, a due regard for the lessons which it has taught, and the presentation of the evidence of the present hour can lead to no other conclusion than that the danger which threatens us is imminent and great.

Sir Wilfred Laurier (prime minister) in a speech delivered before the Dominion House of Commons on January 28, said that in 1902 "Lord Lansdowne had concluded a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive, between Great Britain and Japan. Under the conditions of this treaty it is possible, if war broke out where the interests of Great Britain would be jeopardized in the north Pacific Ocean, that we would see the fleet of Japan and the fleet of England riding the waves together against a common enemy."

The exact language used by this great leader of the Conservative party is as follows:

But Lord Lansdowne attached so much importance to the new condition Japan had attained that in 1902 he did what had not yet been done for us by any British statesman, and concluded a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive, between Britain and Japan. What is the condition, therefore, which has existed since 1902? It is that, under the treaty negotiated by Lord Lansdowne, it is possible, if unfortunately the interests of Great Britain were to be jeopardized in the northern Pacific Ocean, we might see, should unfortunately war break out, the fleet of Japan and the fleet of England riding the waves together for a common purpose and against a common enemy. It is possible that, under that treaty, we may see the fleet of Japan weighing anchor in the harbor of Vancouver for the protection of those British interests to which Canada attaches such vital importance.

Shall it be said in this Parliament, are honorable gentlemen on the other side of the House to vote to-day that we shall admit Japanese into this country only when they come with a man-of-war in company with the British fleet in order to protect our shores, and that there shall be an enactment of Parliament to prevent them coming in times of peace?

A verbatim report of this speech, delivered in the Canadian Parliament, is found in the "House of Commons Debates," fourth session, Tenth Parliament, January 28, 1908, from column 2090 to 2101.

This is significant language, and of itself should be sufficient to put this nation on its guard. [Applause.]

The history of the great past tells us that we drove the British from these shores in the days of the Revolution because of their tyranny and oppression. Britain went unwillingly and because she had to. She came back in 1810 and 1812 and ravaged our shores and drove our shipping from the seas. That I may not be considered as in any way coloring the situation as it then was, let me read from the life of John Quincy Adams a brief description of the situation. Speaking of the conditions which then existed, Morse, in "American Statesmen," says:

All this while the impressment of American seamen by British ships of war was being vigorously prosecuted. This is one of those outrages so long ago laid away among the mouldering tombs in the historical graveyard that few persons now appreciate its enormity or the extent to which it was carried. Those who will be at the pains to ascertain the truth in the matter will feel that the bloodiest, most costly, and most disastrous war would have been better than tame endurance of treatment so brutal and unjustifiable that it finds no parallel, even in the long and dark list of wrongs which Great Britain has been wont to inflict upon all the weaker of the uncivilized peoples with whom she has been brought or has gratuitously forced herself into unwelcome contact.

The more illegal the act committed by any British officer the more sure he was of reward, till it seemed that the impressment of American citizens was an even surer road to promotion than valor in an engagement with the enemy. Such were the substantial wrongs inflicted by Great Britain. Nor were any pains taken to cloak their character. On the contrary, they were done with more than British insolence and offensiveness, and were accompanied with insults which alone constituted sufficient provocation for war.

To show that the customary conduct of Great Britain did not change in subsequent years, in the estimate of John Quincy Adams, let me read his opinion given of England in 1843, when the matter of the attitude of Great Britain toward slavery in Texas was being considered:

(Referring to the attitude of Lord Aberdeen, who pretended that he was astonished at Adams's distrust of the British Government on the subject of slavery and particularly on the surrender of fugitive slaves.)

"This article is a patent example of diplomatic swindling. There is hope that its purpose may be defeated by the alarm of the English abolitionists and their remonstrance against it before the enactment of it by Parliament as English law. A grosser fraud was never practiced upon nations than was intended by that article. The apologies for it by Lord Ashburton and by the British ministers are lame and prevaricated, and all my suspicions of the duplicity of British ministers on the subject of Texas and slavery are but too strongly confirmed. The policy of the British Government is to cherish, sustain, and protect the institution of slavery in our Southern States and Texas, and their task is to do it by humbugging the abolitionists in England in the belief that they intend directly the reverse." (Memoirs of John Quincy Adams.)

I have the honor to represent the same Congressional District that was represented by John Quincy Adams, and I believe that in all fairness I can urge upon this House to regard the present policy of the British Government in seeking a treaty of arbitration with this country as a scheme entered into for the purpose of blinding the American people to the real purpose of Great Britain while she pursues her policy of aggression and spoliation which in time she will endeavor to extend toward this country. [Applause.]

Let us skip hurriedly down to the days of the civil war, twenty years later, and we find at the breaking out of hostilities there was a treaty existing between Great Britain and the United States, which compelled Great Britain by its terms to remain friendly. Yet the most disgraceful violation of the terms of that treaty is discovered in the record of Great Britain.

I do not care to designate this in language of my own. My feeling on the matter can best be conveyed in the language of the Senator from Massachusetts, Charles Sumner, who was then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I read from his description his idea of the so-called "British friendship."

Stating the case against England, Sumner showed how the civil war began, how England in hot haste recognized the Confederate States as belligerents, and how the *Alabama* was built and put to sea:

The case is not yet complete. The *Alabama*, whose building was in defiance of law, international and municipal, whose escape was "a scandal and reproach," and whose enlistment of her crew was a fit sequel to the rest, after being supplied with an armament and with a rebel commander, entered upon a career of piracy. Mark now a new stage of complicity. Constantly the pirate ship was within reach of British cruisers, and from time to time within the shelter of British ports. For six days unmolested she enjoyed the pleasant hospitality of Kingston, in Jamaica, obtaining freely the coal and supplies so necessary to her vocation. But no British cruiser, no British magistrate, ever arrested the offending ship, whose voyage was a continuing "scandal and reproach" to the British Government. The *Alabama* case begins with the fatal concession by which the rebels were enabled to build ships in England and then to sail them without being liable as pirates. It next shows itself in the building of the ship, in the armament, and in the escape with so much of negligence on the part of the British Government as to constitute sufferance, if not connivance; and then again the case reappears in the welcome and hospitality afforded by British cruisers and by the magistrates of British ports to the pirate ship when her evasion from British jurisdiction was well known. Thus at three different stages the British Government is compromised: First, in the concession of ocean belligerency, upon which all depended; secondly, in the negligence which allowed the evasion of the ship in order to enter upon the hostile expedition for which she was built, manned, armed, and equipped, and, thirdly, in the open complicity which, after this invasion, gave her a welcome hospitality and supplies in British ports. Thus her depredations and burnings—making the ocean blaze—all proceeded from England, which by three different acts lighted a torch. To England must be traced also all the widespread consequences which ensued. One after the other ships were built; one after the other they escaped on their errand; and one after the other they enjoyed the immunities of British ports. Audacity reached its height when ironclad rams were built and the perversity of the British Government became still more conspicuous by its long refusal to arrest these destructive engines of war, destined to be employed against the United States.

It is plain that the ships were built under the safeguard of this ill-omened proclamation, which stole forth from the British shores, and afterwards enjoyed the immunities of British ports, were not only British in origin, but British in equipment, British in armaments, and British in crews. They were British in every respect, except in their commanders, who were rebels, and one of these, as his ship was sinking, owed his safety to a British yacht, symbolizing the omnipresent support of England. British sympathies were active in their behalf. The cheers of a British passenger ship crossing the path of the *Alabama* encouraged the work of piracy, and the cheers of the House of Commons encouraged the builder of the *Alabama*, while he had defended what he had done, and exclaimed, in taunt to him who is now an illustrious member of the British cabinet, John Bright, that he "would rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen *Alabamas* than be the author of the speeches of that gentleman 'crying up' the institutions of the United States," which the builder of the *Alabama*, rising with his theme, denounced as "of no value whatever" and as "reducing the very name of liberty to an utter absurdity," while the cheers of the House of Commons echoed back his words. Thus from beginning to end, from the fatal proclamation to the rejoicing of the accidental ship, and the rejoicing of the House of Commons, was this hostile expedition protected and encouraged by England.

No candid person who studies this eventful period can doubt that the rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support from England; that it was strengthened at once by the concession of belligerent rights on the ocean; that it was fed to the end by British supplies; that it was encouraged by every well-stored British ship which was able to defy our blockade; that it was quickened into renewed life with every report from the British pirates, flaming anew with every burning ship; nor can it be doubted that without British intervention the rebellion would have soon succumbed under the well-directed efforts of the National Government. Not weeks or months, but years, were added in this way to our war, so full of the most costly sacrifice. Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Commons that England made war from her shores on the United States, "with an amount of damage to the country greater than in many ordinary wars." According to this testimony, the conduct of England was war; but it must not be forgotten that this war was carried on at our sole cost. The United States paid for a war waged by England upon the national unity.

Great Britain, in thus breaking the sacred stipulations and obligations which she was under to a friendly country, effect-

ively drove American commerce off the seas, and it has never gone back. The indignation of this country was such at that time that if we had been in a position to retaliate unquestionably a greater war would have followed the wrongs and treaty violations which were, in effect, declarations of war on the part of Great Britain toward the United States. For her violations of her treaty with this country we made Great Britain pay to us \$15,500,000 in the court of arbitration which met in Geneva. [Loud applause.]

Now, what brought about this sudden change of attitude on the part of Great Britain which we find toward us since the war with Spain? Is it that she loves us any more than she did? The feeling that was rampant for many years up to 1880 and subsequently had no reason to suddenly die forever. That feeling had existed for over one hundred years from the time that British tyranny first began to show its head in this country. It is found and explained in the fear which Great Britain has, and that acknowledgment wrung from her that we are a world power to-day. She claims that she helped us win the war with Spain. I am one of those who believe that we would have won that war if England had been allied with Spain. I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that we could have done it as easily. The task would have been harder, it would have been a more strenuous proposition, but I have an abiding confidence in the ability and capability of our people, and I am sure that we would have thrashed Britain the third time, as we have done it twice before. [Loud applause.]

Now, with these lessons of the past, are we to make a treaty with this perfidious nation; a nation which, when the treaty of Limerick was written, broke it before the ink with which it was penned had dried; a nation that disregarded its sacred obligations in the days of the civil war, not because she loved the South any more than the North, not because she wanted to see the cause of the Confederacy prevail, but because she felt she could deal a blow to the American Republic from which it could never recover? Her friendship for the Southern cause was not the friendship of a nation that believed in the principles of that cause. Rather it was the determination of mercenary ministers taking revenge for the loss of territory once their own, but now the United States of America.

Are there any dangers at present that we may be invaded by a British fleet? There certainly are. Bermuda is less than 700 miles east of Charleston and in the same latitude. Bermuda is less than 700 miles south of Halifax, which is a base of supplies for England on this continent. Within the last two or three years a fire broke out in Bermuda. She telegraphed to Halifax for engines, and these engines arrived the next day and put out the fire. Certainly with such a base as Halifax, with communications that can be established with Bermuda, with the great Atlantic seaboard just as close as Charleston, the chances which a hostile fleet would have against our undefended coast would be beyond all argument.

I believe I correctly represent the desires of my district when I state that I am in favor of four or more battle ships. I know President Roosevelt is correct in his attitude in asking for four, and I am convinced that the nation at large, particularly the 16,000,000 people along the Atlantic seaboard, are strongly in favor of a large increase in our Navy to replace those ships that have left our waters.

It should be borne in mind that the United States on the Atlantic proper has 5,400 miles to defend. If there is added to that the Gulf of Mexico, Cuba, and Porto Rico, there is a total of 17,200 miles. The coast line of Great Britain, France, and Germany totals only 4,700 miles.

On the Atlantic coast there is a population of 16,000,000 people within gunshot of a ship; there is approximately eighteen billions of property within striking distance of the ships' guns; our coast defenses are inferior. We have spent \$84,000,000, but there remains \$70,000,000 which must be spent before the present scheme is complete. Only five out of the twenty-seven fortified harbors have complete equipment of fire control; only one-third of the searchlight equipment has been completed. We have no merchant marine from which to extend our Navy and to draw transports and colliers. We have no bases on either side of the ocean such as Europe has on this side. Less than 20,000 regular soldiers are available, and these are scattered over the whole country.

At the present, Great Britain has in the Atlantic 45 battle ships and 33 armored cruisers, making a total of 77, while the United States has but two battle ships and three armored cruisers. To-day England has ten *Dreadnoughts* under way, of over 17,000 tons each, and two more are about to be laid; Japan has four *Dreadnoughts* under way with seven more about to be laid. The United States has only two under way, and inasmuch as it takes three years to complete one of these

monsters of the sea it can readily be seen how completely unprotected the Atlantic seaboard is.

Our seacoast is woefully wanting in proper defense. Our batteries are not manned as they should be, and unless we have battle ships in sufficient number to stand off an invading force from Great Britain, we stand in great danger. She broke her treaties in the past because it was to her advantage; what security have we in the promise of Great Britain that she would not break any treaty that she made to-day? We have been strong and powerful in our isolation; we have been independent of the rest of the world because we have not allied ourselves with any other nation. [Applause.] Let us continue that course; let us say to Great Britain that the ideals which she has are not our ideals. [Loud applause.]

Ambassador Bryce last winter appeared before the Society of Colonial Wars in Boston and urged that there was a community of ideals between the people of the two countries. He would not dare tell this doctrine to a camp of the Grand Army of the Republic. Yesterday he sat in the galleries and possibly to-day he has his representative in the diplomatic gallery. He is vitally interested in the outcome of this appropriation. If you appropriate for only two battle ships Ambassador Bryce will say to his ministry that they won an advantage; you will have helped him to get a treaty through, because they can urge the weakness of our defenses along the Atlantic seaboard as a reason for an alliance.

Let Mr. Bryce say to the people of England that America has adopted the policy of equaling the type of the *Dreadnought*, which England is now building, and then she will realize that we can not be hoodwinked into any kind of treaty. [Applause.] We have no more occasion for a treaty of arbitration to-day than we ever had, and this House should never yield in its protest against the ratification of such treaty. The greatest and surest form of protest is to build a sufficient number of battle ships that will protect our coast.

I believe that with four battle ships building each year, all the shipyards in this country could be kept busy for the next twenty-five years, and the navy-yards could be kept up to such a high grade of efficiency, either in building a few of these ships or in repairing those already built, that thousands of men could be given employment and millions of dollars' worth of material used to the general benefit of the country at large. [Applause.]

A strong navy is the surest insurance we have against war. Our Navy was gotten together and maintained at an expense of over \$200,000,000. To-day it is absent from our shores and no man knows whether that armada will ever come back. There can be no good reason for leaving the Atlantic coast unprotected. It is the most valuable part of this country.

If there was any reason for building a fleet such as we have for the protection of the Atlantic seaboard, then there is equally good reason for replacing that fleet as soon as possible by one just as strong if not stronger. [Prolonged applause.]

During the delivery of the foregoing remarks,

Mr. O'CONNELL said: I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record.

Mr. NEEDHAM. Mr. Chairman, I do not object to that, but I want to couple with it a request that the gentleman from California [Mr. McKINLEY] may have leave to extend his remarks.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I dislike to intervene in that kind of a situation; but everybody knows what the situation is. I objected to Mr. McKINLEY's request yesterday, and I adhere to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is made.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, can I have the one minute of my time that has been occupied?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman can not, unless the gentleman from Tennessee yields the time.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Give me one minute more.

Mr. PADGETT. Take it right quick.

Mr. O'CONNELL resumed and concluded his remarks as above.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. RAINEY].

Mr. RAINEY. Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter from Capt. Walter S. Thomas, chairman of the Ohio Afro-American League, which I send to the Clerk's desk and ask to have read in my time.

The Clerk read as follows:

[Officers: Capt. Walter S. Thomas, chairman, Columbus, Ohio; Hon. C. L. Maxwell, vice-chairman, Xenia, Ohio; Rev. E. L. Gilliam, secretary and treasurer, Columbus, Ohio. State central committeemen-at-large: Hon. J. S. Atwood, Ripley, Ohio; Rev. T. W. Woodson, Dayton, Ohio; Rev. E. L. Gilliam, D. D., Columbus, Ohio; Capt. Walter S. Thomas, Columbus, Ohio.]

OHIO AFRO-AMERICAN LEAGUE,
HEADQUARTERS STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE,

No. 473 South Eleventh street, Columbus, Ohio, March 21, 1908.

Hon. HENRY T. RAINEY,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Permit me, a stranger, to address you this letter in obedience to what I consider my duty to the colored Republicans of the State of Ohio.

I note in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 18, as I had already noted in the public press on March 15, that Mr. BANNON, Representative from the Tenth District of Ohio, in a speech delivered before the House on March 14, 1908, took occasion in reply to your speech, made a few days prior thereto, to make the following statement:

"The gentleman from Illinois, in a speech in this House the other day, said the negroes in Ohio would vote the Democratic ticket next November and that Ohio would go Democratic. He failed to give the Ohio negroes credit for any intelligence. The Ohio negro knows what Democratic hard times are just as well as the white people do. They do not want a Democratic administration any more than we do. They are no better prepared for it than we are, and they would suffer from it just as much, if not more, than we would."

I agree with Mr. BANNON in this, that we are no better prepared for a change of administration than are the white people, but I disagree with him when he says to Ohio and the country that the colored voters of Ohio, no matter whom the standard bearer may be, will vote solidly for that standard bearer, even if he be Mr. Taft or President Roosevelt.

Sir, the American negroes have reached that point in their civilized history where they know just as well what is best for them as their friends of the so-called "dominant race" variety. We have had since the close of the war of 1861-5 two Democratic Presidents, and I am frank enough to say to you, as a Republican of the Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Foraker type of Republicans, that the colored people, during the two terms of Mr. Cleveland as President of the United States, lived better in the South, socially, morally, financially, and politically, than they have ever done under any other administration. I mean to say by this, that the colored people were free from petty bickerings, caused by political chicanery on the part of just such men as now surround the President and try to dictate to the colored people of this country as to whom and for what they should vote.

We have reached that point where we believe it to be our duty to emphasize our position as free Americans by refusing to be led like dumb, driven cattle to the voting booths and there cast our ballots for President Roosevelt, his Secretary of War, or any man he may see fit to support for the nomination for the President of the United States at Chicago. We believe that a great injustice was rendered our people by the act of President Roosevelt in his summary discharge, without honor, of the colored soldiers, who were entitled to a fair and impartial trial, as provided under the Constitution and statutes. We are not so much drawn to the support of any man by reason of our resentment along this line as we are for the reason that if the President of the United States can discharge, without honor, humble black soldiers, he can commence at the head of the Army and Navy of the United States and discharge in disgrace the highest officer in either branch of the service.

I want to add, in conclusion, that the colored people of Ohio and all over the United States, wherever they have the free and untrammelled right of suffrage, will support no candidate for President of the United States who does not stand squarely upon the broad principles of justice and equality as exemplified and typified in the lives of Lincoln, Grant, and McKinley, who obeyed the Constitution and dealt justly by all Americans whether black or white.

We have almost reached that point where we can say "Thank God for Senator TILLMAN," for we believe him to be at least honest in his expressions and we believe him square in his life. I am absolutely convinced of this one fact: That should Secretary Taft be nominated at Chicago for President of the United States the colored voters of Ohio, and of the whole United States—95 per cent of them, at the least calculation—would cast their votes for the straight Democratic ticket for President or remain away from the polls, thus making the election of a Democratic President absolutely certain.

With great respect, I am

Very truly, yours,

No. 221 North Sixth street.

WALTER S. THOMAS.

[Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, there being no one on this side who desires to speak, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of the time I have and that yielded to me to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. FERRIS. Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee, it has been my pleasure to see this Congress appropriate more than \$11,000,000 for the benefit of the farming and agricultural pursuits of this land. That was more than was appropriated last year. It was more than was appropriated the year before. It should be more than it is this year. I am proud to know that this Congress has recognized the necessity of this appropriation. I am proud to know they have exceeded former limits and it begins to look like the farmers' cares were our cares and that agriculture might take a new lease on life. [Applause.]

But while we are rendering this aid, I want to say that there is some legislation needed for the farmer that will do him more good every year than the appropriation we have already made, viz, the total annihilation of the "future dealing, bucket-shop gambling, and gambling in American farm products."

The last census report furnishes us with figures that let us know that our United States is populated by more than 80,000,000 industrious people. It is further a conceded fact of common knowledge that practically one-half of them are engaged in the useful and historic art of agriculture.

Forty million people, that produce more every year than

they themselves consume, renders them good and useful citizens. It entitles them to careful consideration from this Congress. They not only support themselves, but they contribute largely to the support of the entire nation. They contribute to other nations. They are indispensable.

It is an oft-told and oftener-used adage that "England expects every man to do his duty."

With the same propriety and precision, America expects this Congress to do its duty.

1. I am going to charge and do charge that "dealers in futures," "dealers in margins," "bucket-shop dealers," and gamblers in American farm products are conducting a fictitious, fraudulent, and dangerous business in New York, which has a very depressing effect on the price of farm products and are a great menace to the producer and consumer alike.

2. I charge further that, by false reports and fictitious sales, they are able to control the price of farm products, raising and lowering them almost at will and wholly independent of the true producer.

3. I charge that they neither produce, export, manufacture, nor consume, and that more than 95 per cent of their dealings are fictitious and tend to throttle and curtail the market.

4. I charge that more than 95 per cent of their contracts are wagers as to whether the price of commodities will go up or down, with no intent or apparent ability to perform them in keeping with their terms.

5. I charge they are selling contracts for products that do not exist—are selling approximately ten times more cotton in the New York Stock Exchange alone than is produced in the entire United States each year.

6. I charge they are using the farmers' money—the farmers' products—to an unlawful advantage and to the great detriment of the American producer and consumer.

7. I further contend that these evils should be abolished, and, further, that it is the duty of this Congress to do it.

It will be my purpose to give you a reason for the faith that is within me.

Some of the New York bankers associated with these concerns and other defenders of this nefarious business take the position that this wild-eyed gambling and speculation is a necessary evil in this: First, that people will gamble in any event; second, that it affords a useful market for the products.

In reply to the former, I am going to lay down the broad principle that gambling is never necessary; gambling never brings good results, but universally corrupts morals and brings home a direful effect. I am going to say, further, that this is the worst form of gambling; that it is the most far-reaching gambling, and that it is not confined to the participants or their immediate associates, but is of a far-reaching character, as for example: If "A" plays at dice, at cards, at faro, or any other game of chance, he demoralizes himself and denies his family his association, attention, and support. I am further going to say that he is a criminal in the eyes of the law; his crime is described on the statute books and other categories of crime; his property is subject to confiscation; he is subjected to fine and imprisonment, and the world all agrees that it is right. No one would repeal the statute if they could. No one could if they would. [Applause.]

"A" steps into one of the Wall street dens where agricultural products are gambled upon and trafficked in and buys a margin contract for future cotton at the rate of 10 cents per pound, the same to be delivered some time later, and pays \$1 per bale down to hold it. We will say he buys 1,000 bales and pays \$1,000 for the option. When he buys it he knows the bucket-shop dealer has no cotton to supply his contract. He knows that there is no such cotton in existence; he knows that the largest crop of cotton that was ever raised in the United States was thirteen and a half million bales; he knows they have sold through the exchange many times that amount, or any other reasonable and probable crop. Further, he well knows that he does not want any cotton for export; further, he does not want any cotton for use; further, never expects to see the cotton or have it delivered to him; would not know what to do with it if it was. Now, what does he buy it for? I believe I can tell you what he buys it for. He buys as a plain wager as to whether the price will go up or down. What does he do to accomplish the raise in price, so that his fictitious contract may become valuable to him? He at once joins in with other bucket-shop operators and they put out false and fraudulent reports as to the true output of cotton; further, put out false reports from the ginnings; further, put out false reports from foreign countries, and the farmer is induced to hold his crop, thinking he will get a higher price. Further, that while the farmer is holding his spot cotton the spinners will become anxious to buy their contracts for spots for the ensuing year.

The unsuspecting American producer thinks these false reports are genuine and are a good criterion to follow. Thinks he, "I will hold my crop; will wait for higher and better prices." The spinner thinks it is time for next year's supply; he finds there is little spot cotton on the market. Cotton goes up and is apparently scarce, and continues for a time to go up in price. The bucket-shop dealer, while the price is high, is hurriedly disposing of his cotton future contracts as fast as he can; some to the spinner and some to unsuspecting speculating buyers. Well knowing his selling price is speculative and unhealthy, he can reduce the price by false reports, so that he can buy the future contracts back for about half of amount sold for. The spinners are then supplied with contracts which they expect to be carried out. There is little call for the spot cotton. The false reports have spent their force, and then comes a reaction. Cotton goes down, down, down, until it has reached a price that the producer can hardly afford to raise it and pick it.

What does the bucket-shop dealer do? He lays in wait like a tiger for its prey, and the speculator, with his little or no means with which to pay the balance of his contract price, is forced to sell his equity or interest in his fictitious contract for what he can get. The farmers' taxes, mortgage, and interest come due, and he is forced to sell his cotton product for what he can get. He is not situated so he can hold his crop. What does the bucket-shop dealer do? He buys back from the lamb speculator for 6 cents a pound the future contract he had previously sold to him for 12 cents. He buys the spot or actual cotton from the farmer for 6 cents, and supplies the contracts that have reached the hands of the spinners at 12 cents. Here the farmer has sold for less than it cost to produce the cotton. Here the weak and unsuccessful speculator, or "lamb," as they are called in bucket-shop parlance, has lost his money. The spinner has paid higher prices than he should pay for the cotton; the bucket-shop gambler has made the money, and practically all of it.

Which of these classes have profited? Which have lost? The answer comes that "surely the farmer has not profited," for he has sold his cotton for less than it cost him to raise it, and has no product to sell and no money with which to buy again. The imprudent lamb has lost his money, and has performed a hard day's labor in the field of experience. The bucket-shop dealer has the money in his pocket, and he is safe and sound. The spinner has paid an exorbitant price, but has a chance to get out. How? we ask. How? Why, he can weave the cloth and add his profit on top of the swollen price he was forced to pay; the retailer can add to his profit on the price that he is forced to pay the spinner, and the poor consumer who wears the garment pays tribute to them all.

You may ask, "Why does not the farmer hold his crop?" Many of our American farmers are in debt. They have mortgages on their homes, many of them have mortgages on their teams and wagons, mortgages on their crops. Interest rates are high. They know not the facts and the bickerings and jugglings of the speculator. It is all confusing to their brain. They must sell their products or lose their homes under the mortgages; must sell or lose their teams; must sell or lose their cotton crops, with court costs and attorneys' fees along with it. Interest rates are high. The producer who earns slowly but honestly can not compete with the speculator on interest rates, for one earns honestly, but slowly, while one earns rapidly, but dishonestly. There is no alternative for them. It is, therefore, the duty of this Congress to help maintain an open, uniform, and healthy market.

The farmer is at great disadvantage when the prices are rising and falling almost with the tide. Their uniformity in change is not governed by the sun, the moon, or the revolutions of the earth. The sliding and gliding of prices come not with equal regularity, so honest calculations may be made, but without notice, without warning, and while the farmer is wholly unawares change with the will and wish of the future dealers who operate independent of the law of supply and demand, independent of right and wrong, independent of intrinsic value, and even wholly independent of the very existence of the actual commodity itself.

The producer and consumer alike are chained like Prometheus to this practice of future dealing, fictitious dealing, margin dealing, corner dealing, and bucket-shop dealing that divest them of an honest, healthy, and open market; divest them of the value of their products without advice, consultation, or a sigh.

Oh, but the bucket-shop advocate says this system furnishes them a boundless market. "They need a market as wide and boundless as the ocean," they will blandly remark. It is quite true; they do need a boundless market. But the difference of opinion is whether this fiction and gambling will afford it to them. Instead of affording a boundless market as

broad as the ocean, they are afforded a market the width of one street, and that during the recent disclosures of this panic is not a very popular street at that. It but serves to blind their eyes, shackle their feet in a network of unlawful practices behind closed, locked, and bolted doors, the number of members being at all times limited to 450 members.

Is such a proceeding as that conducive to the best interests of our American farmers that we have sworn to protect? Is such bickerings and juggling as that what it takes to afford the producer with an untrammelled, open, boundless, and honest market? Must we confess that such an evil as that is an inevitable condition that we must submit to and refuse to legislate upon? Is that good government for all and special privileges for none? Will that serve as a protection to the 40,000,000 people that are engaged in agriculture? Does that tend to promote and encourage the historic and noble art of agriculture? The answer comes from every farmers' union in all the land; the answer comes from most of the rulers of the leading countries of the world; the answer comes from most of the legislatures of the States where the fleecy staple grows; the answer comes from most of the governments of the world; the answer comes from the President of the United States of to-day in his recent message; the answer comes from the next President of the United States, W. J. Bryan—all answering in unison and accord: "No! No! No!" [Loud and prolonged applause.]

Some Wall street bankers who lend these concerns the reserve deposits that belong to the farmers of the South and West argue and stubbornly contend, in their 45-page brief full of subtle defenses of this nefarious business, that "future dealers" are just as honorable and that their transactions are just as honorable as the man who gives his note for \$100 to another. In each case, they blandly argue, is a contract to do something in the future.

Comparison is always fair. Comparison helps us arrive at true situations. Let us compare. In the note case we will say that Mr. A lends Mr. B \$100. Mr. B executes a promissory note, which is a signed promise to pay. The note also includes interest. This is a positive and an honorable transaction. There is no fiction here. There is no deception here. Here A has money that he does not need. Here B needs money that A has. B can use to his advantage by investment and necessary use, and can use it to an advantage that he can afford to pay interest on it. B uses the money and keeps it in circulation. A gets his interest and the return of his money. No fraud, no wrong; all a perfectly regular transaction, and one that is countenanced the world around. While in the cotton case the seller has no cotton and does not expect to get any cotton. The buyer knows the seller has no cotton to sell him and would not want it if he did have. He does not pay over the price of the cotton; he merely makes a payment on it of a dollar a bale to hold his contract and wagers that amount on the price going up or down as his judgment leads him. Neither has any cotton, neither uses any cotton. Usually dealing in a thing not in existence renders commerce and society no service whatever and an irreparable injury instead.

They contend that it is a practice that we must countenance, as there is no way to separate the wheat from the chaff. Let us see. Let us use another humble example:

A sells B 100 acres of land in Oklahoma for \$10 an acre. They draw up a contract similar, if not identical, with the cotton contract, save that one relates to land and the one to cotton. It develops later that A had no 100 acres of land in Oklahoma to sell. What is done? The answer comes quickly from every mouth from all corners of the land. A criminal! Guilty of fraud! Arrest him, indict him, prosecute him, convict him, send him to jail, and the whole world says it is right. It is right in this case, and the same doctrine should be applied to the men or set of men who inhabit these dens on Wall street in the greatest city in the United States and sell by their fraudulent and improvised contracts, approximately, 100,000,000 bales of cotton every year, when the greatest output of cotton ever produced in the United States in an entire year was 13,500,000 bales.

In the latter case the prosecution should be more vigorous than the first, for in addition to the fraud they perpetrate on the unsuspecting lamb dealer it is but infinitesimal to the wreck and ruin it deals to the whole agricultural and consuming world over the lamb speculator's shoulder.

Oh, but the bucket-shop dealer says it is not a parallel case. He says: "Yes, but in the cotton case the seller could go in the cotton belt and get the cotton, when in the land case he could not." To this doctrine I can not subscribe, for when they have contracted, approximately, ten times as much cotton as there is in existence in the United States, it is an utter im-

possibility to perform or procure, while in the land case the Oklahoma land is in existence, and I submit the chance to procure a thing that is in existence is more susceptible of procurement than that which is not in existence at all.

Certain bankers in New York have come to the rescue of these violators of the law, and have sought to defend them and their nefarious business, and have been sending briefs and circulars to Members of Congress in an attempt at justification. They contend that the bucket shops and gambling exchanges are a necessity to the cotton and grain business. If this be true, it seems to me that the actual cotton that grows in the Sunny Southland in all its purity and grandeur would seek them, or at least they in return would seek the cotton fields. This they have not done in the past, and from the constantly diminishing trade we could easily speculate that they would not do so in the future.

I submit some figures for your examination that I think will quite well show it. The three leading ports of the United States as cotton markets are:

1. Galveston—receipts, 1906-7, 3,891,695 bales; no cotton exchange.
2. Savannah—receipts, 1906-7, 1,668,633; no cotton exchange there.
3. New York—receipts, 1906-7, 23,108 bales; a cotton exchange there.

Now that we have seen how much cotton was actually received this last year, it might be interesting to know how much New York sold in future contracts last year. We are advised from reliable sources that during the last year on the New York Cotton Exchange alone they sold about 100,000,000 bales, this, if you please, being more than 4,000 times the actual amount sold. Stop and compare receipts of 23,108 and sales of a hundred million. Enormous! Startling! Almost inconceivable!

These figures do not stand alone for the last year, for the receipts for the years prior thereto may be easily run down. The New York Cotton Exchange has been on the decline for the past decade of years so far as actual receipts are concerned and on the incline so far as fiction and gambling are concerned. I desire to submit some figures that will quite well show it. These figures apply to New York:

	Bales actually received.
1901	205,897
1902	161,964
1903	57,577
1904	45,123
1905	33,798
1906	6,575
1907	23,108

Now, it must be interesting to observe that each year with precision has the real cotton diminished in receipts at the New York Cotton Exchange, while their volume of business on the future side has steadily accumulated. So we can but conclude that as the fictitious business prospers it is at the expense of the real business. These figures can but lead us to further believe that the future business and the actual cotton business do not walk hand in hand, are not a necessity, are not conducive to the best interests of the producer or the consumer, but are a menace instead. They certainly prove that the cotton does not seek this gigantic institution; its location conclusively shows that they are not in operation where the fleecy staple grows. We are constrained to believe that the farther apart the real product of the soil and this institution, known as a "cotton exchange" or "bucket shop," remain, the better for both and all concerned. For as the cotton exchange is permitted to keep itself remote from the real cotton, they are harder to detect and know of their fiction, oppression, and vice; while in the cotton case, the atmosphere and market is apt to be more pure where they have not polluted it with fiction and false reports of false and fraudulent sales. [Applause.]

It is not a benefit to the spinner, for it does not bring the cotton to his door through the bucket shop. The receipts conclusively prove that, as above given.

Nor to permit them to sell commodities that do not exist for prices where the consideration is not paid, nor is it expected to ever be paid. To permit them to report through the mails and over the wires this fiction is but to permit them to blind the eyes of the honest producer and permit them to loot the threadbare pocket of the consumer who wears the garment and uses the product. Surely this Congress will not longer permit it. [Applause.]

The figures, if we can rely on figures and they prove anything, they prove it a myth and a snare. They offer nothing to commend it and everything to condemn it. [Applause.]

Oh, but the friend of the bucket shop says: Why, the price of cotton is higher now than when the bucket shop was in its

infancy. This may be true, but of course there is no course of reasoning that can trace the credit of this to the gamblers in farm products. It is because cotton is more universally used. It now takes the place of the silkworm and the sheep. There was a time when it could only be used when woven with hemp, flax, wool, or silk. To-day, under the benign influence of modern science and invention, this useful product stands alone and is king. It has robbed the silkworm of his tedious task. It has robbed the historic shepherd of his usefulness. It is king of every clime. It is used in every home. [Loud applause. Prolonged applause.]

The recent panic, with its many ghastly disclosures, very vividly demonstrates to a marked degree who is even furnishing the money to carry on this business. When the Southern and Western banker called for his account in the local bank last fall, in the good year 1907, he learned that his money had gone East to the reserve banks, as it has been permitted to do under the very defective banking laws of the present. The reply came that he could not draw his account. The reserve banks would not, if you please, pay over the funds that had been intrusted to their institutions by the Western and Southern banks. Where was the money? The answer came faint, but clear. It was loaned to carry on the very business the American farmers are asking to have driven from our borders—the stock gamblers. Whose money was it? We can easily trace it. The local farmers and business men of the West and South had unsuspectingly deposited their money and little accounts with their local banks. The local banks in turn had forwarded to the Eastern banks. The Eastern banks in turn had loaned it to wild-eyed speculators with which to gamble on American products. I respectfully ask, Who furnished the products? The American farmer. I again repeat, Who furnished the money? The American farmer. The American farmer here furnishes all the paraphernalia for this New York gambling, but is not permitted to sit in the game. He is not, if you please, permitted to even make inquiry as to what is to be done with his money or with his product, but must believe the gamblers when they say, "It is inevitable, for men will speculate, men will gamble." Sir, will this Congress permit 40,000,000 American farmers to longer be looted, over-ridden, and abused? [Applause and voices of "No!"]

Who is here defending this nefarious business? Is it the American farmer? No! No! He is opposed to it. Is it the American consumer? No! No! He is opposed to it. It robs him. Is it the American banker? No; not all of them, but I regret to say, some of them, for I have within my possession a brief and a fierce attack against any attempt to legislate against them. This defense comes from a Wall street banker, seeking to ridicule and disgust Members with the idea of legislation to prevent it. Such a defense, though unsound, is dangerous to those who are not personally and vitally interested in the matter.

In reply to that defense, I would say, to my mind, it does not come in good grace from them. It does not come with a good odor, for it is but a few weeks ago when every bank in my entire State had to close its doors on account of over-speculation on reserve funds in the reserve banks of the city of New York. It is not my purpose to assault all the banks in New York, nor all in the street of Wall, which is getting to be a widely advertised place, and whose popularity does not always keep abreast with its advertisement; but it is my purpose to deal rebuke to any bank or set of banks who hope to share in such a vicious speculating scheme as the bucket shop or seek to defend its nefarious methods.

I have read their defense carefully, and they have nothing even bordering on a true or genuine defense. They offer such defenses as "Men will gamble, and there is no use to try to prevent it." Shame on such a theory! Shame on such an argument! Shame on such a principle! There is no place in the world where such a principle, where such a thought, can find lodgment in an honest breast or a thoughtful brain. It may be practiced by good men, but they wink at vice and forget virtue when they do it, and honest men will own it. [Applause.]

I would very much prefer to have their nefarious defense that is now cloaked in criticism, ridicule, and playing the rôle of a disinterested party bear a well-worded, careful, and painstaking apology to the Southern and Western bankers, to the Southern and Western depositors, and the whole panic-stricken Union, for that matter, that they so ruthlessly help retard, disgrace, overturn, and upset from their vicious and unworthy banking methods employed. I say they have bank failures and suicides to their credit now for their lax and irreconcilable methods. Their conscience must be whalebone! Their hearts must be stone! [Applause.]

In my own little home city in Oklahoma they have one banker suicide to their credit, one bank failure, and thousands of depositors who lost their all. This is but a pitiful example of the thousands that exist. This, I say, is but one of the many!

Where do we find them now? Do we find them in the attitude of the meek and lowly, sorrowful and careworn from their vice? No, indeed; we find them arrogantly presenting briefs to the Sixtieth Congress to kill all classes of legislation that tend to harm a hair in the head of the bucket shops and stock exchanges.

These bankers give their address as 16-18 Wall street, New York. In their 45-page brief they blandly reply that every contract is made and every contract for futures is made in strict accord with the rules of the exchange! Pray tell. How many farmers know this rule? How many farmers helped make these rules that are to govern their future destiny? The answer comes! None of them! None of them! It leads us to believe their operations are carried on with much greater success where we know them not! [Applause.]

This firm of legal lights, who call themselves "bankers" and give their address as 16 and 18 Wall street, say in substance: "Why, it would be to the utter ruin to let the spinner and the producer deal direct." "Their interests are directly antagonistic to each other," they blandly contend. "One, you see, is the buyer; he wants to buy as cheaply as possible," "while the producer is the seller, and he wants to sell as high as possible." Think of this logic! Think of the anxiety these bankers have for the producers! Their anxiety must be so acute that it brings about insomnia. [Applause.]

As to the status of the buyer and the seller and their respective interest with reference to the price, we must all subscribe to the fact that their interests are opposed to each other in that regard. But it is an open, an apparent interest that accompanies every business transaction known to the business world.

Now, pause for a moment and think of this logic! How terrible that would be. Now, I want to urge this Congress to think of what a deplorable condition that would be to put the real producer in if, perchance, he was ever permitted to sell to the real spinner himself instead of letting a dozen middlemen who have bought, sold, and juggled with the product, and everyone made a profit before it reaches the true market, which is the spinner. It is to be remembered of them—that paternal, knightly, and good Samaritan spirit of the New York banking institution, in their 45-page brief, elegantly bound and very tastefully gotten up, full of deception, full of ridicule, full of snares, and full of pitfalls, aimed at those who have not a deep interest and who are not willing to study the philosophy they call into vogue. It is amusing and interesting to know of the keen sensibilities they possess for the producer. [Applause.]

It is interesting to know how they have picked out the pitfalls (such as the one above mentioned) for the farmer. They must certainly feel the farmer owes them a deep debt of gratitude, and think they are to be applauded and commended for their ever vigilance and watchfulness over the interest of the American toiler, the American producer, and the American consumer! That same self-sacrificing Samaritan spirit was made manifest in the recent panic; it had been visible prior to that; it was not only visible then, but was a howling reality! [Applause.]

No; it is all wrong. It has not a peg on which to stand. It is a vicious practice of speculating that this Commonwealth not only does not need but it is very desirous of getting rid of. It needs legislation to wipe it off. It needs hasty legislation to do it. There are a number of bills here on the subject. I have introduced H. R. 11785 on the subject. It may not be the best. It may be the poorest. I care not whether it be the best or the worst. It deals with legislation that is all-important and it is your duty to act and consider it. Amend the bill if there be defect. Draw one yourself that will stand the test. What the 40,000,000 American farmers want is legislation to cure the evils. No matter whose bill you pass, or from which side of the House; in either event it shall have my loyal support. It is relief the farmers want. [Applause.]

My bill first denies them the use of the mails; second, the uses of the telegraph, the telephone, and every other hasty method of transmission of intelligence, thinking this would rout them out of their den in New York and make them seek the fields of cotton in the Southern districts, where the local legislatures could handle them from time to time as their wants needed administering to. It further subjects those who deal either as proprietors or patrons to a fine and imprisonment for bucket-shop wagering and speculating in future transactions, unless the vender is possessed of the article or has the apparent ability to deliver the same. This would deny them the benefit of hasty communication to their lieutenants in the field and would retard

their vicious practices, and in my judgment would put them out of business. I say, put them in stripes for these wrongs! Stamp them out root and branch! And the American farmers and producers will see her first proud day.

Let the farmer have an open market, where all can read and all can know. Let the farmer have a chance. His lot is not the brightest in all the land. Let that ever-faithful wife and children of tender years, when they crawl on their hands and knees from gray daylight till close of day gathering the fleecy staple, believe and know that they are gathering nature's most useful crop for an honest and open market. Let them feel a true and honest pride in procuring and being made secure in a fair price, and let it serve as a solace to tired constitutions, but ever-rested souls, that this Congress has yet a heart that throbs, yet an ear that hears, and is willing to give them heed. [Loud applause.]

Let us not permit the bucket shops and dens of gamblers in farm products to longer curb, throttle, checkmate, divert, debauch, and destroy this noble and historic art. Let us not permit them to discourage, hamper, and burden the 40,000,000 of American citizens who are engaged in agricultural pursuits, living and residing on 6,000,000 cultivated farms. Let us not permit further exploitation of that class that produce more every year than they themselves consume. It is wrong in principle. It is wrong in morals. It is the burning duty of this Congress to make it wrong and criminal in law as well. [Applause.]

If you legislate for them as you ought to do, it will not retard the growth of the historic cotton plant in the springtime. It will not make the cotton bloom in midsummer with any less splendor; it will not increase the appetite of the ever-vigilant boll weevil; it will not cause its bolls holding the valued product to open with less speed or less certainty; it will not make the task more difficult of gathering; it will not increase the expense of hauling to market or of ginning. The fleecy staple will yield and grow and produce as of yore. [Applause.] To refuse to legislate against this evil will not make the wheat of the North and West greener in winter and spring, will not make it more golden at harvest time; it will not retard the binder or the sickle; it will not make the showers less plentiful in summer; it will not make the sun-kissed petals produce less than of yore. But if Congress will act, nature will continue to do her annual task and do it well. Agriculture will progress and improve. The ever faithful American farmer will start with new zeal and new energy and agriculture will take a new lease on life. [Applause.]

The farmers of America believe the bucket shops should go. They feel there is no place in this country for them. They feel they are plain, everyday gamblers. They think that their crimes should be described in the category of crime the same as the man that conducts the Louisiana lottery or the game of chance. They think it corrupts the morals of this Commonwealth. They neither produce nor consume. They neither furnish pleasure nor value, but, on the contrary, deal vice and disaster throughout the land. They reap where they have not sown. They deal where and when they have not with which to deal. They control prices, raising and lowering them at will. They deal independent of the producer and irrespective of their rights. I ask the American Congress if this is inevitable? Is this necessary? Surely this Congress can not longer be misled. Surely they will not longer refuse to act. [Applause.]

You have the right to look into the books of the corporations and know their wrongs. You have the right to know their vices and their methods. Surely, when corporations, creatures of law, are subjected to regulation and control, surely enough should this class of citizens which operate in the absence of law, in the face of the law, and because there is no law be dealt with speedily and effectually.

I am one citizen that believes the people should have an in-ning. I am one citizen that believes that the time is at hand when the people should have the opportunity of good laws to protect their own; should have a Congress that represents the wish of the people, and when the wishes of the people are proven wrong, let them repeal the laws.

These gamblers and garblers of prices wield a two-edged sword that smites both consumer and producer at the same stroke. How can the farmer know when to sell? How can he know when to buy? He has not their figures. He knows not of their machinations and vice. He knows not of their fictitious deals. He knows not whether the market be healthy or unhealthy, and there is no law to enable him to find out, or protection afforded. Can such a fictitious market benefit the farmer? Can this benefit the consumer? Can this purify the morals of the land? No; it is all wrong. There is no dividing line. There is no reason why the bucket shop should not be viewed in the proper light, to wit, that of the everyday gambler and of the most injurious character.

No; this is an era when men should deal honestly, when men should deal fairly and squarely, when the products of the soil should be handled in a careful and painstaking way.

The farmer knows not of the "bills" and "bears." They do not want to know them. They do not want to know of or concerning them. It has been humorously but truthfully said that our Oklahoma farmers do not care to know of any bulls but "Durham bulls" nor any bears but the ones in the zoological gardens in safe captivity. I take it this rule is quite universal and applies to the American producers generally. [Loud applause and laughter.]

The products of the soil should be a sacred matter. They should not be longer subjected to this orgy of speculation by a failure on the part of this Congress to act. This Congress has authority to act—has authority to go into this matter in detail. This Congress has men on both sides of the House who have introduced bills on the subject.

This is not a partisan question. This is not one that Republicans should be against because the Democrats are for. This is not a bill that will unsettle conditions that now exist. This is not a measure that will wound the feelings of any, save a few gamblers who are making their living by irregularity and speculation. It is a measure the farmers are pleading for, a measure the consumers all need and many of them are asking for, a measure that is to-day being opposed chiefly by New York reserve banks who are interested in the transactions and the bucket-shop people themselves, who are annually robbing the farmers out of millions of dollars, not by honest business methods, but by fraud, vice, stealth, and irregular transactions.

It is not my disposition to threaten this Congress, for you would not heed me if I did; but I am going to make a modest prophecy that I think will come true. This prophecy is made, of course, only on the theory that you fail to act. I am going to say that I think you will find 40,000,000 farmers anxious to know why this bill was not passed. They are going to be so inquisitive and so unkind as to ask why a Republican House, why a Republican Senate, why a Republican President that is eminently qualified to do all things at all times; why, when every committee was loaded down with Republican members—there being on an average twice as many Republicans on every committee as there are Democrats—refused to stop this gambling in high places by passing a bill that will forever put them out of business and cause them to pursue honest industry as other citizens do. You can not lay it onto the Democrats, for they could not stop you if you wanted to pass it. And, fortunately for us, there are not many Democrats that I know of trying to stop it. The truth is, most of them have been working ever since they came here to get this bill through for the relief of the farmers.

You may defeat this legislation that the farmer is asking for; you may let this gambling in farm products run on and on; you may go home and tell the farmers you were in favor of the bills, but could not get them out of the committee. You may fool them again on this matter. It is not my prophecy to say you can not, for, as experience is our blessed teacher, you have been doing it for twelve long years. But even if you can fool them again, even if you could get all of their votes again under misapprehension, you would still feel and know down in your heart, which is often more honest than your vote, that you had rendered them a sting when you had sworn to protect. You should not do it. I hope you will not do it. [Loud applause.] I desire to submit the views of some citizens and some farmers' union organizations—some from my district, some from the nation, and any of them entitled to consideration equal to the gamblers who are flooding this Congress with briefs, arguments, and subtle defenses of this future, corner, margin dealing business.

W. J. BRYAN'S INDORSEMENT.

On Monday, June 18, 1894, in the Fifty-third Congress, second session, in an able speech on the question of "bucket shops, options, futures, corners, and gamblings upon agricultural products," while a member of that body, W. J. Bryan, among many other things, said:

When the farmer has taken the chances of rain and drought; when he has taken the chances which must come to the farmer as they scarcely come to anybody else; when he has escaped the grasshopper and the chinch bug and the rain and the hail and the dry winds, I insist that he shall not then be left to the mercy of a gang of speculators, who, for their own gain, will take out of him as much of the remainder as they can possibly get.

S. H. Greely, a Chicago commission merchant, admits, and the digest of his testimony is that the law of supply and demand no longer control prices of farm products, which are regulated by four distinct systems—bucket shops, railroads, warehouses, and future speculation. Mr. Greely estimates that from 75 to 90 per cent of the business done on the stock exchanges is

fictitious, and that the success of the bucket shops is depressing to prices and markets.

Hon. Joseph Brigham, who was Assistant Secretary of Agriculture during the first session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, testified before an investigating committee that gambling in farm products on the exchanges tends to injure the farmer.

Franklin Dye, secretary of the State board of agriculture of New Jersey, was of the opinion that gambling in farm products was detrimental to both consumer and producer alike.

Michael P. Moran, president of the National Grain Growers' Association, advocated the total abolition of gambling in futures, holding the bucket shop to be a destroyer of values.

BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA., INDORSEMENT.

DOXEY, BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA.,
February 19, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill and want it to pass.
(Signed by 12 farmers.)

JACKSON COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

MARTHA, JACKSON COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 16, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned, are very anxious to have the "bucket-shop" business abolished. We believe it an injustice to the farmer.
(Signed by 20 farmers.)

JACKSON COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

ELDORADO, JACKSON COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 20, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

I indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill now pending before Congress.
J. M. BAKER,
President of Eldorado Local.

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

WANETTE, POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 10, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned, do heartily indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill and want it to become a law.
(Signed by 30 farmers.)

CLEVELAND COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

LEXINGTON, CLEVELAND COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 17, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We indorse everything that you have done and are trying to do, especially in passing the "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785. The bill will stop gambling in farm products.
(Signed by 19 citizens of Lexington, Okla.)

GREER COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

SANDY, GREER COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 16, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned citizens of Greer County, Okla., heartily indorse your "antibucket-shop bill," No. 11785. We ask all who are interested in the welfare of the "common people" to assist you in its passage.
(Signed by 35 farmers.)

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

GRIFFIN UNION, No. 314,
Trosdale, Okla., March 15, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned members of this local, do petition the House of Representatives, now in session in Washington, D. C., that they support House bill No. 11785.
(Signed by 21 members of local.)

CLEVELAND COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

CANADIAN TOWNSHIP, CLEVELAND COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 17, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

We, the undersigned legal voters of Canadian Township, Cleveland County, Okla., do indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785.
(Signed by 17 voters.)

CLEVELAND COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

NORMAN, CLEVELAND COUNTY, OKLA.,
February 14, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We want all gambling on farm products abolished by law. We heartily indorse your bill on gambling in futures.
Signed by M. B. Fulkerson, president Cleveland County Farmers' Union, and 9 other members of the local union.

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

TEMPLE HILL LOCAL UNION, No. 315,
Pottawatomie County, Okla., March 16, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

We, the undersigned members of the F. E. and C. U. of A. of Pottawatomie County, Okla., do heartily indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785.
(Signed by 15 members of local.)

KIOWA COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

FARMERS' INSTITUTE OF KIOWA COUNTY,
Snyder, Okla., January 16, 1908.

To the Committee on Agriculture:

We, the Farmers' Institute of Kiowa County, Okla., do hereby approve and indorse the principle and purpose of House bill 11785.

W. J. CAUDILL, President.
W. J. MCCOLLOM, Secretary.

WASHITA COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

FARMERS' UNION OF KORN, WASHITA COUNTY, OKLA.,
RED TOP LODGE, No. 605,
Korn, Okla., February 16, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

My order instructed me to express our gratitude to you for the stand that you have taken on bill 11785, now pending in the House. We indorse the bill and want it to become a law.

JOHN ESTES, Secretary-Treasurer.

KIOWA COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

LONE WOLF, OKLA., February 16, 1908.

We, the undersigned citizens and landowners of Kiowa County, Okla., do heartily indorse House bill No. 11785, introduced in Congress by Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, and want to see the bill pass. We think it for the best interests of the people.

(Sixty signers of Kiowa County.)

STEPHENS COUNTY, OKLA.

PARKS, OKLA., March 15, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

We indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill 11785 and wish to see it pass.
(Signed by 30 farmers.)

BECKHAM COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

ERICK, BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA.,
February 11, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned, heartily indorse your bill to prevent gambling in cotton, grain, and other farm products.
(Signed by 20 farmers.)

[Farmers' Union indorsements.]

GREER COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

LOONEY, GREER COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 19, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the Farmers' Union of Liberty Local, No. 812, do by a unanimous vote adopt the following resolution:

That the Congress of the United States do pass and cause to become a law House bill 11785, so that we can put our produce on the market without being molested and robbed by a lot of gamblers and speculators.

A. C. BOYETT,
President Greer County Farmers' Union.
W. L. OSBAN,
Secretary.

CLEVELAND COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

LITTLE RIVER LOCAL, No. 462,
Cleveland County, Okla., February 4, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

Little River Local, No. 462, of the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, has instructed me as its secretary-treasurer to write to you that our local heartily indorses House bill 11785, so vital to the interests of the farmers.

JAS. A. DUNBAR, Secretary-Treasurer.

TILLMAN COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

TILLMAN COUNTY, OKLA.,
March 20, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

We, the Farmers' Union of Tillman County, Okla., met in our annual county meeting March 19, 1908, and passed resolutions indorsing your "antibucket-shop" bill.

J. L. GIVENS, Secretary.

GRADY COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

GRADY COUNTY, OKLA.,
January 23, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

The Farmers' Union of Grady County, in session at Rush Springs, Okla., met on January 17, 1908, and passed resolutions indorsing your bill (H. R. 11785) to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures.

E. I. WILLIAMS, Secretary.

GREER COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

LONE STAR LOCAL, No. 325,
Kelly, Okla., February 20, 1908.

To Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington D. C.:

The Farmers' Union of Lone Star Local, No. 325, of Greer County, Okla., passed resolutions indorsing your bill to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures, and instructed me to write you that we as a body of 75 members indorse said bill.

F. M. LOCKE, Secretary.

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

ASHER, OKLA., February 16, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

Avoca Union, No. 571, requested me to write you that we agree with you in every particular and that we extend to you our sincere thanks for the interest you have taken in behalf of the producers of all wealth, and that we indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill.

JOHN H. HOOVER,
Member Avoca Union, No. 571.

UNION LABOR AND RAILWAY UNIONS' INDORSEMENT.

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Guthrie, Okla., March 26, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SIR: We, the joint legislative board of the State of Oklahoma, now assembled at the State capital, Guthrie, Okla., composed of the farmers, American Federation of Labor, and railway unions, do hereby make the following request:

Whereas we do heartily indorse the "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, now pending in the House of Congress, and further request that you use your influence in its passage.

Respectfully submitted.

JACKSON COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

Frazier Local Union, No. 86, Jackson County, Okla., pass resolutions indorsing House bill No. 11785:

ALTUS, OKLA., March 22, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

All the members of Frazier Local Union, No. 86, indorse your "antibucket-shop" bill and want it passed.

W. H. XANDER, Secretary.

JACKSON COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

Farmers' Union, No. 384, Jackson County, Okla., indorse bill 11785:

ELDORADO, OKLA., March 24, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Your "antibucket-shop" bill was presented to our Local Union, No. 384, and it was unanimously indorsed. We hope you will succeed in getting your bill passed.

J. A. DICKERSON.

CLEVELAND COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

Member of Cleveland County, Okla., F. E. and C. U. of A. indorse House bill 11785:

NOBLE, OKLA., March 18, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

We the undersigned heartily indorse your efforts to suppress gambling in farm products. We urge the passage of your "antibucket-shop" bill 11785.

(Signed by 24 members of the Farmers' Union.)

Resolution adopted by Victory Local Union, No. 738, F. E. and C. U. of A.:

MARCH 14, 1908.

Be it resolved by this union, That we favor the "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, offered by Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, of Oklahoma. We urge the United States Congress to act favorably on the bill.

I. M. BYRD,
J. B. KETCHERSID,
J. P. HENSLEY,
Resolution Committee.

M'CLAIN COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

Resolutions from Washington Local, No. 392, F. E. and C. U. of A., McClain County, Okla.:

WASHINGTON, OKLA., March 31, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS:

Your "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, was read and discussed in our union and unanimously indorsed. We sincerely urge that Congress pass the bill.

W. W. YODER, Secretary.

ROGER MILLS COUNTY INDORSEMENT.

Willow Springs Local, No. 350, Roger Mills County, Okla., pass resolutions indorsing the bill No. 11785:

BERLIN, OKLA., March 21, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS has introduced in Congress a bill known as the "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785: Therefore, be it

Resolved by Willow Springs Local Union, No. 350, F. E. and C. U. of A., That we urge Congress to pass said bill to prohibit gambling in farm products.

A. M. UNDERWOOD,
Secretary-Treasurer.

INDORSEMENTS FROM BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA.

MAYFIELD, OKLA., March 21, 1908.

To the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.:

We, the undersigned voters of Beckham County, Okla., respectfully and earnestly ask your votes in the interest of the "antibucket-shop" bill, known as "House bill No. 11785," introduced by Congressman FERRIS, of Oklahoma.

(Signed by 15 farmers.)

INDORSEMENTS FROM WASHITA COUNTY, OKLA.

FARMERS' LOCAL UNION, No. 136,
CORDELL, OKLA., March 25, 1908.

To the United States Congress:

Whereas there is now pending for the action of Congress a bill known as "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785: Be it

Resolved, That we give such Congressmen as give the bill their support our hearty cooperation, and Hon. SCOTT FERRIS especially.

Be it further resolved, That we ask our friends in Congress to notify us of those who oppose the bill that we may mark them for future elections.

W. B. DRUCE,
R. R. NANCE,
JESSE STOVALL,
Committee.

(Also signed by 14 other farmers.)

INDORSEMENTS FROM BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA.

ERICK, OKLA., March 26, 1908.

We, the members of North Star Union, No. 250, do petition and pray that Congress pass an "antibucket-shop" bill to put a stop to gambling in farm products.

(Signed by 20 farmers.)

INDORSEMENTS FROM GRADY COUNTY, OKLA.

COLBERT LOCAL, No. 76, F. E. and C. U. of A.,
Bradley, Okla., March 30, 1908.

We, the members of Colbert Local, do indorse, commend, and approve the bill known as "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, introduced by the Hon. SCOTT FERRIS in the House of Representatives. We therefore urge the passage of the bill at this session of Congress, as we believe it is one of the crying needs of working humanity.

W. E. SPENCER, President.
N. E. HEYING, Secretary.

INDORSEMENTS FROM M'CLAIN COUNTY, OKLA.

DIBBLE, OKLA., March 28, 1908.

We, the members of McClain County Local, No. 391, F. E. and C. U. of A., do indorse and recommend "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785. We think gambling in farm products is against the interest of the farming class.

JERRY RAMSEY, President.
L. H. DAVIS, Secretary.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS,
Washington, D. C.

The Murray County Farmers' Union indorses "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785.

SULPHUR, OKLA., March 28, 1908.

Be it resolved by the Murray County Union in regular session assembled, That we do hereby indorse the efforts of Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, our Representative in Congress, in his efforts to stop gambling in futures in farm products, and we ask all our Representatives and Senators to assist him in every honorable way, to the end that his bill introduced for this purpose may pass and become a law.

Unanimously adopted this 28th day of March, 1908.
BIRT RUCKER,
County Secretary Farmers' Union of Murray County, Okla.

INDORSEMENTS FROM POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY, OKLA.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Your "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, was read before our local, and we unanimously indorse and heartily recommend the passage of said bill. We realize that the worst enemy the farmer has is the parasite who gambles in farm products. We feel that in you we have a representative of the working people of Oklahoma.

W. T. OTIS,
Secretary-Treasurer Cloverdale Local Union, No. 400.
TROUSDALE, OKLA., March 30, 1908. R. F. D. No. 2.

INDORSEMENT FROM STEPHENS COUNTY FARMERS' UNION.

MARLOW, OKLA., March 25, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: We as a lodge hope your "antibucket-shop" bill, No. 11785, will pass.

JOHN MARLER, President.
W. D. CARUTHERS,
Secretary-Treasurer Local No. 1451.

FARMERS' UNION LOCAL IN JACKSON COUNTY, OKLA.

WILMOTH, OKLA., March 19, 1908.

To the House of Representatives of the United States,
Washington, D. C.:

We, the members of Farmers' Union Local, No. 588, unanimously favor the "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785, presented by Hon. SCOTT FERRIS.

C. L. FORD, President.
W. G. BURNS, Secretary.

PRAIRIE VIEW LOCAL UNION, BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLA.

DOXEY, OKLA., March 31, 1908.

To the Congress of the United States:

Prairie View Union in session begs to submit the following resolutions: That we do hereby indorse "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785. We ask for the passage of the bill.

J. E. HOHENSHELT, President.
C. S. STOKESBERRY, Secretary.

FARMERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 1215, M'CLAIN COUNTY, OKLA.

PURCELL, OKLA., March 31, 1908.

Be it resolved by the Johnson Local No. 1215 of the F. E. and C. U. of A., in convention assembled at Johnson, McClain County, Okla., March 31, 1908, That we indorse and recommend the passage of H. R. No. 11785 entitled "A bill to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures, and providing penalties for the violation thereof," introduced January 6, 1906, by our Representative, Hon. SCOTT FERRIS.

R. E. SINGLETON, Vice-President.
J. E. MADDEN, Secretary.

COOPER LOCAL UNION, NO. 183, POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY, OKLA.

ASHER, OKLA., March 22, 1908.

Hon. SCOTT FERRIS, Washington, D. C.:

The Cooper Local Union, No. 183, F. E. and C. U. of A., in convention assembled, heartily indorses your "antibucket-shop" bill No. 11785.

F. T. LASTER, Secretary.

William A. Graham, president of the North Carolina Farmers' Alliance, had no doubt that dealing in futures has much to do with the low prices of farm products and believed that the Government ought to treat such dealing as it did the lottery.

A. J. Wedderburn, corresponding secretary of the National Pure Food and Drug Congress, and Master of the State Grange of Virginia, believed that the effect of dealing in options and futures is absolutely ruinous. If a man has a right to sell something he does not own and never expects to have, in competition with the actual commodity and at a lower price, it is bound to bring the price down. The selling of many times as much wheat as is raised for delivery for future dates, makes it necessary for the men who have to deliver the wheat to work to keep the price down.

Hon. O. B. Stevens, commissioner of agriculture of the State of Georgia, declared that grain and cotton gambling had been very harmful to the farmers of the South and to industry in general. He believed that if all gambling in futures could be suppressed the price of commodities would advance and the farmers would be in much better condition.

J. Pope Brown, president of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, was of the opinion that dealing in options and futures has a tendency to demoralize the prices of cotton, and on the whole to depress them. Forty, fifty, or a hundred times as much cotton is sold in a week on the exchanges as is raised in a year, and this apparent greater supply naturally reduces the price.

In 1893, President Cleveland, in his inaugural address at Washington, spoke in the strongest language against trade conspiracies which, he said, "Were unnatural and opposed to all American sense of fairness."

In 1894, the German Emperor announced, in his speech from the throne, the introduction of two Government measures "in connection with the gambling 'future' systems and agricultural depression, in order to protect the trading and industrial community."

In 1904, King Edward VII, in his speech from the throne, specially dwelt upon the distress of the "Lancashire cotton crisis" of that year.

In 1905, Her Majesty Queen Alexandria, by example as well as precept, nobly showed her deep and active sympathy in relation to certain internal social problems in Great Britain.

President Roosevelt, during the whole period of his Presidency, has never ceased attacking the various financial and trading frauds in the United States and other scandals caused thereby.

PRAYER OFFERED BY THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER ON AUGUST 13 AND 20, 1905.

Almighty God, who art always more ready to hear than we to pray, and art want to give more than either we desire or deserve, we humbly beseech Thee to hear our prayer that Thou wouldst guide at this time the minds of those who, as leaders of the employers and of the employed, are in Thy providence charged with the issue now at stake in the cotton industry. Grant unto them both an earnest desire for conciliation, and wisdom in devising means thereto. Avert, if it be Thy will, the calamities which we fear, and give peace and prosperity in our homes. We pray Thee, Heavenly Father, to teach us also to make a right use of all that Thou sendest, of all times of tribulation, and of all times of our wealth. May we acknowledge Thee in all things, and ever seek Thy glory and the advancement of Thy Kingdom, through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.

Mr. FERRIS. I now yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ANSBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I desire at this time to say a word with reference to the Sulloway widows' pension bill, which recently passed this House, and later on, with some amendments, passed the Senate. The amendments, of course, made it necessary that conferees be appointed, and they accordingly were appointed on the part of the House and the Senate. As I understand, from underground sources, the committee are deadlocked on the proposition as to what shall be the date permissible for widows of soldiers to come under the provisions of the act. In the brief time allowed me I think I

can best serve the purpose that it is my desire to promote by reading an article recently printed in the National Tribune, of this city, which paper is the recognized organ of the old soldiers of the country, which is as follows:

AN OPEN LETTER.

To the Senators and Representatives.

GENTLEMEN: A fortnight ago the country was delighted at the speedy prospect of the passage of the widows' pension bill by both Houses of Congress. Certainly the reception which the country gave this intelligence is sufficient demonstration to you of the wisdom and justice of that act and the immensity of the good that it would accomplish.

Undoubtedly each of you has heard extensively from his State and district as to the number of most worthy women, who are held in esteem by the people of their respective localities, who will be benefited by this act. It was received everywhere with as much general approval as the passage of the McCumber Act a year ago, and is regarded as a legitimate and proper extension of the benefits of that act to the widows of the veterans. In every community in the country the widows of veterans are as near the heart of the people as the veterans themselves. As much honor and credit as was due the veterans for going to the front in the nation's days of peril are felt to be also due to the noble women who shared their lives with them and gave a wife's unpurchasable devotion and care to the veterans in their mournful passage toward the tomb. The people are as insistent that these women be properly treated by the Government as they are that the veterans themselves shall be so treated. In all its history the National Tribune has never seen a more popular piece of pension legislation than the widows' pension bill.

Now there is understood to be an inexplicable hitch which threatens the final enactment of that law, and the people of the country are nervous lest it should not be approved at this session. Like the McCumber bill, the widows' pension bill is imperative in its demand for speedy action. The beneficiaries are generally aged women, who are incapacitated by their many years and attendant disabilities from earning a livelihood; they are nearly all in dire need of such assistance as the bill proposes, and it will give them a sum which will secure their old age and decrepitude from the cruel gnawings of want. While a broken-down veteran, unable to earn his livelihood, is an object that arouses our most sincere compassion, his feeble widow is equally deserving of our pity and help. She has given all her life to him, as he gave his to the country, and the debt of the nation is as great to her as to him.

Whatever is to be given should be given at once. The years of all these widows are numbered, and most of them will not enjoy their pensions long. They can not, in the very nature of things, and it is nothing short of cruelty to withhold from them, for even a short time, that which both Houses have unanimously agreed should be given.

The cost of the bill is but a trifle in comparison with the services which the husbands of these widows rendered the country, and the disbursement of the money under it will be of the highest benefit to the country at this time. The greatest public need at present is for additional currency in circulation, and there is no speedier or more equitable way of securing this than through the payment of pensions. Money given in pensions goes to every crossroads and hamlet in the country, and at once becomes part of the life blood of business in the remotest sections. This has been so thoroughly demonstrated that it is useless for us to argue further upon the subject.

Gentlemen, we appeal to you by considerations which should be the most powerful in moving men. We ask you in the name of the tens of thousands of broken and aged widows in this country to allow no factious disagreements, no obstinate quibbling over details, no Congressional jealousies, to prevent your coming together upon this most meritorious and just bill. You are being watched with sickening anxiety by most deserving women all over the country, whose sole hope of support during the last few years of their lives is in the passage of this bill. Every day that you delay agreeing upon it brings ineffable sadness to their hearts and shrouds them with the gloomy clouds of despair.

We beg of you with the utmost earnestness to complete your work next week by the passage of the bill which will carry joy to tens of thousands of bereaved women sitting by their desolate and fireless hearthstones.

Yours, in anxious hope,

THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE.

I hope that the fears expressed in this editorial are groundless and that the House and the Senate conferees will come together and that this bill will be passed. If it fails, it will add a dark and gloomy chapter to this country's pension laws.

RECESS.

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 5 o'clock having arrived, under the order of the House, the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union will stand in recess until Monday morning at 11.30 a. m.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several Calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. OLCOTT, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 16977) for free lectures, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1424), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 12898) to change the proceedings for admission to the Government Hospital for the Insane, and for

other purposes, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1425), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, private bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the Committee of the Whole House, as follows:

Mr. MILLER, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 7048) for the relief of Henry A. Tolbert, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1422), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 18487) for the relief of Charles H. Dunning, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1423), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. SMITH of Michigan: A bill (H. R. 20653) to amend an act of Congress entitled "An act for the widening of Bladensburg road, and for other purposes," approved January 9, 1907—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. COUSINS: A bill (H. R. 20654) to provide for the purchase of a site and the erection of a public building thereon at Tipton, in the State of Iowa—to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. BYRD: A bill (H. R. 20655) to prohibit dealing in future contracts on agricultural products by forbidding the use of mail, interstate-commerce, and bank facilities to dealers—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. CRAVENS: A bill (H. R. 20656) appropriating \$3,500 and providing for the laying of sidewalks and the placing of curb and gutters around certain portions of the national cemetery in the city of Fort Smith, Ark.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. JONES of Virginia: A bill (H. R. 20657) to amend an act entitled "An act to establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia"—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. HAUGEN: A bill (H. R. 20658) authorizing the issue of equipment of arms, ammunition, and such accouterment as accompany same, for target practice, to the Memorial University, Mason City, Iowa—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANSBERRY: A bill (H. R. 20659) granting an increase of pension to John Stickle—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BURTON of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 20660) granting an increase of pension to Charles A. Keller—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CHANEY: A bill (H. R. 20661) for the relief of James L. East—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. FULLER: A bill (H. R. 20662) granting an increase of pension to G. W. Horton—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FULTON: A bill (H. R. 20663) granting a pension to Arthur B. Cray—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRANGER: A bill (H. R. 20664) granting a pension to Octavus Wood—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HALE: A bill (H. R. 20665) granting an increase of pension to William G. Selvidge—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20666) granting a pension to Thomas Baker—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20667) for the relief of the estate of Noah C. Wenger—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. HAUGEN: A bill (H. R. 20668) granting an increase of pension to David A. Garlock—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HEPBURN: A bill (H. R. 20669) granting an increase of pension to George W. Page—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HULL of Tennessee: A bill (H. R. 20670) for the relief of the estate of Ed. B. Drake, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20671) for the relief of George W. Waters—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. LANGLEY: A bill (H. R. 20672) to correct the military record of William Linden—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. LAW: A bill (H. R. 20673) granting a pension to William Macbeth—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LILLEY: A bill (H. R. 20674) granting an increase of pension to John H. Weeks—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LINDSAY: A bill (H. R. 20675) granting a pension to Adolph Weil—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LOUDENSLAGER: A bill (H. R. 20676) granting an increase of pension to Edward D. Mattson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. McLACHLAN of California: A bill (H. R. 20677) granting an increase of pension to William B. Bird—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20678) granting an increase of pension to William H. Munroe—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20679) granting an increase of pension to John O'Bryan—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20680) granting an increase of pension to James P. Garlin—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20681) granting an increase of pension to William Wiley—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20682) granting an increase of pension to Charles Truax—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20683) granting an increase of pension to John H. Folks—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20684) granting an increase of pension to Michael J. Maw—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20685) granting an increase of pension to William A. Cannon—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20686) granting a pension to Benjamin L. Gorsuch—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MUDD: A bill (H. R. 20687) for the relief of the legal representatives of Walter A. Haislip—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. REID: A bill (H. R. 20688) granting an increase of pension to Amanda C. Bayliss—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20689) for the relief of the legal representatives of Catherine Carter—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. RICHARDSON: A bill (H. R. 20690) for the relief of Mary J. Bailey—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SIMS: A bill (H. R. 20691) for the relief of Eli T. McGill—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20692) granting a pension to Frank M. Wells—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20693) granting a pension to Sebe N. Scott—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20694) for the relief of John C. Mitchle—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. BEALL of Texas: A bill (H. R. 20695) granting an increase of pension to Zelica Rich—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 20696) to refund to Jesse H. Smith, of Ellis County, Tex., the sum of \$449.51—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. DAWSON: A bill (H. R. 20697) granting an increase of pension to John A. Rowan—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HALE: A bill (H. R. 20698) for the relief of the legal representatives of Jacob G. Carmichael, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ALLEN: Petition of John F. Hill Grange, No. 393, of Eliot, Me., for creation of a national highways commission and making appropriation for construction and improvement of public highways—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Harry Remer—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BARTLETT of Georgia: Petition of Typographical Union, No. 93, of Macon, Ga., against enactment of S. 1518, revising section 3593 of Revised Statutes of United States—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. BEALL of Texas: Paper to accompany bill for relief of W. C. Short—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, paper to accompany bill for relief of Mrs. Zelica Rich—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BEDE: Petition of John Grant and other citizens of Minnesota, for a national highways commission and appropriation for Federal aid in building highways (H. R. 15837)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. BOOHER: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Charles Thorp—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BURLEIGH: Petition of Local Cigarmakers' Union No. 179, of Bangor, Me., against application to labor unions of the provisions of amendments to the Sherman antitrust law—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CALDER: Petition of Baltimore Clearing House, against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of Standard Finance Company, favoring the Crumpacker bill, relative to fraud orders issued by the Post-Office Department—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of John McDonald, of Brooklyn, N. Y., favoring remedial legislation excluding labor from the provisions of the Sherman antitrust act—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CALDWELL: Petition of Chicago city council, for H. R. 15123 and 15267 and S. 4395, relative to conduct of telegraph companies—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. COOK of Pennsylvania: Petition of Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, favoring H. R. 16091, regulating appointment of pharmacists in the United States—to the Committee on Expenditures in the Treasury Department.

Also, petition of Glass Bottle Blowers' Association, favoring amendment to the Sherman antitrust law—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Baltimore Clearing House, against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of H. Herold & Son, of Philadelphia, for remedial legislation excluding labor from provisions of the Sherman antitrust act—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DAWES: Letters of citizens of McConnellsville, Ohio, favoring passage of H. R. 14783, asking national aid in equipping the militia of the United States—to the Committee on Militia.

By Mr. DUNWELL: Petition of Baltimore Clearing House, against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. ESCH: Petition of city council of Chicago, for H. R. 15123 and S. 4395, relative to conduct of telegraph companies—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. FOSTER of Illinois: Petition of Baltimore Clearing House, against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of Chicago (Ill.) Local Union, Commercial Telegraphers of America, for exemption of labor unions from the operations of the Sherman antitrust law; for the Pearre bill, regulating injunctions; for the employers' liability act, and for the eight-hour law—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FULLER: Petitions of city council of Chicago and Commercial Telegraphers' Union of America, for legislation concerning telegraph companies—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of H. C. Scoville, of Rockford, Ill., for the Fuller bill (H. R. 19250), for a volunteer officers' retired list—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of First National Bank of Ottawa, Ill., against the Aldrich bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. GOULDEN: Petition of A. W. Dodsworth, favoring the immediate enactment of the Stevens bill, placing wood pulp on the free list—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, petition of Baltimore Clearing House, of Baltimore, Md., against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of Edward Smith & Co., of New York City, disapproving of legislation regulating interstate business affecting the sale and interchange of paints—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HALE: Petition of Board of Trade of Knoxville, Tenn., for an appropriation to further industrial education in the United States.

Also, petition of Board of Trade of Knoxville, Tenn., for appropriation of \$100,000 for improvement of the Tennessee and French Broad rivers—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

Also, paper to accompany bill for relief of Jacob G. Carmichael—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. HAYES: Petition of C. A. Parker and 28 other citizens of San Francisco, Cal., for enactment of an Asiatic exclusion law—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. HENRY of Connecticut: Petitions of Vernon, Bloomfield, New Britain, and Whigville granges, all in the State of Connecticut, for the creation of a national highways commission and for appropriation to give Federal aid to the States in highway construction (H. R. 15837)—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HEPBURN: Petition of city council of Chicago, Ill., for legislation requiring time of filing to be placed on telegraph messages and on other subjects affecting telegraph companies—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Charles V. Bently and other citizens of Faragut, Iowa, for legislation giving State control over importations of intoxicating liquors—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LINDBERGH: Petition of Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis, favoring Davis bill, relative to technical secondary education in agriculture—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. LINDSAY: Petition of Sarah Wool Moore, for S. 4812, for regulation of child labor in the District of Columbia—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Security Savings Bank, of Cedar Rapids, for adoption of a simple, purely emergency currency act—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of Chamber of Commerce of New York City, for increase of salaries of district and circuit court judges—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of Chamber of Commerce of New York, against H. R. 19245, as permitting injurious deposits in New York Harbor and adjacent waters—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

Also, petition of Baltimore Clearing House, against Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023)—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. LORIMER: Petition of Popular Mechanics, favoring the Stevens bill, to remove duty on wood pulp—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McKINLEY of Illinois: Petition of certain citizens of Waynesville, Dewitt County, Ill., favoring H. R. 18970, for enlarged homestead grants—to the Committee on the Public Lands.

Also, petition of city council of Chicago, for H. R. 15123, 15267, 15929, and joint resolution 126, relative to conduct of telegraph companies—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MANN: Petition of South Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly, against enactment of S. 1518, revising section 3893 of Revised Statutes of United States—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of Northwestern Lodge, No. 424, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, favoring Clapp free-pass amendment (S. 4260)—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Chicago Credit Men's Association, against the Aldrich currency bill (S. 3023) and in favor of the Fowler bill—to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Also, petition of Ohio Shippers' Association, favoring H. R. 14934 and S. 4914, defining order bills of lading and providing for their legal status—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Chicago Odontographic Society, favoring S. 4432, to reorganize the Corps of Dental Surgeons attached to the Medical Department of the Army—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. RAINEY: Petition of Commercial Telegraphers Union, of Chicago, favoring act exempting labor unions from operations of the antitrust law, etc.—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SLEMP: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Philip Rohr—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SMITH of Michigan: Petition of A. J. Brabazon and 31 others, of Thetford, Mich., for a rural parcels post as per S. 5122—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: Petition by letter of Secretary Garfield, for legislation concerning certain lands in Oklahoma allotted to members of the Five Civilized Tribes—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

Also, paper to accompany H. R. 12900—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.